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Rescuing Mr K. Ballantyne from the burning building on Colombo Street, 
Christchurch  
The worst fire in New Zealand's history occurred on the 18th November 1947 at Ballantynes 
department store in Christchurch.  The fire was first observed by a staff member at 3.35 p.m 
at which time an estimated 250–300 people were shopping at the store, served by a 
reported staff of 458.  In total, 41 people perished in the fire, and these deaths have been 
attributed to the delay in placing the call to the fire brigade and possibly the brigade's 
purported delayed response which occurred at 3.48 p.m1. At its height, there were 19 
appliances in attendance, crewed by 230 fire fighters and armed service personnel2. The 
Royal Commission of Inquiry that followed resulted in the 1949 Fire Services Act which was 
the first attempt at standardisation of the Fire Service. 
Photograph reproduced with permission from Christchurch City Libraries Moore 
Collection 0741, PhotoCD 1, IMG0018 image.  
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The Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) has been in use for over a decade and is used 
regularly throughout Australia and to a lesser extent in New Zealand.  Since November 
2008, the FBIM has been referenced within the New Zealand compliance document C/AS1 
and is accepted by the New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) as a suitable methodology to 
demonstrate the performance requirements of the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) 
relating to fire brigade operations.  However, the FBIM currently has no New Zealand data 
available to reflect NZFS operations.  At present, building designs are using Australian data 
which is potentially dated and which has only undergone limited validation for New Zealand 
conditions.   
An analysis of building consent applications as submitted to the NZFS for review has been 
undertaken with specific emphasis on quantifying the impact of alternative fire engineering 
designs and fire-fighting facilities.  This statistical review has indicated that up to 67% of all 
the fire reports reviewed contained insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with 
the requirements of the NZBC.  For new buildings that contained alternative fire engineering 
designs, the NZFS made recommendations specific to fire-fighting facilities in 63% of the 
reports reviewed.   
A review of international performance-based building codes is provided to compare 
international performance requirements and expectations on responding fire fighters from 
overseas codes.   The NZBC and prescriptive requirements are also discussed for their 
requirements and implications for fire-fighting requirements. 
This project presents data that has been collected from a number of sources including 
specifically designed exercises, NZFS incident statistics, incident video footage and from 
attendance and observation at emergency incidents.  Validation of this data has been 
undertaken against fire ground field experiments and with real emergency incidents attended 
during this research. 
A FBIM is provided based on the data presented in this research using a probabilistic risk-
based approach and Monte-Carlo analysis methods considering a high-rise building 
scenario.  This identifies some of the advantages of using probabilistic methods and the 
FBIM rather than the traditional percentile approach.  An FBIM analysis allows the building 
designer to factor in the effects of fire fighters on the building design and to identify areas of 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Impetus for Research  
 
Fire engineering is a relatively new engineering discipline requiring knowledge of complex 
fire phenomenon to understand its impact on occupants of a building, the surrounding 
environment and the wider community.  To enable performance-based fire engineering 
design to be undertaken appropriately, the gaps that exist in the knowledge of fire science 
and engineering must be filled so that designs can be approached from a holistic basis.  
Currently there are many assumptions made in fire engineering designs which lack the 
understanding of their impact on the outcome of a fire event, be it financial, environmental or 
through injuries and illness caused to building occupants or emergency responders.  In fire 
engineering there is no bigger void that requires filling than that regarding the intervention of 
the emergency services and specifically the impact of responding fire brigades on building 
designs.   
One of the most significant changes made to fire safety regulation in New Zealand was the 
inclusion of the NZFS as a reviewer of alternative building designs required by the Building 
Act 2004 (the Act).   The 2004 Act requires that certain building consent applications be 
provided to the NZFSC for review and to provide advice to Building Consent Authorities with 
respect to means of egress and fire-fighting needs. 
The NZFS Design Review Unit (DRU) began reviewing building consent applications on the 
22nd April 2005.  Before this time, information regarding the design of fire-fighting facilities 
within buildings was unknown to the NZFS and due to the nature of building consent 
processing, unquantifiable.  However, the NZFS was aware through building inspections and 
emergency incidents that buildings were being designed and built that did not meet NZFS 
expectations and fire-fighters‘ needs.  Since 2005, the NZFS have identified that building 
designs submitted for Building Consent frequently ignore the requirements and needs of the 
NZFS within alternative designs.  Further, when dealing with designs that deviate 
significantly from the prescriptive requirements of the NZBC compliance documents, some 
designs that were reviewed were acknowledged by the designer to have completely ignored 
fire-fighting intervention aspects and the impact of the NZFS on the design.  
Whilst there is qualitative evidence to suggest that buildings are becoming more difficult for 
fire fighters to operate within, the potential exists for larger and more complex modern 




The author believes that because of the lack of analysis and assessment regarding fire 
fighting intervention within building designs, this could become a serious problem if the 
current trend to ignore fire-fighting facilities identified within this report continues.  A number 
of designs have been submitted to the NZFS for review which, in this authors opinion, could 
place occupants and fire fighters at an increased level of risk due to the methods of design 
chosen and because the designers ignored the implications of the design on fire fighters 
entering the building.   This perception has also been a finding of other overseas brigades 
involved in the assessment of performance-based fire engineering designs (1). 
The increased use of performance-based design, speed of development of new assessment 
methods and the modern building construction methods, techniques and materials in use is 
outpacing the understanding of the consequences on fire fighting.  The requirements 
presently in place within prescriptive compliance documents and standards for fire-fighting 
equipment and their design intent have typically been based on knowledge of historic 
building performance in fire; therefore, the relevance and adequacy of these requirements 
when used for performance-based designs needs to be questioned.  Additionally the use of 
modern materials, construction methods and designs may also have an impact on the 
assumptions that went into the formulation of the historic prescriptive methods (2). 
Many fire-fighting operational procedures and the requirements they place on building 
designs are prescriptive in nature which is problematic for those striving for pure 
performance-based design.  However, by quantifying the tenability parameters to which fire 
fighters can be subjected to and by setting accepted performance criteria for fire brigade 
operations, the assessment of fire brigade intervention can be undertaken just as it can be 
for occupants escaping from a building.   
Fire fighters have limitations on their ability to fight fires and operate within buildings as 
shown by UK research (3; 4).  Building designs requiring fire fighters to enter deeper into fire 
compartments for prolonged periods and with increased difficulty in reaching the fire floor, as 
with tall buildings, may place fire fighters at greater levels of risk than if the buildings were to 
comply with prescriptive regulations.  Without assessing the impact that designs will have on 
the ability for fire fighters to undertake search and rescue and fire fighting operations and 
without the provision of appropriate equipment, both fire fighters and members of the public 
could be at a greater risk than perceived by current prescriptive documents. The Fire 
Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) (5) provides a methodology that allows the designer to 
quantify the effects of a fire within a building on the responding fire fighters.    
The FBIM, developed by the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council 




brigade operations on building designs.  The FBIM has been in use for nearly a decade and 
is used regularly throughout Australia and to a lesser extent in New Zealand.  Since 
November 2008 the FBIM has been referenced within the New Zealand compliance 
document C/AS1 (6) and is accepted by the NZFS as a suitable methodology to 
demonstrate the performance requirements of the NZBC relating to fire service operations.  
However, the FBIM is still a relatively new tool with no New Zealand data available to reflect 
NZFS operations.  At present, building designs are using Australian data which is potentially 
dated and which has only undergone limited validation for New Zealand conditions.  The 
data being used within the model may not, therefore, represent current NZFS operational 
practices or reflect the New Zealand fire environment. 
The FBIM contains no New Zealand data and has not been scrutinised against NZFS 
standard operating procedures or local fire-fighting tactics that may differ from those 
employed by Australian brigades.  This project aims to provide the statistical data to allow 
the FBIM to be used with confidence in New Zealand. 
 
1.2. Aims and Objectives of this Research 
 
The aim of this project is to collect the necessary data to populate the FBIM and to verify and 
validate the data against real incidents to enable the model to be used with confidence in 
New Zealand. 
The collection, analysis and presentation of the data should also be sufficient to permit its 
use within a probabilistic risk assessment methodology and building design assessment 
methods.   
It would be expected that the FBIM be used in building designs utilising performance-based 
designs or that contain aspects of alternative designs; examples include: 
 performance-based fire engineering designs; 
 
 buildings with large crowd occupancies or with extended evacuation times that will 






 designs which fall outside of the scope of compliance documents or that have 
aspects of alternative designs which have a resultant affect on fire brigade 
intervention; 
  
 buildings located in remote areas or in locations not serviced by fire brigades at the 
same level as that assumed by the compliance documents. 
 
1.3. The Fire Brigade Intervention Model 
 
In response to the introduction of a performance-based building code in Australia in 1996, 
AFAC formed a Performance-Based Fire Engineering Committee. The committee developed 
the FBIM so that fire brigades could ensure that their functional role was maintained in the 
Building Code of Australia.   
The FBIM provides a formal structure for determining fire brigade intervention and 
operations within buildings.  The FBIM is an event-based methodology, which quantifies fire 
brigade responses employed during a fire from time of notification through to control and 
extinguishment and overhaul.  Detailed information is provided within the FBIM user manual 
available from AFAC (5). The FBIM time line is shown in Figure 1 incorporating the AFAC 
description of fire brigade intervention and operations (7). 
 
Fire Brigade Intervention: 
All fire agency activities from time of notification up to fire extinguishment and overhaul and 
includes fire brigade operations. 
 
Fire Brigade Operations: 
All fire-fighter activities from time of arrival at an incident including set up, search and 














Figure 1 AFAC description of fire brigade intervention and operations (7) 
The FBIM was developed for use in building designs so that the functional role of a fire 
brigade could be effectively incorporated into the building design process.  It establishes a 
structured framework to quantify fire brigade activities on a time-line basis.  The FBIM is 
carried out in conjunction with knowledge of typical fire engineering outputs such as fire 
growth, smoke and fire spread, detection and suppression as well as occupant evacuation.  
These outputs influence and modify the activities of the resources of the fire brigade at the 
fire scene and determine if additional resources are required. 
An FBIM analysis allows the user to understand the times associated with each of the main 
critical factors that affect the overall time taken to undertake fire fighting operations within a 
building.  Quantifying these issues informs the user on matters that affect both occupant and 
fire-fighter safety as well as property loss aspects of the design where they will be impacted 
upon by a responding fire brigade. 
The FBIM relies on the completion of 16 flow charts to determine the sequence of events 
and the time taken to perform the relevant fire brigade activities specific to each scenario.  
Some of these tasks are sequential and some are parallel.  The model establishes the 
critical path and thus the length of time to undertake fire brigade operations.  Each flow chart 
represents a specific component of fire brigade intervention during a fire. The FBIM 
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Figure 2 Fire Brigade Intervention Model overview (5) 
 
 
time to notify brigade 
(chart 1)
time to dispatch resources 
(chart 2 & 3)
time to reach kerb side 
(chart 4)
time to access & assess fire 
(chart 5, 6, 7 & 8)
time to travel to set up area 
(chart 9)
time for water set up 
(chart 10 & 11)
time for search & rescue tasks 
(chart 12)
time for other property protection tasks 
(chart 13, 14)
time to control and extinguish fire 
(chart 15)
detection of  fire
brigade receives signal
signal reaches fire station
fire fighters leave station
road travel time
don BA & gather initial equipment
determine fire location fire fighter travel rates
survey fire & building surrounds, 
determine additional resources
initial fire fighter protection
BA control procedures
undertake search & rescue
set up for exposure protection
undertake other property protection 
set up hose streams
water application
travel to set up area
water supply requirements
time for environment protection 
(chart 16)
assess environmental impact





1.4. Existing FBIM Data 
 
To support each of the 16 FBIM charts, section 7 of the FBIM manual (5) provides 30 tables 
labelled A–Z providing statistical distributions and single values for the different times 
required to populate the model.  Except for the five F series tables which provide the 'speed 
data for brigade travel' and are specific to specified brigades within the five different 
Australian states, all of the data provided is assumed to be representative of all Australian 
state fire brigade operational activities.  No data currently provided within the FBIM manual 
was collected from the NZFS or has been verified against current NZFS operational 
procedures.   
The data currently presented within the FBIM manual dates back prior to 1997 and was 
derived using various methods including literature review, statistical collation methods, 
measurement analysis, training practices and the Delphi method as described within the 
manual.  Whilst the age of the data for most activities provided with an associated 
distribution is unlikely to have changed significantly over time, there is likely to have been a 
number of changes to both equipment and operating procedures that could have an effect 
on the accuracy of the data when applied to the current fire ground environment.  Also, with 
there being known differences between the equipment used in Australia and New Zealand 
and with the potential for procedural differences between the respective brigades, the 
applicability of use of the existing FBIM data within New Zealand is uncertain.   
The FBIM computer program user manual (8) provided to aid implementation of the FBIM 
further identifies that the model relies on applicable data specific to the attending fire 
brigade:  
"The fire brigade intervention model relies upon applicable data, which may be 
obtained from the fire brigade fire safety department of the brigade that will attend the 
property in question." 
As the NZFS has no supporting FBIM data, the NZFS have, to date, been recommending 
the use of the FBIM manual data for generic operational tasks and the brigade travel times 
associated with the Melbourne Fire Brigade.   
The FBIM computer program user manual provides five different general uses or "run 
strategies" as examples of the level of analysis which can be undertaken to support fire 
brigade intervention strategies.  These run strategies list the extent of data required to 




 Kerbside arrival 
o This includes the time for the fire brigade units to respond to a call and arrive 
at the fire scene, represented by Charts 1-4. 
 Fire brigade arrival and set-up 
o The time at which the fire brigade will arrive at the fire scene, represented by 
Charts 1-11. 
 Search and rescue 
o fire brigade arrival time including the time taken for search and rescue 
operations to be conducted, represented by Charts 1-12. 
  Protect exposure 
o the time taken for exposure protection to be setup but not completed, 
represented by Charts 1-13. 
  Other strategies 
o Including the time taken for exposure protection to be completed and other 
aspects of fire brigade operations including property protection and protection 
of the environment.  These strategies are completed using Charts 1-16. 
 
From the above and lack of NZFS data it can be seen that even the most basic FBIM 
analysis – kerbside arrival, would produce uncertain results when used in New Zealand.  
This project aims to collect and validate the required data to support any FBIM analysis or 
fire brigade intervention strategy desired.  The following chapters in this project aim to 
provide relevant information and NZFS-specific data to support and validate the use of the 





CHAPTER 2. Fire-Fighting Needs and Building-Design Requirements 




Building designs have traditionally been required to provide sufficient facilities to support fire 
fighting operations based on the requirements of the attending fire brigades.  These 
requirements are dependent on their level of resources, equipment type and methods 
employed when fighting fires. In New Zealand these have historically followed on from those 
predominately established in the United Kingdom.  Assumptions regarding fire brigade 
attendance and the implications this has on building design has been evident for decades in 
guidance documents such as the UK Post War Building Studies published in 1952 (9).  Any 
fire brigade operations in buildings will be reliant on the limitations provided by the 
equipment being used and the fire fighters who themselves have limitations on their ability to 
perform for extended durations in the fire environment.  Prescriptive building design 
requirements have traditionally recognised the limitations of fire fighters by requiring 
sufficient facilities internally and externally to the building to facilitate their needs.  These 
have included access requirements to building perimeters, the provision of internal fire-
fighting equipment and access provisions to support expeditious fire-fighting activities in 
places of relative safety.   
To ensure that the needs of the fire service are provided within a building using 
performance-based design methods, an understanding of the responding fire brigade and 
relevant legislation must exist.  Only with an understanding of fire brigade operations and 
how a fire brigade uses the fire-fighting facilities provided within buildings, together with 
legislative requirements, can a designer ensure that the level of safety provided to the 
building, its occupants, fire fighters and the environment is provided at least to the same 
level as that implicit within the NZBC performance requirements.  Therefore, an 
understanding of the legislation that drives the requirements for both the fire brigades and 
the building design must be understood.  The Building Act of 1991 which introduced 
performance-based design, consolidated a wide range of building legislation and simplified 
building construction requirements.  The 1991 Act has since been superseded for various 
reasons, but of significance was the introduction of the NZFS into the building design review 
process within the 2004 Act.  The following sections provide a brief introduction to the NZFS, 
the Fire Service Act (1975) and the Building Act, Building Regulations and NZBC and how 
they impact on the design requirements in a performance-based building environment.  It 




such as the Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 2006 and the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 are not covered below. 
  
2.2. New Zealand Fire Service Introduction and Legislation 
 
Two separate statutes, the Fire Service Act 1975 and the Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977, 
establish the governance, management and operational arrangements for protecting life and 
property from fire in New Zealand. From a fire-fighting perspective, the fire environment in 
New Zealand consists of two distinct categories: the built environment, known as urban fire 
districts (UFD) and the land environment, or rural fire districts (RFD).  UFD typically include 
those areas containing industrial, commercial and residential structures, community 
infrastructure and social amenities.  RFD comprise large areas of cultivated crops, plantation 
forestry, forest and land reserved for conservation.  RFD also include isolated dwellings and 
rural amenities.  
Inside UFD responsibility for the prevention, suppression and extinction of all classes of fires 
rests with the national commander of the NZFS and the chief fire officer of the fire district.  
UFD are covered by a single national agency (NZFS) responsible for emergency response 
across almost all urban areas, The NZFS currently comprises the following resources. 
 345 gazetted UFD, each with a statutory officer authorised to exercise prescribed 
powers within the fire district.  
 436 fire stations and their associated plant and equipment. 
 Approximately 1,700 career firefighters, 8,000 volunteer firefighters, 85 specialist fire 
safety officers and 10 professional fire engineers.  
 800 fire appliances and operational response equipment for dealing with fires and 
other emergencies.  
 Three communication centres with 75 staff who receive emergency calls from the 
111 system and private fire alarm monitoring systems and dispatch resources from 
local fire stations to emergencies.  
 A national headquarters located in Wellington; eight regional offices and 25 area 
offices located around New Zealand to provide leadership and support services via 





Within RFD, responsibility for managing all types of fire rests with the relevant rural fire 
authority. Rural fire authorities include territorial authorities, the Department of 
Conservation, the New Zealand Defence Forces and special purpose collectives of the 
aforementioned entities together with plantation forest companies.  There are 86 rural fire 
authorities who are responsible for response to vegetation wildfires in association with the 
NZFS who can respond to non-fire emergencies and fires in a RFD.  The work of these rural 
fire authorities is coordinated by the office of the National Rural Fire Authority (NRFA). 
The NRFA currently comprises the following resources: 
 The national rural fire officer and five regional rural fire managers.  
 National fire weather monitoring system.  
 National alerting capability through the three communication centres shared with the 
UFD.  
 Three national incident management teams.  
 Funding for grants to fire authorities for equipment and appliances.  
 
As this project is primarily focused on urban built environment issues no further detail on the 
Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977 is provided. 
 
 
2.2.1. Fire Service Act 1975 
 
The NZFS is governed by the Fire Service Act 1975.  This Act places specific functions on 
the NZFS including those concerning the protection of life and property as set out within 
section 28 of the Act:  
28. Functions, duties, and powers of Chief Fire Officer 
(2) In the event of any alarm of fire or any fire happening, the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire 
District, or in his or her absence, the Deputy Chief Fire Officer, or, in the absence of both 
of them, the person for the time being in charge of the fire service, shall forthwith 
proceed, or direct some other member of the brigade to proceed forthwith, to the place to 
which the brigade has been called, and endeavour by all practicable means to extinguish 





Whilst this Act does not specifically require protection of the environment; NZFS policies 
require that protection of the environment be afforded and taken into account and 
recognised within fire-fighting operations, including such issues as fire-fighting run-off water 
and discharges made at fires. 
 
2.3. Building Act 2004 
 
Requirements of the Building Act surrounding fire-fighting needs are central to the FBIM and 
its implementation.  Of significance is that the Act specifically recognises fire fighters as 
occupants of a building and that the building must be durable for its intended use which 
includes the life safety of fire fighters during fire emergencies. 
Part 1 Preliminary provisions 
4. Principles to be applied in performing functions or duties, or exercising 
powers, under this Act 
(2) In achieving the purpose of this Act, a person to whom this section applies must 
take into account the following principles that are relevant to the performance of 
functions or duties imposed, or the exercise of powers conferred, on that person by 
this Act: 
(c) the importance of ensuring that each building is durable for its intended 
use: 
The Building Act goes on to define intended use in relation to a building as: 
(a) includes any or all of the following: 
(iii) activities undertaken in response to fire or any other reasonably 
foreseeable emergency; 
However, the most relevant section of the Act pertaining to fire service operations is section 
4(2)(h) that states that one such principle that must be applied is: 
 
―The reasonable expectations of a person who is authorised by law to enter a 
building to undertake rescue operations or fire fighting to be protected from injury or 




It should be noted that ‗reasonable‘ in this case relates to the expectations of the fire fighter 
to be protected, and not, as many designers would have it, to whether or not the fire fighter 
should enter the building.  This emphasises the fact that the performance requirements of 
the NZBC C3.3.9 are mandatory, and that designers must therefore give them due 
consideration when preparing a fire engineering analysis for any building. 
Section 16 and 17 in part 2 of the Act requires that building work must comply with the 
NZBC. 
Part 2 Building 
s16 Building code: purpose 
The Building Code prescribes functional requirements for buildings and the 
performance criteria with which buildings must comply in their intended use. 
s17 All building work must comply with building code 
All building work must comply with the Building Code to the extent required by this 
Act, whether or not a building consent is required in respect of that building work. 
 
2.4. New Zealand Building Code 
 
New Zealand was one of the first countries to adopt a performance-based building code in 
1992.  Before this time, prescriptive building requirements describing how a building must be 
designed and constructed were set out within a model building bylaw known as ‗NZS1900‘ 
Chapter 5 (10).  NZS 1900 was adopted and enforced by most local authorities prior to the 
introduction of the 1991 Building Act.  Contrary to prescriptive regulations, a performance-
based code states how a building and its components must perform.  A performance-based 
approach is therefore intended to provide flexibility, innovation and uniqueness and with 
specific regard to fire safety should offer benefits that a prescriptive code cannot provide for, 
these include: 
 allowing for innovative design; 
 an overall higher standard of fire safety in buildings; 
 allowing for the safety levels for alternative designs to be compared; 




 flexibility of choice and specification leading to cost-effective fire safety and 
protection measures; 
 increased and better communication with the stakeholders involved in the design and 
construction process, including the emergency services; 
 maximising efficiencies through eliminating redundant safety features whilst 
maintaining safety standards. 
 
As with most performance-based building codes, the structure of New Zealand‘s Building 
Code specifies a specific objective of the code and sets performance requirements that must 
be followed to demonstrate compliance with the code.  The structure of the NZBC is set out 
below as given by the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) (11). 
The NZBC consists of two preliminary clauses and 35 technical clauses. Each technical 
clause contains: 
An objective – the social objective that completed building work must achieve  
A functional requirement – what the completed building work must do to satisfy the 
social objective  
Performance criteria – qualitative or quantitative criteria which nominates how far 
the completed building work must go in order to comply. 
 
The Act requires that all building work must satisfy the NZBC and must comply with the 
performance requirements of the Code.  Demonstrating compliance with the code can 
therefore be done by any means.  Compliance documents establish one method of 
complying with these performance requirements, the other is by way of an alternative 
solution.  These two compliance paths are discussed further in sections 2.5 and 2.6.   
Selected parts specifically relating to the fire brigade intervention requirements of the NZBC 
follow (where words in italics are specifically designed terms). 
Clause C2—MEANS OF ESCAPE 
OBJECTIVE  
C2.1 The objective of this provision is to: 




FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT  
C2.2 Buildings shall be provided with means of escape from fire which:  
(b) Give Fire Service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue operations.  
PERFORMANCE  
C2.3.1 The number of open paths available to each person escaping to an exitway or 
final exit shall be appropriate to:  
(d) The fire safety systems installed in the firecell.  
C2.3.2 The number of exitways or final exits available to each person shall be 
appropriate to:  
(e) The fire safety systems installed in the building.  
Clause C3–SPREAD OF FIRE 
OBJECTIVE 
C3.1 The objective of this provision is to:  
(b) Provide protection to Fire Service personnel during firefighting operations.  
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT  
C3.2 Buildings shall be provided with safeguards against fire spread so that:  
(b) Fire fighters may undertake rescue operations and protect property, 
PERFORMANCE  
C3.3.1 Interior surface finishes on walls, floors, ceilings and suspended building 
elements, shall resist the spread of fire and limit the generation of toxic gases, smoke 
and heat, to a degree appropriate to:  
 (d) The active fire safety systems installed in the building.  
C3.3.9 The fire safety systems installed shall facilitate the specific needs of Fire 
Service personnel to:  
(a) Carry out rescue operations, and 




Clause C4—STRUCTURAL STABILITY DURING FIRE 
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT 
C4.2 Buildings shall be constructed to maintain structural stability during fire to: 
(b) Allow fire service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue and firefighting 
operations. 
PERFORMANCE 
C4.3.1 Structural elements of buildings shall have fire resistance appropriate to the 
function of the elements, the fire load, the fire intensity, the fire hazard, the height of 
the buildings and the fire control facilities external to and within them. 
 
The most explicit performance requirement relating to the fire brigade is that of C3.3.9.  The 
term ‗fire safety systems‘ is defined in the Building Regulations as ―The combination of all 
methods used in a building to warn people of an emergency, provide for safe evacuation, 
and restrict the spread of fire, and includes both active and passive protection‖.  This 
definition has the same meaning and wording as the definition of ‗fire safety precautions‘ in 
C/AS1. 
Otherwise, the other requirements only relate to the fire safety systems required to be 
installed.  It is also noted that there are no performance requirements specific to fire brigade 
intervention required to meet clause C4 of the NZBC.  However, this does not imply that 
structural fire ratings are not required to facilitate fire brigade operations as fire control 
facilities are considered to include the fire service.  This can be seen in Determination 
2001/5 (12) in which the Building Industry Authority (BIA), later replaced by the Department 
of Building and Housing (DBH), referred to both NZBC Clause C3.3.9 and to Clause C4.3.1 
when dealing with the matter of protecting fire fighters from structural collapse.  Clause 
C4.3.1 states that: 
Structural elements of buildings shall have fire resistance appropriate to the function 
of the elements, the fire load, the fire intensity, the fire hazard, the height of the 
buildings and the fire control facilities external to and within them. 
 
The BIA took the view that C4.3.1 required such fire resistance to be appropriate to the 
function of allowing fire brigade personnel adequate time to undertake fire-fighting 
operations.  The BIA did not accept that the life of a fire fighter is to be safeguarded only 




property.  The determination stated that it was enough that the fire fighter was in or around 
the building for the purpose of activities taken in response to fire or other emergencies as 
mentioned in the definition of ―intended use‖.  The BIA concluded that in order to comply with 
the building code, the building elements concerned must have fire resistance ratings 
appropriate for the protection of fire fighters. That does not necessarily mean that the ratings 
must be those specified in the Acceptable Solution and indicated that an appropriate 
analysis could demonstrate that lower fire resistance ratings could meet the performance 
requirements of the NZBC. 
 
2.5. The Acceptable Solution, C/AS1 
 
The Acceptable Solution C/AS1 (6) provides a means of complying with the fire safety 
requirements of the NZBC.  Section 8 of C/AS1 is specific to fire fighting and contains 
provisions for fire-fighting facilities including, specifically, vehicular access, internal fire 
hydrants, hose reels, fire systems centres, lift control and communication systems.  
However, requirements specific to fire brigade intervention can also be found throughout the 
remaining parts of C/AS1.  Clear examples include the limitations on fire cell floor areas in 
clause 4.2.3 which are required to ‗assist fire-fighting operations‘.  Other clauses of the 
document also make assumptions based on the ability of the fire service to intervene 
effectively as can be seen within the comment to clause 7.3.15.  This comment states that 
radiation criteria used to control external fire spread within the said document are based on 
the historic ability of the fire service to control fires and prevent external fire spread, 
indicating that C/AS1 assumes a minimum level of attendance and availability of the fire 
service.  Another well known requirement relating specifically to fire service limitations is the 
restriction on single internal escape routes for buildings over 25 m (cl.3.15.3).  This limitation 
was originally based on the limited ability of the fire service to enter buildings externally and 
was derived from the limitations of fire appliances with 100 ft ladders (13).  It is interesting to 
note that modern fire aerial appliances are typically still specified on the basis that they only 
need to reach to buildings constructed up to this height.  
Other than the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) (14) no direct reference to 
the FBIM existed within the NZBC or compliance documents prior to November 2008.  
However, the latest amendment to C/AS1 specifically references the use of the FBIM and 
was a significant step on behalf of the DBH in recognising the FBIM.  The FBIM comment 





Roof venting systems such as drop-out panels, louver vents or ridge venting shall be 
designed and proven for the purpose of facilitating firefighting operations. The 
Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council's Fire Brigade 
Intervention Model (www.afac.com.au/awsv2/ learning/fbim.htm) provides guidance 
on performance criteria for fire fighters. Less than 15% roof area for venting may be 
acceptable if total system performance can be demonstrated. 
 
It is also important to note that within the scope of C/AS1, clause 1.1.2 states that it is 
appropriate for 'simple, low rise buildings.'  It therefore needs to be questioned how 
applicable the compliance document is, especially with respect to fire-fighting facilities when 
dealing with design of buildings that are not 'simple, low rise buildings.' 
The Acceptable Solution C/AS1 is currently undergoing a major review and is expected to 
address some of the issues raised within this project. 
 
2.6. Alternative solutions 
 
The Department of Building and Housing (DBH) provides guidance on what constitutes 
alternative solutions (or specific design) on its website (15).  It states that:  
An alternative solution is a building design, of all or part of a building, that 
demonstrates compliance with the Building Code. It can include a material, 
component or construction method that differs completely or partially from those 
described in the Compliance Documents. 
 
As C/AS1 is not a mandatory document, the DBH endorses the use of the IFEG for guidance 
on appropriate process and methodology for developing and reporting fire engineering 
Alternative Solutions. The DBH released the IFEG in 2005 as a guidance document under 
section 175 of the Building Act 2004 (16).  The IFEG provides a process for developing fire-
engineering solutions using international best practice which has also been endorsed by the 
NZFS and the Institute of Professional Engineers New Zealand.  These documents provide a 
process to undertake fire engineering and methodologies that can be used, including the 




engineering design work' (17).  Both the IFEG and DBH provide a number of approaches 
and methods of analysis including: 
 comparative or absolute; 
 qualitative or quantitative; 
 deterministic or probabilistic. 
 
For compliance with the fire safety requirements of the NZBC it is typical for alternative 
solutions to only consider minor alterations from the requirements of the compliance 
documents.  It is rare for designs produced in New Zealand to be derived from a total 
performance approach and/or to deviate significantly from the compliance documents.   
Therefore, it is common to see the identified non-compliance aspects reviewed in isolation 
from the other requirements of the compliance documents.  This is problematic in itself as 
most prescriptive requirements have been derived or based on assumptions about the 
interaction and effectiveness of the other requirements.  Little or, in most cases, no guidance 
or explanation is provided to explain what formed the basis of the requirements or what 




The NZFS maintains that the prescriptive compliance documents provide a benchmark as to 
the level of safety required to achieve the performance requirements of the NZBC.  In 
Determinations taken by the NZFS, concerns have been raised and upheld by the DBH that 
designs have ignored fire fighters as occupants of the building within the alternative designs 
put forward.  As well as Determination 2001/5 (18), another recent example includes 
Determination 2009/100 (19) regarding the structural stability of a high-rise office building.  
Within this determination it specifically notes NZFS concerns regarding the proposed 
structural fire ratings and their relationship to fire-fighter safety: 
"Allowing C6.10.5 to take precedence takes absolutely no account of what is above 
the car park, and therefore fails to recognise any consequences of structural failure in 
terms of the threat to the life of occupants, people in the vicinity and, most 







CHAPTER 3. A Statistical Review of Fire Engineering Designs 




This chapter provides the statistics associated with the Building Consent applications 
reviewed to date by the NZFS Design Review Unit (DRU) specifically with regards to the 
assessment of fire-fighting facilities.  They are intended to support the ongoing concerns that 
have been raised in New Zealand and internationally regarding the impact of fire engineering 
on fire service needs and to support the need for the use of the FBIM together with the 
research presented herein. 
The Building Act 2004 requires that certain building consent applications be provided to the 
NZFSC and enables the Commission to provide advice to Building Consent Authorities with 
respect to the following matters: 
(a) provisions for means of escape from fire; 
(b) the needs of persons who are authorised by law to enter the building to 
undertake fire fighting. 
 
The NZFSC were included in the 2004 Act for a number of reasons, one of which included 
ensuring that departures from the compliance documents relating to fire-fighting facilities 
were approved by the NZFSC and not the Building Consent Authorities (20).  This work is 
undertaken for the NZFSC by the DRU.   
The DRU was established in 2005 and began reviewing building consent applications on 
22nd April of that year.  Before this time, information regarding the design of fire-fighting 
facilities in buildings was unknown and due to the nature of building consent processing, 
unquantifiable. The DRU receives and reviews on average 48 building consent applications 
a month.  At the time of writing this report, approximately 3,000 designs had been reviewed 
by the DRU, of which 1,200 have been specifically reviewed in this project for the purposes 
of gaining statistics relating to fire-fighting facilities. 
Additional findings are also presented which potentially impact on fire brigade operations on 
a holistic basis.  For example, where the DRU has provided recommendations with regards 




undertaken and recommendations made, these statistics have also been collected and 
presented.  
 
3.1.1. Data Collection 
 
The statistics presented within this report have been collated using simplistic yes/no 
sampling.  All of the DRU memorandums produced have been specifically reviewed to 
ascertain whether any recommendations have been made that have an effect on fire brigade 
operations.  This includes issues specific to fire-fighting facilities and also issues that may 
have a detrimental effect on the ability of the NZFS to undertake its statutory functions 
including search and rescue and fire fighting.  Statistics relating to fire-fighting facilities have 
been collected based on the recommendations provided to Building Consent Authorities 
within the DRU memorandums.  The statistics have been broken down into five categories 
which reflect the main requirements of fire-fighting facilities within the compliance 
documents, C/AS1.   
1. Recommendations regarding and taking into account any fire-fighting facilities that 
have been commented upon.  This includes any recommendations that the DRU has 
provided that specifically affect fire-fighting operations, such as the provision of fire 
service lift controls, fire cell size limitations etc.  These figures include other 
recommendations that have been specifically identified and segregated, including: 
 
2. Recommendations specifically regarding the provision of building fire hydrants. 
 
3. Recommendations specifically regarding the requirements for vehicle access which 
incorporates the identification of any attendance points including the location of Fire 
Alarm Panel (FAP) locations.  Vehicular access and alarm panel requirements have 
been captured together as typically identification of the placement of a FAP 
placement infers the location of any attendance point and vice versa. 
 
4. Submissions where no information at all regarding fire-fighting facilities is provided 
but considered necessary by the DRU to demonstrate compliance with the 





Fire reports often provide no details whatsoever regarding fire-fighting facilities.  For new 
buildings, such requirements are necessary, but this is not always the case for certain 
buildings undergoing minor alternations, not affecting fire-fighting requirements. 
To capture the holistic aspects of building design another category has been provided which 
includes: 
5. Submissions where the DRU considered that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC with regards to any 




3.2.1. DRU Building Consent Applications by Type 
 
Building consent applications can be divided into three categories requiring different levels of 
DRU review in accordance with the Act.  It is important to recognise the effect that these 
different requirements place on the consideration of fire-fighting needs and specific facilities 
as existing buildings may not need consideration of fire-fighting facilities to the same extent 
as new buildings.  This factor would need to be recognised within any FBIM assessment so 
these statistics have been separated into the different categories dependent on the 
requirements placed upon it by the Building Act. 
The different requirements include: 
 New building work assessed in accordance with s.17 of the Act.  S.17 requires all 
new building work to comply with all clauses of the NZBC. 
 
 Existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use assessed in accordance with s.115 
(b) of the Act. 
 
 Existing buildings undergoing alterations assessed in accordance with s.112 of the 
Act. 
 
For existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use, s.115 of the Act requires that such 
buildings comply with the NZBC aspects that relate to means of escape from fire, protection 




Fire-fighting facilities are required to be considered under s.115 of the Act only where their 
provision relates to the means of escape from fire, protection of other property, structural 
performance or the fire-rating performance of the building. 
For buildings undergoing alterations, there are further subcategories which need to be 
considered with respect to how the consent application should be assessed.  
 Existing buildings undergoing alterations assessed in accordance with s.112 (1) of 
the Act. 
 
 Existing buildings undergoing alterations and additions assessed in accordance with 
s.112 of the Act.  It should be noted that the NZFS typically undertakes assessment 
of additions in accordance with s.17 of the Act 
 
 Existing buildings undergoing alterations assessed in accordance with s.112 (2) of 
the Act.  It should be noted that alterations undertaken in accordance with s.112 (2) 
of the Act need not comply with the requirements of the NZBC if: 
 
(a)  the building was required to comply with the relevant provisions of the 
building code, the alteration would not take place; and 
(b)  the alteration will result in improvements to attributes of the building 
that relate to: 
(i) means of escape from fire; or 
(ii) access and facilities for persons with disabilities; and 
(c)  the improvements referred to in paragraph (b) outweigh any detriment 
that is likely to arise as a result of the building not complying with the relevant 
provisions of the building code. 
 
It is important to note that buildings undergoing alterations are only required to comply, 'as 
nearly as is reasonably practicable' with the provisions of the NZBC that relate to the means 
of escape from fire and access and facilities for persons with disabilities.  Fire-fighting 
facilities not related to the means of escape from fire do not require assessment and are not 




Collation of statistics from the DRU memorandums is ongoing.  To date, over 1200 
(approximately 42%) of the consents received have been reviewed.  Figure 3 summarises 
the breakdown by type of consent applications submitted to the DRU.  
 
Figure 3 DRU consent type breakdown 
The breakdown of Building Consent applications by type assessed by the DRU is as follows: 
 new (proposed) buildings accounted for 40% of submissions; 
 existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use accounted for 13; 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration accounted for 47%. 
 
Of the 47% of applications for buildings undergoing alterations for all submissions: 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration accounted for 12%; 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration including Additions accounted for 34%; 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration considered to be an upgrade accounted 
for 1%. 
 
For all consent applications, the DRU provided recommendations in 86% of all the 
submissions.  From this it could be concluded that the DRU considered that the design 
information submitted for review had demonstrated compliance with the relevant 
performance requirements of the NZBC in 14% or approximately 170 of the submissions. 
The associated breakdown of memorandums considered to demonstrate compliance with 





Figure 4 DRU memorandums provided with no recommendations 
The percentage of DRU memorandums in which no recommendations were provided is as 
follows: 
 all Building Consent submissions – 14%; 
 new (proposed) buildings – 13%; 
 existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use – 16%; 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration: 
o Alterations only – 23%; 
o Alteration and Additions – 14%; 
o Upgrades s.112(2) – 73%. 
 
The DRU also considered that there was not enough information provided to establish and 
demonstrate compliance with the NZBC in 67% of all submissions.  Information indentifying 









3.3. Fire-fighting Facilities 
 
This section provides the statistics specifically relating to fire-fighting facilities identified in 
DRU memorandums. 
3.3.1. All Submissions 
 
Statistics from all DRU memorandums specific to fire-fighting facilities are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Fire-fighting facilities questioned within all DRU memorandums 
Analysis of the DRU memorandums produced the following findings. 
 Recommendations regarding fire-fighting facilities were made in 47% of 
memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding fire hydrants were made in 21% of memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding attendance points including FAP locations were made 
in 25% of memorandums. 
 Of significant concern is that in 16% of all submissions, no information at all 
regarding fire-fighting facilities was provided, but was considered necessary to 
demonstrate compliance with the NZBC.  
 Sixty-seven percent contained advice stating that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC and recommended 





3.3.2. New Buildings  
 
Statistics from DRU memorandums for new buildings specific to fire-fighting facilities are 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Fire-fighting facilities questioned within DRU memorandums for new 
buildings 
Analysis of the DRU memorandums for new buildings produced the following findings. 
 Recommendations regarding fire-fighting facilities were made in 63% of 
memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding fire hydrants were made in 31% of memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding attendance points including FAP locations were made 
in 37% of memorandums. 
 In 23% of all submissions for new buildings, no information at all regarding fire-
fighting facilities was provided. 
 Sixty-six percent contained advice stating that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC and recommended 







3.3.3. Buildings Undergoing a Change of Use 
 
Statistics from DRU memorandums for buildings undergoing a Change of Use specific to 
fire-fighting facilities are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Fire-fighting facilities questioned within DRU memorandums for buildings 
undergoing a Change of Use 
Analysis of the DRU memorandums for buildings undergoing a Change of Use produced the 
following findings. 
 Recommendations regarding fire-fighting facilities were made in 50% of 
memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding fire hydrants were made in 18% of memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding attendance points including FAP locations were for new 
buildings in 28% of memorandums. 
 In 15% of all submissions, no information at all regarding fire-fighting facilities was 
provided. 
 Seventy-four percent contained advice stating that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC and recommended 







3.3.4. Buildings Undergoing Alterations 
 
3.3.4.1. Alterations Only 
 
For existing buildings undergoing Alterations only, fire-fighting facilities are not specifically 
required to be considered under s.112 of the Act.  However, where such fire-fighting facilities 
are considered to be relevant to the means of escape from a building, such as when fire-
fighting facilities are provided to support NZFS search and rescue operations, the DRU will 
provide comment as considered necessary.  These figures are shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Fire-fighting facilities questioned within DRU memorandums for buildings 
undergoing an Alteration 
Analysis of the DRU memorandums for buildings undergoing Alterations produced the 
following findings. 
 Recommendations regarding fire-fighting facilities were made in 38% of 
memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding fire hydrants were made in 12% of memorandums. 
 Recommendations regarding attendance points including FAP locations were made 
in 14% of memorandums. 





 Seventy-one percent contained advice stating that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC and recommended 
that further information be supplied. 
 
 
3.3.4.2. Alterations  and Additions 
 
For buildings undergoing Alterations and Additions, where significant additions should be 
treated as for new buildings and comply with all the requirements of the NZBC, issues 
specific to fire-fighting facilities are shown in Figure 9. 
  
 
Figure 9 Fire-fighting facilities questioned within DRU memorandums for buildings 
undergoing Alterations including an Addition 
Analysis of the DRU memorandums for buildings undergoing Alterations and Additions 
produced the following findings. 
 Recommendations regarding fire-fighting facilities were made in 33% of 
memorandums. 
 Recommendations specifically regarding fire hydrants were made in 16% of 
memorandums. 
 Recommendations specifically regarding attendance points including FAP locations 




 In 9% of all submissions, no information at all regarding fire-fighting facilities were 
provided. 
 Sixty-five percent contained advice stating that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC and recommended 
that further information be supplied. 
 
3.3.4.3. Alterations Considered as Upgrades 
 
For buildings undergoing Alterations and treated in accordance with s.112 (2) of the Act and 
considered to represent upgrades to the building, issues specific to fire-fighting facilities are 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10 Fire-fighting facilities questioned within DRU memorandums for buildings 
undergoing alterations considered to be upgrades 
Analysis of the DRU memorandums for buildings undergoing Alterations in accordance with 
s.112 (2) of the Act produced the following findings. 
 Recommendations regarding fire-fighting facilities were provided in 5% of 
memorandums. 
 The DRU did not raise any recommendations regarding internal fire hydrants. 





 In 5% of all submissions, no information at all regarding fire-fighting facilities were 
provided. 
 Twenty-three percent contained advice stating that the documentation contained 
insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC and recommended 
that further information be supplied. 
 
3.4. Additional Findings impacting on Fire-fighting Response  
 
3.4.1.  Structural Fire Ratings 
 
Recommendations regarding the adequacy or specification associated with structural fire 
ratings are shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 Recommendations regarding structural fire rating requirements  
The findings indicate that within the DRU memorandums, recommendations were made 
regarding structural fire rating requirements as follows: 
 all Building Consent submissions – 17%; 
 new (proposed) buildings – 26%; 
 existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use – 17%; 
 existing buildings undergoing Alterations: 
o Alterations only – 7%; 
o Alteration and Additions – 12%; 




3.4.2. Computer Modelling 
 
Computer fire models3 are typically used to model fire development and as part of an egress 
analysis to demonstrate that occupants can safely egress from a fire compartment before 
the conditions within the compartment become life threatening.  The robustness and quality 
of any design reliant on fire modelling to predict the fire environment can be affected by 
many factors.  Those raised by the DRU with respect to the use and reliance on fire 
modelling typically include: 
 the use of models outside of their validated limits; 
 the use of unsubstantiated and unreferenced input parameters relevant to the 
subject building, such as design fire size, fire growth rate and combustion 
parameters etc.; 
 the use of unsubstantiated and unreferenced tenability criteria.  
 
Consent application using fire models to demonstrate compliance with the performance 
requirements of the NZBC accounted for 230 (21%) of the submissions reviewed as part of 
this review.  The breakdowns by type of consent submission are shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 Building consent submissions using computer fire modelling 
                                               
3
 This definition does not include hand calculation methods or more advanced methods requiring the 




The breakdown by type of consent in which computer fire models were used is as follows: 
 all Building Consent submissions – 23%; 
 new (proposed) buildings – 31%; 
 existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use – 13%; 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration: 
o Alterations only – 20%; 
o Alteration and Additions – 18%; 
o Upgrades s.112(2) – 5%. 
 
Figure 13 shows the percentage of consents containing fire modelling which were also 
provided with recommendations regarding the modelling. 
 
 
Figure 13 Percentage of recommendations made in submissions using computer fire 
modelling 
The percentage of recommendations made within DRU memorandums regarding the use of 
fire models is as follows: 
 All Building Consent submissions – 76%; 
 New (proposed) buildings – 74%; 
 Existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use – 74%; 




o Alterations only – 73%; 
o Alteration and Additions – 70%; 
o Upgrades s.112(2) – 100%.4 
 
Of the 230 building consent submissions reviewed that used computer fire models, the 
following findings present the breakdown of the different types of fire models used within the 
submissions. 
 Zone models accounted for 158 or 69% of submissions with the following 
breakdown: 
o BRANZFIRE – 126 or 55%  
o CFAST – 20 or 9% 
o Firewind, Hot layer sub program – 12 or 5%. 
 
 CFD models using only FDS accounted for 29 or 13% of submissions. 
 Other models accounted for 60 or 26% of submissions with the following 
breakdown: 
o Firewind – 26 or 11% 
o Misc – 34 or 15%. 
 
3.4.3. Management Procedures  
 
The NZFS generally considers that there is an over-reliance on the use of management 
procedures and often sees the use of management procedures as compensating for the lack 
of provision of fire safety precautions required by C/AS1.  An example would be the reliance 
on building staff to close fire doors rather than providing doors with the correct automatic 
closing mechanisms. The percentage of submissions reviewed for which the DRU provided 
recommendations with regards to the reliance on management procedures are shown in 
Figure 14. 
                                               
4
 Only one submission presented a computer fire modelling to demonstrate compliance for an 





Figure 14 Recommendations made within DRU memorandums specific to management 
procedures 
 
Recommendations regarding the use of management procedures were made in the following 
percentages of DRU memorandums: 
 all Building Consent submissions – 5%; 
 new (proposed) buildings – 5%; 
 existing buildings undergoing a Change of Use – 5%; 
 existing buildings undergoing an Alteration: 
o Alterations only – 7%; 
o Alteration and Additions – 3%; 
o Upgrades s.112(2) – 0%. 
 
3.4.4. Water Supplies for Fire Fighting 
 
The provision of water supplies for fire fighting is essential to ensuring the NZFS can 
undertake its legislative role adequately and safely.  Building consent applications do not 
typically indicate if adequate5 water for fire fighting is to be provided.  Water supply 
provisions are regulated under the Resource Management Act and not the Building Act; 
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thus, most fire reports consider that it is outside of the scope of a building consent 
application to consider water supplies for fire-fighting purposes.  When the DRU began 
providing memorandums in 2005, recommendations regarding water supplies were 
provided.  The recommendations ceased after the DRU was given specific advice from the 
DBH not to provide recommendations relating to water supply requirements.  This issue is a 
concern for the NZFS as it is difficult to confirm if existing and new buildings are provided 
with sufficient water supplies to meet the needs of the NZFS without undertaking resource-
intensive on-site testing after completion of the building.  A critical part of the FBIM is to 
ensure that the water provisions on site are sufficient to meet the needs of the fire service 
given the size of the fire upon arrival and depending on the activities required of the fire 
service. 
Whilst it is considered rare for building consent applications to address fire-fighting water 
supplies, an example of what is considered to be acceptable by some engineers in the 
industry follows.  Within a recent Determination application dealing with the safety of fire 
fighters within a large cool store complex in excess of 5,000 m2, the fire engineer asserted 
that approximately 4,000 litres (4 m3) of water (the amount carried by the two NZFS 
appliances that would attend a fire in this particular location) would be deemed adequate to 
satisfy the requirements of the compliance documents and therefore the Act.  This volume of 
water would not be sufficient to support any fire-fighting activities within a building of this size 
and construction. Of significant concern would be the implications of the NZFS not being 
able to source further water supplies at an incident at this building.  In the event that fire-
fighting activities requiring personnel to enter the building were required without sufficient 
water supplies being available, any personnel operating within the building would be at risk.   
To rectify this problem, the DBH is considering placing additional performance requirements 
into the future version of the NZBC specifically dealing with fire-fighting water supplies (21).  
For the purposes of this research, it should be noted that an FBIM analysis would identify the 
water requirements required to support fire-fighting operations specific to the nature of the 
building being assessed. 
 
3.4.5. Reports Sent to the DRU against the Advice of the Report Author 
 
In accordance with s.46 of the Act, the type of building consent application that must be 
referred to the NZFSC is specified in the Gazette notice dated 24 March 2005.  The Gazette 




to which building consent applications are required to be sent to the NZFSC and which are 
not.  The requirements of the Gazette notice are listed in Appendix A. 
Commentary to this section of the Act provided by 'Brookers Online' states that: 
In practice, that appears to mean that the only applications for building consent that need 
not be copied to the Fire Service are: 
 buildings designed to comply with the Acceptable Solution or verification methods for 
fire safety (C/AS1), emergency lighting (F6/AS1 or F6/VM1), and signs (F8/AS1); 
 single household units; 
 terraced or town houses; 
 sheds or other outbuildings; and 
 building work that has only a minor effect on a fire safety system. Such work would 
include the alteration of the tone or type of sounding or visual alert for a fire alarm but 
would not include work such as moving sprinkler heads. 
 
From this commentary, it is clear that almost all applications for building consent that involve 
an alternative solution or that deviate from the Compliance Documents should be sent to the 
DRU. 
The confusion this causes has a number of implications with regards to the applications the 
DRU does and does not review under s.46 of the Act, and thus with respect to fire-fighting 
facilities.  Whilst it is not possible to quantify the number of building consent applications that 
should have been sent to the DRU but were not, the NZFS Engineering Unit are aware of 
building consent applications that contained alternative solutions which should have been 
sent to the DRU.  Ultimately it is up to the Building Consent Authority to decide which 
consents are submitted to the NZFSC for review; however, many take advice from and 
expect the fire engineering reports to identify the presence of alternative solutions and the 
need to refer the Consent documentation to the NZFSC. 
Whilst it is not possible to quantify this problem, an increasing trend noted by DRU engineers 
is that certain authors of fire engineering reports specifically identify whether the report 
contains alternative solutions or not and whether the building consent application should be 
forwarded to the NZFSC for review.  A total of 175 reports have been identified to date that 
have stated that the report should not be sent to the DRU for review.  In total, 26 different fire 
engineering companies have been identified, of which three have authored more than ten 
fire reports that fall into this category.  Of these three companies, two have produced 15 




These results confirm that there is confusion over interpretation of the Gazette notice that 
can lead to misinterpretation of s.46 of the Act.  It is also suggested that a number of building 
consent applications only containing minor non-compliances with the compliance documents 
are being sent to the NZFSC that may not strictly need to be sent for review under the Act.  
However, these findings also suggest that some companies, and one in particular, may be 
deliberately trying to avoid having fire reports sent to the NZFSC for review. 
 
3.5. The Impact of Alternative Solutions and Building Performance in Fires 
 
Whilst this research has identified significant issues associated with alternative designs and 
fire-fighting needs, it has not attempted to identify a link between the actual performance of 
these buildings in the event of fire.  Hughes-Brown (22) investigated the link between 
alternative building solutions and real fires in the state of New South Wales (NSW), Australia 
and identified that the evacuation of occupants and fire service access were the principal 
areas of concern at real fires. A secondary concern identified from the fire investigations was 
the lack of adequate smoke management provisions in these buildings.  
The report also identified a need to provide further studies on recording buildings with 
alternative solutions throughout NSW and Australia as well as a means to "notify attending 
fire officers that there are alternative building solutions applied to the building which may 
contradict elements of their training and standard operating procedures". 
Even without investigating this issue in depth in New Zealand, the author believes this 






The findings contained in this chapter do not necessarily capture all recommendations made 
by the DRU that could have an effect upon fire-fighting facilities and the holistic effect of the 
proposed building designs upon fighting operations.  It should also be recognised that DRU 
advice is provided in accordance with s.47 of the Building Act and as such does not 
constitute a peer review of all fire safety systems in the design.  Other issues outside of the 
scope of the DRU assessment that could affect NZBC compliance and fire-fighting 




Whilst the recommendations provided within DRU memorandums may be taken up by the 
building consent authority and acted upon, there is no mandatory requirement to do so under 
the Act.  There is also no requirement for the building consent authority to notify the NZFS if 
the recommendations have been considered. Therefore, it is not possible at the current time 
for the NZFS to quantify to what extent the issues identified by the DRU in this section 
impact on the ability of the NZFS to undertake fire-fighting operations.   
Even with these limitations, the results of this statistical assessment clearly identify that there 
is a significant issue with respect to how the needs of the fire service are being addressed 
within fire engineering designs in New Zealand.  Whilst many of the simple issues identified 
by the DRU need not require a full FBIM assessment to be undertaken, the most 
fundamental of FBIM assessments to understand the likely NZFS response times to the 
building would assist in demonstrating that the appropriate access requirements have been 






CHAPTER 4. Current Methods Used in New Zealand to Demonstrate 




This chapter provides information and discussion regarding the different methods currently 
used within New Zealand to demonstrate the performance requirements of the NZBC 
relating to fire brigade operations.   
 
4.2. Holistic Design Process and Documentation  
 
Chapter 3 identified concerns with respect to the provision of fire-fighting facilities given that 
for new buildings the NZFS DRU provided comment on fire-fighting facilities in 63% of 
building designs reviewed that used alternative fire engineering methods. However, it also 
needs to be recognised that in 67% of memorandums provided, the DRU stated that the 
documentation contained insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC 
and recommended that further information be supplied.  This indicates that concerns may 
not be exclusively related to the analysis methods chosen by designers, as insufficient 
information to demonstrate compliance may have been the reason why compliance could 
not be confirmed when being reviewed by the DRU.      
This perceived lack of sufficient information and the provision of inadequate plans and 
specifications has been identified by a number of sources including the DBH in 
Determinations.  A clear example includes Determination 2005/109 (23).  In this particular 
determination relating to a single means of escape in a high-rise building, the DBH 
specifically concluded in section 14.2.4 that: 
"Nevertheless, because of the lack of full plans and specifications, I would not have 
confirmed the territorial authority‘s decision to issue the building consent even if I had 
concluded that submissions justified the use of a single means of escape from fire.‖ 
 
The 'Hot Topics' report (17) by the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand also 
identified that: 
"The quality of engineering judgement and the supporting documentation is of 





Without appropriate supporting documentation and specifications detailing how the design 
will meet the needs of the NZFS amongst others, it is clear that any design will not 
demonstrate the performance requirements of the NZBC.  Furthermore, without providing 
complete and final documentation, all of the factors that could have an impact on fire-fighting 
operations cannot be considered.  Hot Topics also reported that authors of two technical 
audits of the DRU had provided commentary noting: 
"the generally low standard of fire reports, lack of supporting calculations, 
inappropriate use or modification of the Acceptable Solution and over-reliance on 
unsubstantiated opinion purported to be expert judgement." 
 
One of these technical audits of the DRU (24) also identified (amongst others) the following 
finding: 
Finding 8-1 
A review of the means of escape and firefighting provisions within a fire engineered 
design should not be conducted in isolation to other measures of the proposed 
strategy. 
Fire Engineering Design requires a holistic approach to an assessment; therefore, 
the review should also adopt this principle in associating aspects of a proposed fire 
engineering design to the provisions for the means of escape and firefighting. NZFS 
Design Review Unit should adopt this principle in discharging their duties in 
accordance with Section 47 of the Building Act 2004. 
 
This finding was further explained within the audit document with respect to DRU reviews. 
The audit said that when conducting an assessment of a fire engineering design, the DRU 
should analyse each aspect of it more holistically. That is, from the view point of how that 
aspect might impact on all other potential subsystems and aspects of the provisions for 
means of escape and fire fighting. 
Overseas standards also recognise the importance of the holistic design process.  BS 9999 
(25) specifically warns against the need to assess fire engineering designs as a 'package of 
fire safety measures' and that applying individual recommendations 'in isolation might give 





From these findings, it is clear that appropriate documentation and a holistic approach to 
fire-fighting provisions is required to adequately demonstrate the performance requirements 
of the NZBC and specifically those relating to fire-fighting needs.   
 
4.3.  Building Consent Application Examples 
 
The following examples are taken from building consent applications submitted to the DRU 
for review.  These examples present a range of opinions expressed within building designs 
that directly affect NZFS operations and are provided to indicate how such facilities are 
viewed by engineers designing buildings. 
 
4.3.1. Fire Hydrant Systems  
 
Fire hydrant systems are necessary to ensure that fire fighters are provided with sufficient 
water inside buildings.  Such systems are typical in high rise buildings and large facilities 
where fire fighters are required to operate at extended distances from fire appliances.   
 "The building does not have a fire hydrant system installed and therefore does not 
comply with the requirements of C/AS1.  However, hydrant risers are primarily for the 
use of the New Zealand Fire Service to protect property.  We believe it provides little 
benefit to the objectives of life safety during the early stages of the fire." 
 
 "as the hydrant riser is utilized for Fire Service operations and not life safety for the 
occupants of the building it is our opinion that this precaution need not be 
provided…" 
 
 ―This is outside the scope of the of the Building Act requirements for means of 
escape, hence is not included in this design.‖   
 
 "A fire hydrant is required only for fire-fighting purposes and is unlikely to significantly 
increase the level of fire safety of the building occupants escaping from fire, and is 





 "‗On behalf of our client, it is our proposal that a fire hydrant system is not necessary 
in this building on the following basis: 
 
o It would be impractical and expensive to install a hydrant system complying 
with NZS4510…in addition it is our view that as only one side of the building 
is accessible it is likely that the Fire Service would only be able to mount an 
external attack on any fire unless they were on site in the incipient stage of 
the fire growth, otherwise fire fighters entering the building could be at risk." 
 
The impact on fire-fighter safety and successful fire-fighting operations within a building that 
has not been provided with sufficient fire-fighting facilities such as internal hydrant systems 
should not be overestimated.  The implications of deficient design can range from minor 
complications to severe restrictions in fire-fighting capability.  It could mean additional efforts 
and time requirements to enable the set up and commencement of fire-fighting operations or 
the complete inability of a responding fire brigade to operate in the building presented due to 
equipment shortfalls or the premature reduction in compartment tenability conditions.  An 
appropriate assessment either through FBIM analysis or by discussion with the appropriate 
fire authorities can establish what effects the lack of appropriate facilities may have on the 
responding fire brigade should a fire occur, and should establish what facilities are required 
to support fire-fighting operations within the building. 
 
4.3.2. Structural Fire Ratings 
 
Structural fire ratings are of significant concern to the NZFS as the requirement for structural 
fire protection extends beyond the egress of occupants from a building and needs to be 
sufficient to allow fire fighters to undertake their statutory function within the building.  Any 
reduction in the prescribed structural fire rating requirements of the compliance documents 
needs careful consideration.  However, for some building designs, especially those 
concerning industrial low-rise buildings, their fire designs can be basic in nature due to their 
layout.  Such designs often suggest that the means of egress is straight forward and 
therefore that intervention from the NZFS, for either search and rescue or fire fighting 
requirements is not a requirement of the building owner and therefore for the design.  In 
these designs it has not been uncommon to see the specified structural fire ratings either 
completely removed or significantly reduced from what would be otherwise required by 




As discussed previously in section 2.7, Determination 2009/100 identified matters of doubt 
relating to the specification of substandard structural ratings provided to support an 18-
storey building.  Other structural fire rating examples include: 
This particular fire report acknowledged the locality and type of fire brigade that 
would respond to a fire in this proposed building as would be required within an FBIM 
analysis. 
"New Zealand Fire Service resources in Kerikeri are volunteer staff, and the Kerikeri 
fire station is located approximately 8 Kilometres from this site.  The Volunteers 
maintain a very professional and effective fire-fighting resource, and would be 
expected to respond to this site with two appliances within 13–16 minutes." 
However, the fire report goes on to state, with respect to the structural adequacy of 
the building, that:  
‗an early collapse of the building in a timeframe of 10–15 minutes is anticipated‘.   
Given that the fire report also removed the automatic direct connection of the fire 
alarm system to the NZFS, there is no guarantee at what time during fire 
development arrival of the NZFS could be expected.  However, even at best from the 
fire report comments, it is quite likely that arrival of the fire crews could be just prior to 
the onset of structural collapse of the building.  Therefore, any crews attempting entry 
to the building at this stage would be at significant risk. 
 
The functional requirement C2.2 (b) of the NZBC specifically requires that buildings shall be 
provided with means of escape from fire which give fire service personnel adequate time to 
undertake rescue operations.  The above example provides a scenario in which the 
proposed building would not allow for fire fighters to undertake rescue operations should 
occupants not be able to escape from the building.    
Further problems can also be seen when designers make assumptions regarding the ability 
of fire service personnel to be able to react to the environment given the building design.  
For example: 
‗In the opinion of the structural engineer, the loss of stability after the loss of the first 






One would hope that such an observation would occur and that fire fighters would retreat 
from this situation.  However, obvious questions need to be raised such as fire-fighters‘ 
ability to observe such movement in smoked logged compartments, and while undertaking 
either rescue or structural fire-fighting activities.  The above example highlights a situation in 
which quantification of fire service activities along with the structural and fire assessment 
could have been undertaken to determine the conditions to which fire fighters would have 
been subjected and to assess whether the opinion expressed could have been validated by 
engineering analysis.  The FBIM could have been used in this circumstance to support the 
required assessment. 
For issues such as structural fire ratings that must consider fire brigade intervention it is 
difficult to see how deviations from C/AS1 or S ratings derived using alternative methods can 
be considered appropriate unless fire brigade intervention is considered.  Without the use of 
a quantitative analysis tool such as the FBIM it is not possible to predict times of fire brigade 
operations or expected activities with any level of confidence and conclude that structural 
ratings are adequate.  Consideration of fully developed post-flashover fires may prove 
conservative in this respect but where localised heating of structures may cause structural 
damage and potentially collapse, consideration specifically with respect to fire brigade 
intervention and the presence of fire fighters in and around the building should be made.  
 
4.4. Performance-Based Designs 
 
There have only been a few fire engineering designs submitted to the NZFS since 2004 that 
have been totally performance based, with little or no reference at all to the prescriptive 
requirements of C/AS1.  The majority of building designs reviewed by the DRU consist of 
minor alterations from the Acceptable Solution and typically contain a limited analysis 
assessing only the deviation in isolation from any other requirement of C/AS1 of the 
performance requirements of the NZBC. 
Performance-based designs for the purpose of this report are considered those which 
provide no reference to the compliance documents and only purport to demonstrate 
compliance with the Building Code by meeting the performance requirements of the Code 
using fire engineering methods.  Although few designers actually attempt full performance-
based designs, many of these to date have clearly demonstrated the issues identified in 




At the SFPE international conference on performance-based codes and fire safety design 
methods in April 2008, the lack of any accepted tool within New Zealand enabling fire 
brigade intervention to be assessed was specifically commented upon as a reason why fire 
brigade intervention was being ignored as part of building design.  The following excerpt is 
taken from a New Zealand paper (26) presented at the conference and highlights this 
specific issue. 
 
‗3.1.2 Fire Service Life Safety 
The performance criteria for Fire Service safety require that conditions be maintained 
to facilitate Fire Service operations. 
There is currently no model for protection of Fire Service personnel during fire-
fighting operations within the New Zealand legislation such as the Australian Fire 
Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM). The basis of the egress design will be that 
occupants are able to evacuate prior to their environment becoming untenable 
without requiring Fire Service intervention. On this basis, Fire Service intervention 
will not be considered as part of this performance-based design.’ 
 
Also with specific reference to fire brigade intervention, this proposed fire design did not use 
C/AS1 and was derived from first principles using performance-based design techniques. 
‗The acceptance criteria in the first instance is for life safety of the building occupants 
in the event of fire.  Provided we meet the criteria above the fire services should be 
satisfied.‘ 
Other DRU findings taken from building consent applications include: 
‗The basis of the egress design will be that occupants are able to evacuate prior to 
their environment becoming untenable without requiring Fire Service intervention. On 
this basis, Fire Service intervention will not be considered as part of this 
performance-based design.‘ 
‗We have only addressed the minimum requirements of the NZBC to achieve code 
compliance.  As such, only the safety of building occupants has been addressed as 




‗There is no particular guidance in C/AS1 with regard to fire fighters and they are 
equipped with appropriate safety gear and in the business of fighting fires.  Therefore 
the chosen criteria are to maintain the smoke level; at 1m above the floor for 10 
minutes‘. 
 
There also appears to be a lack of understanding of the relationship between fire-fighting 
facilities and the function of the fire service to undertake rescue operations within fire-
engineered designs.  Facilitating the fire service to be able to undertake rescue operations is 
a mandatory requirement of the Building Act and Code.  However, assuming that occupants 
will always be able to escape unaided and without the need of fire brigade intervention is 
typically assumed within designs, even when designers propose to remove or modify fire-
fighting facilities.    
 
4.5. Understanding of Fire Service Operations   
 
It is apparent to the author that if buildings are to be designed that do not meet with the 
prescriptive requirements applicable to fire-fighting facilities then deviation from these 
requirements requires a fundamental understanding of fire service operations.  Most fire 
engineering guidance documents recommend that designers liaise with the local fire 
services as a way of overcoming this issue.  However, in New Zealand there is no 
mandatory way of enforcing such liaison and currently recommended engineering practice 
(17) such as the Fire Engineering Brief (FEB) process identified by the IFEG can be readily 
ignored by designers.   Only when an understanding of fire service operations is known can 
designers appropriately plan facilities for fire service operations taking into account 
variations that may be unique to a specific building and responding fire service.  There is an 
apparent lack of knowledge from designers regarding fire service operations let alone local 
variances that may exist.  This can be seen when reviewing the design reports for buildings 
in which fire service operational issues have been altered.  The following quotes are again 
taken directly from fire reports submitted for building consent applications: 
General:  
 ‗No fire systems centre is provided.  It is considered not reasonably practicable to 
install a new fire systems centre given that it is for supporting fire-fighting operations 





 ‗Fire Service lift control is not currently provided.  We believe this feature provides 
little benefit to the objectives of life safety during the early stages of the fire and as 
such is not required…‘  
 
 ‗The Fire Service‘s preferred method of communications is via newer and more 
technologically advanced RT systems or cellphones in the unlikely event that this 
fails‘. 
 
4.6. Fire-fighting Water Supplies 
 
As discussed in section 3.4.4, most fire reports consider that it is outside of the scope of a 
building consent application to consider water supplies for fire-fighting purposes.  However, 
there have been a number of designs produced where fire-fighting water supplies have been 
identified as relevant to the building design.  The example provided in section 3.4.4 identified 
how a lack of understanding of fire-fighting operations and needs of the fire service has 
effectively precluded fire-fighting operations within that building.  In reality however, fire 
fighters may be put in a position where they enter the building and place themselves and 
others at a greater risk than would have otherwise been present, if sufficient water supplies 
had been made available on site. 
 
4.7. Assessment of Building Consent Applications 
 
It should be acknowledged that interpretation of the information provided thus far needs 
further explanation with regards to how designers go about presenting information within fire 
engineering designs.  One of the main changes to the Building Act 2004 was the 
requirement for consent applications to clearly demonstrate how the requirements of the 
Building Code are to be achieved.  It is still apparent, especially with regards to fire-fighting 
facilities, that many designers still consider that these issues can be resolved after the 
consent process has finished.  Examples include: 
 ‗However, it should be confirmed that a suitable hydrant is available for fire-fighting 
water supplies and is within the prescribed distances for NZ Fire Service use‘. 
 





 ‗No requirement for type 18 fire hydrant system provided that Fire Service hose run 
does not exceed 75m.‘   
 
The issue with these types of statements is that the building design stage has passed and it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible to change the building to accommodate any additional 
requirements not already included within the design.  This is especially true when features 
might require physical building space in which to be located.  Unfortunately, as a result it is 
not uncommon for such designs to be accepted by Building Consent Authorities and consent 
granted by which time such issues are overlooked until it is too late.  The result is that these 
fire service features are either ignored or are compromised as a result. 
The leaky building crisis was brought about because of similar issues, which should not 
occur.  This is made clear within the book ―Deconstructing the Building Act‖ by the 
Department of Building & Housing senior legal advisor, Brian Cashin (27) which states:  
 ―The submitted plans and specifications must include everything the builder 
(including subcontractors) needs to know to complete the building…It is no longer 
acceptable to include a fire engineer‘s report of what should be done, for example 
wall A7-Y9 to have a 4 hour FRR, the plans and specification must show how this is 
to achieve the fire resistance rating ‖. 
 
Another significant problem from an NZFS perspective is that rarely are consent applications 
resubmitted to the DRU to confirm if any changes have been made following the DRU 
memorandum.  If consent applications were to be resubmitted to the NZFS, as they should 
be according to Cashin, it is likely that the NZFS would have a greater confidence in the 
building consent process and that many of the concerns presented above would be 
resolved. 
 
4.8. Lack of Reference Design and Prescriptive Criteria  
 
One definite advantage that Australia has over New Zealand with regards to the use of the 
FBIM is the presence of a ‗reference design‘ or the ability to undertake the analysis based on 
a comparative compliant or ‗deemed to satisfy‘ design.  The Building Code of Australia 
(BCA) has the ‗deemed to satisfy‘ prescriptive solutions to which any alternative is required 




to a prescriptive solution and thus the implications of any proposed alternative can be readily 
compared.  In New Zealand however, C/AS1 references the use of ‗specific fire engineering 
design‘ throughout the document.  Although seen by many as an indication of how advanced 
the C/AS1 document is, this has had a significant effect upon how fire engineering has 
evolved within New Zealand as there has been no specific definition of what this term means 
or requires.  With regards to fire brigade intervention, there are numerous references to 
‗specific fire engineering design‘ throughout the document.   The most obvious reference to 
fire service operations that requires ‗specific fire engineering design‘ is that of large Fire 
Hazard Category 4 buildings.  Some of these issues have been addressed above and have 
evolved to the situation where it is now commonly accepted for designers to ignore fire 
brigade intervention as part of ‗specific fire engineering design‘.   
This specific issue was identified within the NZFS Inquiry following the explosion and fire at 
the Icepack Cool stores, Tamahere (28).  In that report, it specifically stated that: 





This chapter has identified that some building design methods currently used within New 
Zealand are considered to be inappropriate and inadequate to demonstrate or justify an 
alternative solution in many aspects of compliance that affect fire-fighting needs.  This fact 
highlights a number of issues including the need for better communication between the 
design engineer and NZFS.  This research has also identified the current belief that the lack 
of any available engineering analysis tools to quantify and establish fire brigade intervention 
activities is being used as an excuse to ignore this crucial aspect of any fire engineering 
design.  The promotion of the FBIM through this research project and by the collection and 
validation of New Zealand data should rectify some of these concerns.  
It is also considered by the author that ‗performance requirements‘ have no place being 
present within a prescriptive compliance document.  Until the Acceptable Solution C/AS1 is 
amended to remove all references to ‗specific fire engineering design‘, there will be no 
benchmark and no lower limit defining an accepted level of safety to the fire service within 
many types of buildings.  Without an accepted level of safety or the minimum expectations 
defined it is considered that there will always be problems with the analysis of fire-fighter 





CHAPTER 5. Fire-fighting Requirements within Other International 
Performance-Based Building Codes. 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Performance-based designs and the application of fire safety engineering vary around the 
world dependent on regulations specific to each location.  However, the general principles 
that must be applied to fire engineering should be relatively consistent irrespective of local 
regulations, given that the objectives of life safety are global.  This chapter provides relevant 
information pertaining to regulations and guidance documents produced outside of New 
Zealand specifically relating to the consideration of fire-fighting needs.  This allows a 
comparison to be made with the regulations and guidance documents currently available 
and used in New Zealand and provides an opportunity to identify if there is a need to update 
requirements and the guidance documents commonly used in New Zealand.   
It is first necessary to understand what constitutes fire safety engineering.  The international 
standard for fire safety engineering (29) defines fire safety engineering as:  
the application of engineering principles, rules and expert judgement based on a 
scientific appreciation of the fire phenomena, of the effects of fire, and of the reaction 
and behaviour of people, in order to: 
 save life, protect property and preserve the environment and heritage; 
 quantify the hazards and risk of fire and its effects; 
 evaluate analytically the optimum protective and preventative measures 
necessary to limit, within prescribed levels, the consequences of fire. 
 
This chapter does not intend to identify all the countries that currently have performance-
based codes in place.  Proceedings such as those from the SFPE International Conference 
on Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods typically contain many 
papers addressing the codes specific to individual countries.  This chapter does, however, 
make reference to and provide discussion on those codes, regulations and methods 






5.2. International Guidance 
 
5.2.1. ISO/TR 13387-1:1999 
 
Annex F of the international standard for Fire Safety Engineering (29) contains an 
informative section specifically dealing with fire-fighting and rescue facilities.  This 
recognises that sufficient consideration must be given to the interaction of fire services for 
fire-fighting intervention purposes.  It also stresses that an analysis in liaison with the fire 
service should be undertaken but recognises that fire fighting and rescue operations are 
extremely difficult to quantify.  The standard does not propose any methodology to assist 
designers with quantifying fire-fighting operations but gives the following factors that need to 
be taken into account within the assessment: 
a) whether the firefighters are full-time or volunteers; 
b) the availability of specialist appliances and equipment; 
c) the precise nature and location of the fire incident; 
d) the position and condition of persons requiring assistance during the evacuation (or 
rescue if the life safety design system has failed). 
 
The standard then goes on to state: 
 
The design of the building, and the facilities provided, can now be reviewed to ensure 
that: 
a) there is sufficient means of external access to enable fire appliances to be brought 
near to the building for effective use; 
b) there is sufficient means of access into, and within, the building for firefighters to 
assist in the evacuation, to effect rescue (where necessary) and to fight the fire; 
c) the building is provided with sufficient fire mains and other facilities to assist 
firefighters in their tasks; 









5.2.2. ISO Technical Report 16738 
 
The introduction to the ISO technical report 16738 on methods for evaluating the behaviour 
and movement of people (30) recognises that occupants‘ response to a fire is influenced by 
fire brigade intervention.  This report states (emphasis added): 
The response of occupants to a fire condition is influenced by a whole range of 
variables in these four categories, related to the characterization of the occupants in 
terms of their number, distribution within the building at different times, their 
familiarity with the building, their abilities, behaviours and other attributes; the 
characterization of the building, including its use, layout and services; the provision 
for warnings, means of escape and emergency management strategy; and the 
interaction of all these features with the developing fire scenario and provisions for 
emergency intervention (fire service and rescue facilities). 
 
Although outside the scope of this report, section C5 of ISO 16738 also recognises that the 
safety of occupants can be reliant on fire brigade intervention: 
Circumstances can arise in a building where the intervention of the fire service is 
necessary to secure the safety of the occupants. To assist the fire service in the 
execution of intervention strategies, it is necessary to include appropriate 
facilities in the design of the building. 
 
5.2.3. International Fire Engineering Guidelines 
 
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (14) is an important guidance document 
because of its adoption and promotion in New Zealand as previously discussed in section 
2.6.  The IFEG are unique as although they were primarily developed for use in Australia, 
they were updated in 2005 through a collaboration of bodies including the Inter-jurisdictional 
Regulatory Collaboration Council (IRCC), the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB), the 
National Research Council of Canada (NRC), the International Code Council (ICC) of the 
United States of America and the DBH.  These guidelines are now considered to be truly 





Sub-system F (SS-F) is specific to fire-fighting needs and provides, amongst other things, 
guidance on quantifying times for:  
 the arrival of the fire services at the fire scene;  
 investigation by the fire services;  
 fire services set-up;  
 search and rescue;  
 fire services attack;  
 fire control;  
 fire extinguishment.  
 
The IFEG acknowledges that in many fire engineering designs the effect of fire brigade 
intervention on the fire is not taken into account. However, the IFEG stresses that: 
 
  "This, however, does not mean that the fire engineering evaluation should discount 
the needs of Fire Services carrying out their intervention activities.‖ 
 
Chapter 2.9.1 of the IFEG references the use of the FBIM to quantify fire service activities to 
allow the design to incorporate fire brigade intervention.  It then follows that the FBIM should 
be an accepted tool to demonstrate the performance requirements of the NZBC as it is 
referenced by publications endorsed by both the DBH and IPENZ. 
 
5.2.4. International Code Council Performance Code 
 
The ICC publish a 'Performance Code for Building and Facilities' (ICCPC) (31) and also the 
International Fire Code (32) which are available and can be adopted internationally; 
however, their membership appears to be largely based in the United States of America. 
Part 3 of the code deals with fire and there are specific requirements placed on fire-fighting 
intervention requirements throughout the document.  Section 103.3.4.1.6 provides 
requirements for design documentation and those specific to emergency response 
capabilities. Of relevance is that this requires the documentation to clearly describe the 'level 
of response expected by emergency responders under the direct control of the owner', as 
well as capability of emergency responders.  Chapter 602.2.2 sets out functional statements 




'buildings and facilities shall be designed and constructed so that fire fighters can 
appropriately perform rescue operations, protect property, and utilize fire-fighting equipment 
and controls.' 
There is also a dedicated section 2101.3, specific to protecting emergency responders from 
unreasonable risks during emergencies.  The performance requirements set out in this 
section specifically include the identification of hazards, appropriate signage, ensuring that 
collapse, if it occurs, is predictable and the provision of communication systems in certain 
buildings. 
Additionally, the ICCPC provides a 'User's Guide' to the Code which describes the rationale 
and basis for the performance requirements.  The guide acknowledges that fire fighting is an 
inherently dangerous activity but provides provision to alleviate the hazards that are 
considered to be beyond those normally expected by fire fighters during an emergency.  
Such guidance is lacking in New Zealand and forces designers and engineers to make 
interpretations of the performance requirements of the NZBC resulting in the findings 
presented in chapter 1.  Chapter 21 of the User's Guide is again specific to emergency 




As the FBIM is specific to the Australian and New Zealand fire engineering environment, 
chapter 6 of this report provides specific information relating to the use of the FBIM in 
Australia and how its use is affected by the regulatory environment found in the different 
Australian states.  This section is provided only to identify the aspects of the Building Code 
of Australia that specifically relate to fire service intervention. 
 
5.3.1. Building Code of Australia 
 
Following New Zealand, Australia also introduced a performance-based building code (33) in 
1996 with a similar structure, the only significant difference being the incorporation of the 
additional layer defining compliance with the performance requirements: 
(a) The Objectives. 




(c) The Performance Requirements with which all Building Solutions must comply. 
(d) The Building Solutions. 
 
A Building Solution in the BCA is defined as a solution which complies with the Performance 
Requirements and is:  
(a) an Alternative Solution; or 
(b) a solution which complies with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions; or 
(c) a combination of (a) and (b). 
 
As in New Zealand, the ABCB publishes a set of solutions similar to C/AS1 which are termed 
the ‗Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions‘.  Of significant difference in the BCA compared with the 
NZBC is that the Guide to the BCA (34) specifically states that to meet the performance 
requirements of the BCA an alternative solution must be shown to be at least equivalent to 
the ‗Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions‘.  No such statement exists within the NZBC, which is 
important when considering the substitution or removal of fire safety systems that impact on 
fire brigade intervention. 
A0.5 Meeting the Performance Requirements  
Compliance with the Performance Requirements can only be achieved by—  
(a) complying with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions; or  
(b) formulating an Alternative Solution which—  
(i) complies with the Performance Requirements; or  
(ii) is shown to be at least equivalent to the Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Provisions; or  
(c) a combination of (a) and (b).  
 
Other than fire safety systems and other relevant terms, the BCA contains specific reference 
throughout to fire brigade intervention which makes the FBIM directly applicable as can be 





SECTION C FIRE RESISTANCE 
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
CP1  
A building must have elements, which will, to the degree necessary, maintain 
structural stability during a fire appropriate to— 
 (i) fire service intervention; and 
CP2  
 (b) Avoidance of the spread of fire referred to in (a) must be appropriate to— 
 (ix) fire service intervention; and 
CP9  
Access must be provided to and around a building, to the degree necessary, for fire 
service vehicles and personnel to facilitate fire service intervention appropriate to— 
(a) the function or use of the building; and 
(b) the fire load; and 
(c) the potential fire intensity; and 
(d) the fire hazard; and 
(e) any active fire safety systems installed in the building; and 
(f) the size of any fire compartment. 
SECTION D ACCESS AND EGRESS 
DP5  
To protect evacuating occupants from a fire in the building exits must be fire-isolated, 
to the degree necessary, appropriate to— 
(e) fire service intervention. 





Suitable facilities must be provided to the degree necessary in a building to co-
ordinate fire service intervention during an emergency appropriate to— 
(a) the function or use of the building; and 
(b) the floor area of the building; and 
(c) the height of the building. 
 
During development of the BCA, AFAC were involved ensuring that the needs of the fire 
services were effectively incorporated into the code.  However, this was a two-way process 
and it is understood that the ABCB considered that it would not be possible to develop a 
robust performance-based code that incorporated the needs of the fire services unless an 
appropriate tool could be developed.  Such a tool would have to be developed on a 
performance basis so that it could be used in conjunction with other recognised engineering 
methods.  Out of this need came the production of the FBIM and hence the expectation that 
the FBIM would be used to meet the performance requirements of the BCA.   
To support performance-based fire engineering, the ABCB published the Fire Safety 
Engineering Guidelines in 2001 which later became the IFEG (14).  As a result, the IFEG 
process and methodology is practically mandated and enforced for any alternative solutions 
proposed within Australia. Of significance is that both the IFEG and FBIM are specifically 
mentioned within the Guide to the BCA as example reference documents that could be used 
when undertaking Alternative Solutions (34).  Section A0.8 of the Guide has been 
reproduced in Appendix B for specific reference. 
 
5.4. United Kingdom  
 
England and Wales adopted one of the earliest performance-based building codes for fire in 
1985 (35).  Similar to New Zealand, the UK Building Act 1984 is the primary legislation under 
which the Building Regulations are enforced.  This is applicable to England and Wales but 
not to Scotland or Ireland.  For building work, the UK Building Regulations specify technical 
requirements which are required to be met.  Guidance on meeting these technical 
requirements is provided in the form of 'approved documents'.  Approved Document B (36) is 




In 2006 The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 came into effect and replaced over 
70 pieces of fire safety law (37) throughout the UK.  The 2005 order applies to all non-
domestic premises in England and Wales and had a significant effect on how fire safety is 
managed in the UK, with a strong influence on fire safety risk assessment.  From a design 
perspective, a comprehensive range of guidance documents and standards are available 
dependent on the nature of the building being designed, the method of design and the 
complexity of the project. BS 9999 (25) provides a three-tiered hierarchy to define the 
approaches and methods that should be used for fire engineering in the UK: 
 
a) General approach. This level is applicable to a majority of building work 
undertaken within the UK. In this case the fire precautions designed into the building 
usually follow the guidance contained in the documents published by the relevant 
government departments to support legislative requirements. 
 
b) Advanced approach. This is the level for which BS 9999 is provided. Guidance 
provided in this document gives a more transparent and flexible approach to fire 
safety design through use of a structured approach to risk-based design where 
designers can take account of varying physical and human factors. Much of the 
guidance in BS 9999 is based on fire safety engineering principles, although it is not 
intended as a guide to fire safety engineering. 
 
c) Fire safety engineering. This is the level for which BS 7974 is provided. This 
level provides an alternative approach to fire safety and can be the only practical way 
to achieve a satisfactory standard of fire safety in some large and complex buildings, 
and in buildings containing different uses. 
 
Documentation supporting all three approaches contains specific advice and details of how 
to satisfy the performance requirements for fire-fighting needs of the Building Code.  The 
following sections provide relevant observations from each of the three documents 





5.4.1. General Approach – Approved Document B 
 
Section B5 of Approved Document B (36) provides the requirements for access and facilities 
for the fire and rescue services.  Of specific note is that the document acknowledges the 
impact of fire-fighting intervention on means of escape strategies from some large buildings.  
Section 4.27 recognises that fire fighters entering stairs may impede evacuating occupants 
and recommends that for buildings in excess of 30 m in height special management 
procedures be put into place in consultation with the relevant fire and rescue service.  
However, for buildings in excess of 45 m physical measures may be required, and 
discounting a stair is suggested.    The recommendation for an additional stair should also 
be recognised to be in addition to other dedicated measures such as vertical shafts or fire-
fighting shafts specifically designed for fire-fighters‘ use.  
 
5.4.2. Advanced Approach – BS 9999 
 
Section 6 of BS 9999 (25) is dedicated to the requirements surrounding access and facilities 
for fire fighting.  Both Approved Document B and BS 9999 require far more comprehensive 
fire-fighting facilities than New Zealand's equivalent, C/AS1.  Of interest in section 20 of BS 
9999 is that the introduction recognises that facilities should be provided to assist fire 
fighters in undertaking more than just rescue operations.    Also, the need to ensure that fire 
fighters are provided with places of relative safety within buildings is relevant to 
understanding the needs of fire fighters while operating within buildings.  Text from section 
20 of BS 9999 is provided below with emphasis added to these points: 
Fire-fighting facilities should be selected and designed to assist the fire and rescue 
service in protecting life, protecting fire-fighters, reducing building losses, 
salvaging property and goods and minimizing environmental damage. Early 
consultation with appropriate approving authorities (including the fire and rescue 
service and building control bodies) is recommended when deciding which facilities 
should be provided. Fire-fighting facilities should include, where appropriate: 
a) the provision of vehicular access for fire appliances to the perimeter of the building 
or site; 
b) provision of easy and speedy entry to the site and/or the interior of the building for 




c) provision of and access to sufficient supplies of a fire-fighting medium; 
d) means of enabling fire-fighters, once they have entered a building, to reach any 
point within that building in the shortest possible time, including the provision of fire-
fighting lifts if appropriate; 
e) means of ensuring that once fire-fighters have arrived at a location within a 
building, they can remain there in relative safety whilst they carry out their fire-fighting 
operations; 
f) provision for fire and rescue service communications;  
g) provision of facilities to release, or extract, smoke and heat from the building or 
site; 
h) provision for removing spent fire-fighting extinguishing medium. 
 
 
5.4.3. BS 7974 – Fire Safety Engineering  
 
The published document PD 7974 Part 5 (4) is specific to 'fire service intervention' and is 
provided to support the code of practice, BS 7974:2001, Application of fire safety 
engineering principles to the design of buildings(38).  This is a directly relevant document to 
the consideration of fire brigade intervention and the FBIM.  Section 4 provides the general 
guidance for any analysis and specifically notes that: 
Consideration needs to be given regarding physiology data of fire-fighters, heat 
stress, training, fire-fighting techniques, breathing apparatus constraints etc. 
 
Of particular relevance is that the document provides no accepted engineering method to 
establish intervention times, as it states that this is difficult to quantify and provides only 
qualitative times based on judgement; 
fire service activities are not easy to quantify. Many aspects of this Published 






Section 5 provides the inputs required for the analysis which include:   
 Building characteristics 
o Building layout and geometry 
o Building location 
o Access to the building 
o fire service facilities 
 Physiology of fire-fighters 
 Design fire 
 Time of fire service notification 
 Evacuation time 
 Environmental influences on smoke control 
 Vehicle access 
 Water supplies 
 Single-storey and multi-storey complexes 
 Fire-fighting shafts 
 Fire-fighting stairs, lobbies and lifts 
 
The outputs for the analysis required are given as: 
 Time of fire service intervention 
 Fire service extinguishing capability 
 
The similarities between PD7974 and that of the FBIM can be seen diagrammatically in 





Figure 15 The defined stages of 'Fire service intervention' taken from PD7974-5 
 
The similarities between PD7974 and the FBIM as a way of quantifying fire-fighting needs on 
a performance basis could be considered to provide a level of validity to FBIM and the 
respective methodologies and also suggests that they are sound and transferable between 
countries and across codes.  However, the weakness with PD7974 is that it lacks credibility 
from an engineering sense as the values or data required for any analysis are too generic 
and not building-specific and are largely qualitative in nature.  This is problematic from a true 
performance perspective as generic qualitative data will ultimately produce a generic 
prescriptive result.  The obvious example of this is that the arrival time of the fire service is 
predicated on government recommended national standards of fire cover rather than actual 
resourcing and response times associated with buildings in specific areas and serviced by a 
local fire service with specific characteristics.  This is further discussed below in section 7.5.2 





5.5. United States of America  
 
The Building Construction and Safety Code, NFPA 5000 (39), allows performance-based 
designs providing they meet with the goals and objectives set, including 'reasonable safety 
for fire fighters and emergency responders during search and rescue operations'.  The code 
also requires that, as well as means of egress, the building or structure be provided with 
other fire and life safety safeguards relevant to eight listed factors, one of which includes the 
'capabilities of response personnel'. 
Chapter 5 sets out the performance criteria that the design must meet to achieve the goals 
and objectives of the code.  Three of these performance criteria are specific to fire-fighting 
needs and are directly relevant to the FBIM.  They are given below with emphasis on the 
reference to time components: 
5.2.2.5* Buildings shall be designed and constructed to reasonably prevent structural 
failure under fire conditions for a time sufficient to enable fire fighters and 
emergency responders to conduct search and rescue operations. 
5.2.2.6* Buildings shall be designed and constructed to reasonably prevent fire 
spread to adjacent buildings and structures for a time sufficient for emergency 
responders to arrive on-site and establish fire suppression operations. 
5.2.2.7 Access shall be provided to enable fire apparatus to reach the principal 
building entrance for fire department use and to reach the fire emergency equipment 
provided for the building. 
 
Paragraph 5.4 provides the characteristics and assumptions to be used for emergency 
response personnel.  As with all the performance-based design methods discussed within 
this document, this paragraph also states that no reliance should be placed on the 
emergency responders as part of the design.  However, an exception to this is provided in 
situations where the emergency responders are under the direct control of the building 
owner or occupant.  Of specific note from an FBIM design perspective, paragraph 5.4.4.2 is 







5.4.4.2 Design characteristics and assumptions related to the availability, speed of 
response, effectiveness, roles, and other characteristics of emergency response 
personnel shall be specified, estimated, or characterized sufficiently for evaluation of 
the design. 
 
NFPA 5000 provides a performance-based approach stating the performance requirements 
which need to be met to achieve the goals and objectives for an appropriate design.  Criteria 
specific to fire fighting is provided with the expectations set out as to what characteristics 
and information is required to achieve these specific performance requirements.  However, 
the code does not provide or reference any acceptable quantitative methods of how to 
achieve these criteria or how to demonstrate that the performance requirements specific to 
fire fighting can be shown to be 'sufficient'.  It is unclear therefore to the author how such 
performance criteria are expected to be justified and without such guidance it would appear 
that such decisions would come down to the individual circumstance and requirements of the 
authority responsible for approval of the design. 
 
5.6. Canada  
 
The FBIM Manual (5) discusses the Fire Risk Evaluation and Cost Assessment Model 
(FiRECAM) (40) which is used in Canada and specifically the shortfalls perceived with the 
model at that time.  There is no intention to address the model in any particular detail here 
except to note that FiRECAM is intended to assess the level of fire safety that is provided to 
the occupants in an apartment or office building.  It is also claimed that by comparing the 
proposed building with a code compliant design, the model can assess whether a proposed 
design meets the performance requirements and is equivalent or better from a performance-
based life-risk perspective.  At the time of writing, the FiRECAM model was under 
development and not available for comparison with that of the FBIM computer program.  
However, the similarities between FiRECAM and the FBIM can be readily observed. 
Also under development in Canada is the Fire Evaluation and Risk Assessment system 
(FIERAsystem) which is similar to FiRECAM but with a current focus on aircraft hangars and 
warehouses.  FIERAsystem contains two sub-models including the Fire Department 
Response Model (FDRM) and the Fire Department Effectiveness Model (FDEM) which can 




service intervention is calculated by the FDRM and is used in the calculations of the FDEM 
in a very similar fashion to that of the FBIM.   
Bénichou et al (41) presents a number of 'typical' values such as that of 5- to 6-minute 
response times for fire departments and a preparation time of 1 minute.  Bénichou et al also 
state that the model has been designed to accommodate the future research and data 
required to populate the model which will be required to accurately predict the time 
associated with responses from local brigades.   For the FDEM model, output calculations 
including the total heat release rate without fire department intervention, the total heat 
release rate after fire department intervention as well as the revised fire‘s properties after fire 
department intervention are provided.  There are no goals or objectives set as part of the 
models discussed and only values given for typical fire service responses.  It is not therefore 
apparent how such a model can be used and evaluated against the performance 
requirement of the Canadian Building Code.  A case study (42) identified how FiRECAM 
could be applied to a 40-storey office building and includes identification of fire brigade 
intervention and the effect of the proposed design.  However, this case study is based on a 
comparative analysis of a code compliant building and assumes that a prescriptive design 
case is in place to be assessed against.  Whilst such comparative assessment methods are 
increasingly becoming more accepted worldwide as in New Zealand, this method first 
requires a comparison building design to be available based on the prescriptive 
requirements.  As identified in chapter 1, with New Zealand's Acceptable Solution C/AS1 
being so limited in scope and application, this comparative design approach is not always 
available.   
 
5.7. Finland and Iceland 
 
Tillander (43) and Tomasson et al  (44; 45) identified the need to incorporate all of the 
influences and effects that comprised the overall risk in a high-rise building design and that 
the time associated with fire brigade intervention needs to be incorporated into the risk 
assessment model.  Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) methods including Monte Carlo 
analysis to support probabilistic assessment for fire brigade intervention times are proposed.  
These papers identified that for buildings such as high-rise buildings, the consequences 
associated with building systems failures and fire brigade intervention times becomes more 
critical than for conventional buildings.  The result identifies the efficiency of various fire 
safety systems and identifies at which point in time fire brigade intervention could become 




conclusions indicate that the simulated response times of the fire service can be used to 
assess the influence that fire service activities have on the overall safety of the building and 
that by using such a model from a performance-based perspective it can provide a 










Whilst the NZFS was involved with the development of the FBIM, it is not in regular use in 
New Zealand and few engineers have an in-depth or practical knowledge of its use for 
design purposes.  Therefore, to understand how the FBIM is used and perceived in Australia 
where the model is used on a more regular basis, a research trip was undertaken to 
Australia.  This chapter provides the results of this research and is intended to provide 
information on the use of the FBIM in Australia and therefore how it should be or might be 
best applied in New Zealand. 
 
6.2. Australian Research Visit 
 
The FBIM model has undergone continuous development by the AFAC FBIM project team 
since 1996, although it is recognised that the most significant period of development was 
during the late 1990s.  A number of the original project team are still involved with AFAC and 
the FBIM while the remaining number have either retired or moved from the fire services into 
private industry.  To provide the greatest depth possible to this research, the visit was 
organised with the intention of visiting as many of the original and latest project team 
members and to also visit a number of private fire engineering consultancies that currently 
utilise the FBIM as part of their work. 
A total of 28 days were spent in Australia over 4 weeks with time spread across five 
Australian states.  In total, 17 days were spent with five fire services and 5 days were spent 
with practicing fire engineering consultants.  The following outlines the itinerary followed 
during the trip:  
Week 1: South Australia and Australian Capital Territory: 
South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service (Adelaide) 
Defire Pty Ltd (Canberra) 
Week 2: New South Wales – Sydney: 




Fire Engineering Professionals  
Week 3: Victoria – Melbourne: 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board  
Country Fire Authority  
Bodycote Warrington fire (Aus) Pty Ltd 
Week 4: Queensland – Brisbane: 
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service   
Connell Wagner Pty Ltd 
Arup Fire Engineering 
 
6.3. Analysis Methods 
 
The intention of the research trip was to understand how the model was being applied 
throughout Australia given the different regulatory environments applicable to each state and 
to understand how the different fire services are using and applying the model given their 
different legislated roles in both fire service operations, design review and post incident/fire 
investigation.  Similar differences were also relevant to the consultancies visited given that 
they were based in different states and had a different level of understanding of fire service 
operations and opinions on the needs and use of the FBIM. 
The most important aspect of the trip was to gain as much exposure as possible to the 
people using the model and those working within the environment to which the FBIM is 
applicable.   The time spent with the individual fire services depended on a number of 
aspects including their availability to accommodate the author, the size of the brigade and 
the exposure or knowledge of the FBIM throughout the brigades.  It was quickly established 
that these factors differed considerably between the various brigades visited.  In the context 
of the FBIM, reasons for this are likely to be directly related to the number and complexity of 
buildings being developed within the individual states and the role of the brigade, i.e. urban 
versus rural.   
In an attempt to understand how the FBIM was being applied, the author used a number of 




 A number of pre-set questions aimed at the fire service‘s fire engineers and fire 
safety staff/operational staff. 
 A number of pre-set questions aimed at the design consultants. 
 Meetings with the various fire service departments/staff members that may or may 
not be involved or have knowledge of the FBIM, including fire safety, fire investigation 
and operational departments. 
 Where possible, sitting in on design meetings (Fire Engineering Design Briefs) to see 
how the design environment compares to that in New Zealand. 
 Reviewing past examples of designs that have utilised the FBIM. 
 
6.4. Australasian Regulatory Environment  
 
To understand how the FBIM is being used within Australia by the various state-based fire 
services and practicing consultants it is important to understand the legal environment in 
which the FBIM is being applied.  The Commonwealth of Australia is made up of six states 
and two major mainland territories, each with their own individual legislation comprising of 
Acts and Regulations.  The Constitution of Australia states that responsibility for emergency 
responses lies with each of the states and territories. This includes preparedness for and 
mitigation of potential emergencies, as well as response and recovery action.  Therefore 
each state fire service operates under different Acts, and has different requirements and 
levels of involvement with building design review, dependent on the legislation.   
To appreciate how the FBIM is applied by each of the fire services and consultants it is 
important to understand both the relevant Fire Services Acts which empower the fire service 
to undertake fire-fighting operations, and the relevant Building Acts, which require the fire 
services to be involved in the building design process, either as an approval or review-only 
authority.   
Appendix C provides the relevant state legislation under which the brigades operate in more 
detail.  The following sections provide an introduction and briefly describe each of the Acts 
relevant to the fire services visited compared with those relevant to the NZFS and how each 
of the fire services operates under that legislation so that the reader can make a comparison 
with the NZFS.   
It quickly became apparent that understanding the legislation under which each brigade 




state fire service and by the designers using the model depending on what state they were 
operating in.   
Website addresses have also been provided for further information on those brigades 
visited: 
South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service – http://www.samfs.sa.gov.au/ 
New South Wales Fire Brigade – http://www.nswfb.nsw.gov.au/ 
Melbourne Fire & Emergency Services – http://www.mfb.vic.gov.au/ 
Country Fire Authority – http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/ 
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service – http://www.fire.qld.gov.au/ 
 
 
6.4.1. South Australia  
 
The state of South Australia contains two fire services, the South Australian Metropolitan 
Fire Service (MFS) and the South Australian Country Fire Service (SACFS).   
The Country Fire Service is a statutory authority reporting through a board to the Minister 
and is responsible for preventing and suppressing fires and responding to other 
emergencies in rural South Australia.  The Service works closely with Forestry South 
Australia and the South Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, which both form 
brigades that operate as part of the Country Fire Service. The organisation comprises 
approximately 16,500 volunteers and 71 career employees operating from 431 brigades and 
six regional offices. 
The MFS is the primary provider of structural fire-fighting services to the State of South 
Australia. The MFS was established in 1867 and is based in the capital of South Australia, 
Adelaide, which has a population of approximately 1.2 million. The MFS employs more than 
1,000 staff across 36 stations (19 metropolitan and 17 regional), which comprise 
approximately 770 career employees and 207 retained (part-time) fire fighters.   
As only the MFS were visited during this research this section only focuses on information 






6.4.1.1. South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service 
 
The Built Environment section of the Community Safety Department is responsible for 
overseeing building designs.  The department is currently made up of community safety 
officers and a fire safety engineer who provides specialist engineering advice to the 
department.  My time at the MFS was primarily spent with the current MFS fire engineer, 
Amy Seppelt, and Roger Marchant, now retired, who was the previous MFS fire engineer 
and one of the original FBIM developers. 
 
6.4.1.2. Relevant Legislation 
 
The MFS is governed by the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005.  This 
Act places specific functions on the MFS including those concerning the protection of life, 
property and the environment.  This is the newest of all the Australian fire services Acts and 
specifically includes reference to protection of the environment, which forms part of the 
FBIM.   
The South Australia Development Regulations 2008, under the Development Act 1993, 
provides for the involvement of MFS under two distinct sections.  The first involves the 
referral of the building design for assessment under regulation 28 to ensure the design is 
adequate, and the second requires the MFS to produce an occupancy report on the 
adequacy of specific fire service installations such as the fire alarm system and booster 
assemblies (hydrants). 
The reports provided by the MFS specifically state that the building design is fit for purpose 
from a fire-fighting perspective and also requires that certain systems (including any system 
installed for fire detection, fire fighting, sound and intercom for emergency purposes, or 
smoke control) should be inspected by the MFS prior to the issuing of a Certificate of 
Occupancy.  This is important with regards to the FBIM as the MFS are legislatively 
empowered to provide comment on these facilities and to ensure that they meet with their 
satisfaction and, in particular, are commensurate with the operational fire-fighting 
requirements of the MFS.  Given the liability issues that would be placed upon the building 
authority without the acceptance from the MFS this effectively means that buildings will not 





6.4.1.3. Guidance Documents 
 
To support their legislative role, the MFS provide guidelines with respect to fire engineering 
and alternative solutions (46).  The FBIM is specifically referenced within section 4 of these 
guidelines as given below. 
4. Fire Service Intervention. 
It may be necessary to undertake a Fire Service Intervention analysis to demonstrate 
compliance with the BCA with respect to an acceptable level of safety for the building 
occupants. The ability of fire fighters to rescue trapped or mobility impaired building 
occupants and prevent fire spread to adjoining property are fundamental objectives 
of the BCA. The Australasian Fire Authorities Council Fire Brigade Intervention 
Model should be used to undertake such an analysis. This Department will assist 
designers to undertake such an analysis (emphasis added). 
 
6.4.2. New South Wales  
 
Emergency management in NSW is the province of a number of government organisations, 
the NSW Rural Fire Service, the NSW Fire Brigade, the State Emergency Service, the 
Ambulance Service of NSW and the NSW Police Service. Each organisation has a separate 
administrative structure and reports directly to the responsible Minister. 
The NSW Rural Fire Service is responsible for the prevention and suppression of bush and 
structural fires within its legislative areas, covering over 90% of the State. It is the designated 
agency for the management, coordination and suppression of all rural fires and achieves this 
by working closely with the NSW Fire Brigade, the National Parks and Wildlife Service and 
State Forests.  The Rural Fire Service is responsible for the coordination of all agencies in a 
major bushfire.  
The Rural Fire Service has 2,400 brigades throughout the State.  Volunteer membership is 
listed as approximately 70,000 people and there are 482 permanent staff.  The Service has 
divided the State into four regions: North, South, East and West, with 141 districts reflecting 
local government boundaries.  The Australian Capital Territory is located within the NSW 




As only the New South Wales Fire Brigade (NSWFB) was visited during this research, this 
section only focuses on information relevant to the NSWFB. 
 
6.4.2.1. New South Wales Fire Brigade 
 
The NSWFB maintains both permanent (full-time) stations and retained (part-time) stations. 
Community fire units have been introduced in some urban bush land interface areas, 
providing limited equipment and training to local residents. 
The NSWFB prevents and responds to fires, hazardous material incidents, rescues and 
other emergency incidents within its legislative area, which comprises the Greater Sydney 
area and regional centres.  It has 3,090 full-time and 3,198 part-time fire fighters at 337 
stations across the State. Together with the NSW Rural Fire Service, the Brigade provides 
significant integrated support to communities in the urban–rural interface. 
During this trip, time was spent within the Community Safety Division (CSD) and primarily 
with the Structural Fire Safety Unit.  At the time of this research this unit had three dedicated 
fire engineers to provide specialist advice to the CSD and provide comment on building 
design submissions.   
 
6.4.3. Relevant Legislation 
 
The NSW Fire Services Act 1989 places emphasis on the duty to deal with fires and 
hazardous material incidents.   The Act requires that all practicable measures for preventing 
and extinguishing fires and protecting and saving life and property be taken.  No specific 
reference is made to the protection of the environment; however, the NSWFB is obliged to 
comply with section 10A – Protection of the Environment, which states that the 
commissioner is to have regard to the principles of ecologically sustainable development in 
carrying out any function that affects the environment.  
The Environmental Planning and Assessment (EP&A) Regulation 2000 made under the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 provides for the NSWFB to be involved 
at both the design stage and pre-occupation stage of a building.  Section 144 requires that 
an ‗initial fire safety report‘ be provided to the certifying authority within 23 days after 




also then requires the certifying authority to provide written notice to the NSWFB if they 
decide to ignore the advice provided or continue with the application if no report has been 
provided by the NSWFB within the 23-day requirement.    
The NSWFB comments on certain Alternative Solutions only, which include: 
 Only Category 2 fire safety provisions which include 
•CP9 Fire service access around buildings 
•EP1.3 Hydrant systems 
•EP1.4 Fire suppression systems 
•EP1.6 Co-ordination centre for Brigades 
•EP2.2 Protection of Evacuation routes 
•EP3.2 Emergency lifts 
 Class 9a (health-care buildings) buildings over 2,000 square metres 
 Any building with a fire compartment over 2,000 square metres 
 Any building with a total floor area exceeding 6,000 square metres 
 
Section A0.8 of the Guide to the BCA (34) defines an Alternative Solution as the method 
which may be used to demonstrate the Performance Requirements of the BCA via a route 
which is not included in a Deemed-to-Satisfy Provision. 
Specific commentary is required to be provided in relation to access to hydrant systems and 
compatibility of couplings for Brigade use.  Prior to occupation of a building the NSWFB are 
then provided with the opportunity to provide a ‗final fire safety report‘ specifically 
commenting on compliance of any hydrant system provided and Category 2 fire safety 
provisions.  This also includes an inspection under clause 152 to verify if the Section 144 
solutions are installed and operate as assessed. 
 
6.4.3.1. Guidance Documents 
 
The NSWFB also provide guidelines with respect to certain building types (47).  Reference 
to the FBIM and expectations relating to fire brigade intervention within building designs can 




Consideration for fire service intervention and conditions need to be evaluated at the 
anticipated arrival time, as calculated through acceptable fire service intervention 
modelling.  The model duration may also be required to be extended to incorporate 
conditions at the anticipated arrival time, following evaluation of the anticipated arrival 
time. 
 
This guidance then goes on to require that fire engineering reports are required to contain 
drawings and technical data which specifically includes reference to an FBIM evaluation. 
 
6.4.4. Victoria  
 
Emergency management in Victoria is the responsibility of a number of different 
organisations, the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, the Country Fire Authority, the State 
Emergency Service and the Ambulance Service Victoria.  Both the Metropolitan fire service 
and the Country Fire Authority were visited while in Victoria. 
 
6.4.4.1. Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
 
The Melbourne Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB) is managed by the Metropolitan Fire and 
Emergency Services Board (MFESB) and covers over 1,000 square kilometres of area 
mainly consisting of the city of Melbourne. 
The MFB has approximately 1,511 professional fire fighters and is supported by a number of 
technical and administrative staff.  The MFB fire fighters are also the first to respond to 
specific medical emergencies under the Emergency Medical Response First Responder 
Program, the first of its kind in Australia. 
The MFB currently employ a range of fire engineers, risk engineers and code consultants to 







6.4.4.2. Country Fire Authority  
 
The Country Fire Authority is a community-based fire service providing fire and emergency 
services to rural and provincial communities, as well as urban Melbourne communities 
outside the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board legislative district.  The CFA is 
one of the world‘s largest volunteer-based emergency services. There are around 60,000 
volunteer members supported by over 500 career fire fighters and officers and more than 
900 career support and administrative staff. 
Situated in Victoria, there are 2.5 million people and 150,182 square kilometres of land in the 
CFA area. This area includes more than 980,000 homes, and covers all of rural Victoria, and 
the provincial cities and towns (except State forests and National Parks). 
CFA divide the land covered into nine CFA Areas and 20 Regions.  Across these areas there 
are over 1200 CFA brigades across the state which carry out a wide range of duties. 
The CFA have only recently employed their first full time fire engineer dedicated to providing 
specialist advice to the Structural Fire Safety department within their Community Safety 
Division.   Prior to this, fire engineering advice was provided both in house and outsourced 
as necessary. 
Although the CFA is typically thought of as a rural fire service, their boundaries and areas of 
jurisdiction cover many urban areas and due to urban sprawl over the last couple of decades 
increasingly cover more urban type risks which overlap with the MFB. 
 
6.4.4.3. Relevant Legislation 
 
The Metropolitan Fire Services Act 1958 requires that the MFB use all practical means to 
protect any persons or property that may be endangered by fire.  No specific reference to 
environmental protection is made within the Act.  However, the MFB have policies in place 
referencing other state legislation that places an emphasis on the need to protect the 
environment.  
Under the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 ('the CFA Act'), the CFA is vested with the duty of 
"taking, superintending and enforcing all necessary steps for the prevention and suppression 
of fires and for the protection of life and property in case of fire...so far as relates to the 




involving hazardous materials, road rescue and rescue in areas of diverse risk, including 
high-risk industries such as petrochemical and gas. 
Under the national Building Act 1993 and Building Regulations 2006, the fire services can 
enforce fire safety maintenance requirements within existing commercial buildings, as well 
as specific fire safety standards within certain existing residential buildings.  The Chief 
Officer is authorised under Section 255 of the Building Act 1993 to issue an official warning 
or building infringement notice for prescribed offences. 
Under Regulation 309 of the Victorian Building Regulations, consent of the Chief Officer 
must be obtained if a building is proposed where any of the following fire safety matters do 
not meet the deemed-to-satisfy provisions of the BCA: 
(a) fire hydrants;  
(b) fire hose reels; 
(c) fire control centres or fire control rooms; 
(d) fire precautions during construction; 
(e) fire mains; 
(f) control valves; 
(g) booster assemblies; 
(h) emergency vehicle access; 
(i) fire indicator panels; 
(j) proscenium curtain drencher systems; 
(k) fire services controls in passenger lift cars. 
 
As can be seen, the involvement of the Victorian brigades is only triggered by an alteration 
to a fire-service-related feature.  This means that if designs contain alternative solutions to 
other aspects of the building design the brigades are not afforded the opportunity to review 
those designs.  However, the reports that are reviewed are done so on an holistic basis, 
which means that they will also provide comment and potentially refuse to accept any 
deviations if alternative solutions are proposed on other building design features, e.g. 




6.4.4.4. Guidance Documents 
 
Of all the fire services, the MFB provides more guidance documents relating to the design of 
buildings than any other.  Although most Australian brigades provide guidance on their 
involvement in the design review process and provide generic guidance on their 
expectations for alternative and performance-based designs, the MFB provides numerous 
guidance documents (48) for specific applications including performance-based designs.  
The MFB also provide policy documents, one of which is specific to performance-based 
designs and fire service requirements (49).  With specific reference to fire brigade 
intervention, the MFB policy document states: 
As a minimum, the following issues are required to be addressed for the purpose of 
fire service intervention:  
Fire fighters must be given a reasonable time to enter buildings to conduct search 
and rescue activities for occupants and to carry out internal fire-fighting attack before 
hazardous conditions occur and prior to building collapse; and  
 
In addition, fire fighters should be provided with the necessary information, control 
and safety systems, equipment and fire-fighting medium to effectively suppress and 
carry out fire-fighting activities. 
 
Fire Safety Guidelines GL-17(50) is specifically dedicated to the FBIM, and due to its 
relevance is contained within Appendix D.  Of significance is the requirement to meet the 
performance requirements of the Australian Building Code ―to the degree necessary‖. 
 Given a reasonable time to rescue occupants prior to hazardous conditions and 
building collapse.  
 Be provided with the necessary equipment, systems and water quantities to 
effectively carry out fire-fighting activities.  
 
The CFA are currently drafting a policy guidance document on alternative and performance-
based designs that will require their endorsement.  It is expected that like the MFB 





6.4.5. Queensland  
 
Queensland has a single Department of Emergency Services that is responsible for 
emergency services and emergency management throughout the state.  The Department 
covers all areas concerned with the prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery 
from all types of emergencies delivered by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service 
(QFRS), the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Counter Disaster and Rescue Service.  
 
6.4.5.1. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service 
 
The QFRS combines urban and rural services employing approximately 1,916 full-time and 
1,952 part-time (auxiliary) fire fighters to staff over 240 urban stations. Approximately 45,000 
volunteer fire fighters make up the State‘s 1,623 rural fire services. 
As part of the standard building approvals process in Queensland, the QFRS is a referral 
agency for all performance-based Alternative Solutions that involve fire safety designs. 
These referrals are generally dealt with by a number of building approval officers in the 
various regions around the state. 
Of all the brigades visited, the QFRS were the only brigade to not have a centrally located 
department solely responsible for building review work.  Two fire engineers are specifically 
employed within the fire engineering section of the Community Safety Department.  
However, they provide more of a support function role to the significant number of regionally 
based Building Assessment Officials who review building designs and consent applications.  
 
6.4.5.2. Relevant Legislation 
 
The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 specifically stipulates that the functions 
of the QFRS are to protect persons, property and the environment from fire and hazardous 
materials emergencies.   
Schedule 2 of the Integrated Planning Regulation 1998 sets out the building approvals 
process and requirements for the involvement of the QFRS.   These regulations require that 
any application made for building approval that proposes an Alternative Solution for a fire 




the BCA must be referred to the QFRS for advice.  This schedule also includes specific 
reference to residential care and budget accommodation buildings.  
The QFRS also has stronger powers of enforcement to ensure adequate fire safety 
standards are maintained than most other fire services.  This includes an ‗on-the-spot‘ fines 
system that commenced on 1st December 2001.   
 
6.4.5.3. Guidance Documents 
 
The QFRS Policy on Fire Engineered Alternative Solutions (51) provides guidance to 
engineers and designers with regards to the required content of alternative designs and the 
consultation process.  Of specific note is that under the heading of the Fire and Rescue 
Service Act this policy requires that: 
Performance-based alternative solutions must incorporate the following objectives: 
Fire service intervention – fire fighters must be given reasonable time to enter 
buildings to conduct search and rescue activities for occupants and to carry out 
internal fire-fighting attack before hazardous conditions occur and prior to building 
collapse. 
The design of fire safety systems must facilitate safe and efficient fire service 
intervention. 
 
6.4.6. Private Building Certifiers 
 
One significant difference between the New Zealand and Australian design environment is 
the presence of private building certifiers who act on behalf of the local councils.  Unlike in 
New Zealand where all Building Consent applications are approved by the relevant Building 
Consent Authority, in Australia building approvals and the design processes are increasingly 
being made by private certifiers.   It is understood from the research undertaken that the 
insurance and liability issues faced by private certifiers has increased the level of caution 
exercised as part of the consent process.  As a result, alternative designs accepted by a 
certifier appear to be far more rigorous in the level of justification required than appears to be 
the case in New Zealand.  Also, any comment made by a fire service on an alternative 




risk and liability should they ignore the fire service and any consequence resulting from the 
alternative solution accepted.    
 
6.4.7. Building Legislation and the FBIM 
 
Although Australia has one Building Code applicable to the entire country, the way in which 
building design is enforced, especially from a fire brigade perspective, differs significantly 
from state to state.  From the short period of time spent with the brigades and reviewing 
reports and issues faced by them, it would appear that the degree to which fire-fighting 
facilities and alternative designs that affect fire brigade intervention are being altered from 
the prescriptive solutions depends on the respective fire brigade‘s level of involvement in the 
design review process and also on their respective enforcement powers, either at the design 
stage or occupation of the building or both.   
There would appear to be a direct correlation between how ‗effective‘ a fire service is at 
enforcing building legislation and their own requirements and how often, and to what degree, 
designers are deviating from prescriptive requirements.  
In simplistic terms, the Australian fire brigades have more enforcement powers during the 
design review stage and have greater powers of Building Code enforcement once a building 
is occupied than the NZFS appears to.  The upshot of this is that it is more difficult to 
propose an alternative solution and almost impossible to get consent if the fire brigade does 
not accept the solution.  If the alternative solution involves changes or removal of a fire-
fighting feature this will almost certainly get rejected unless the fire brigade approves its 
removal.  Should the alternative solution be approved against the advice of the fire services 
there are also implications on completion of the building if the fire services are not satisfied 
that the building complies, as action can be taken at that stage to rectify the situation.  This 
means that there are significant deterrents to building developers both in terms of project 
delays and additional costs associated with designs that do not meet with the approvals of 
the relevant brigades.  Therefore, building designers and especially developers appear to be 
more cautious about deviating from prescriptive solutions than is the case in New Zealand.  
This appears to result in a more risk-adverse design environment, which encourages and 
supports early liaison and consultation during the design stages of the project. 
Notwithstanding this, the widespread knowledge and use of the FBIM is such that there is an 
accepted approach to dealing with deviations that affect fire service intervention.  Although it 




doing so immediately means that there are less advantages of proposing such alternatives.  
This would appear to be directly opposed to the current situation in New Zealand where 
there is no currently accepted methodology of quantifying such alternatives, and engineers' 
opinion is typically the only form of justification used where there are less controls on such 
proposals.  Therefore, with less regulatory risk it can be seen why in New Zealand more 
designers propose such deviations and why there is very little cost associated with such 
proposals.  Additionally, an iterative design process appears acceptable to many during the 
design process even though this is contrary to the Building Act. 
One of the most important conclusions taken from this research is that the FBIM serves as a 
check and balance of the design and as a deterrent to designers to undertake alternative 
designs that impact on fire-fighting requirements. Whether or not the FBIM is being used 
specifically within designs, its presence within the design environment in Australia ensures 
that the fire services become involved in the design process to ensure that they are not 
overlooked or unduly affected by any proposed alternative designs.  
 
6.5. Australian Experience of the FBIM 
 
As could be expected, the opinions formed by individuals or indeed entire companies was 
found to be based on their level of exposure and understanding (through training or 
experience) to the FBIM and, importantly, the environment in which they utilise the FBIM.  In 
other words ‗why is the FBIM being used?‘ 
The following findings are based on the questions asked of each of the fire services and 
consultants.   The specific questions and answers provided by those interviewed are not 
documented here to avoid identification of any particular individual or fire brigade but are 
summarised below based on the authors opinions of the findings.   
 
6.5.1. Exposure and Knowledge of the FBIM Throughout the Fire Services 
 
The number of persons within each of the fire services who had knowledge of the FBIM and 
experience of its use in a practical sense varied significantly between the brigades.  Those 
with knowledge of the model ranged from selected individuals within the brigades, typically 
limited to the fire engineers or selected fire safety officers, to widespread knowledge of the 




Such differences appear to be dependent on the size of the safety departments in relation to 
the size of the built environment within the state and the level of control and legislated role of 
the fire service when it comes to assessing building designs and fire-fighting issues. 
For example, there is a significant difference in the size and nature of the buildings being 
constructed and designed, say in Sydney when compared with Adelaide.  The legislation 
and way in which the brigades become involved in designs also differs, which as a result 
defines how the fire service‘s relationship with the design fraternity functions.   
    
6.6. When and Where to Use the FBIM 
 
―Should the FBIM be used or enforced every time there is a departure from the prescriptive 
compliance documents and every time an alternative departure from codes or standards is 
proposed‖? 
The simple answer to the above question was found by both fire brigades and designers to 
be clearly – no! 
The FBIM should not be used in every situation where a deviation from the prescriptive 
requirements is proposed and fire services should in some respects discourage the use of 
the FBIM unless considered necessary or a full performance-based design approach is 
adopted.  In most sprinkled building designs the fire service should be comfortable that the 
proposed design will generally meet with the objectives and legislated requirements of the 
fire service.  Providing significant deviations involving fire-fighting facilities such as sprinklers 
would almost certainly trigger the requirement to undertake an FBIM analysis.  However, 
were only minor deviations from the prescriptive requirements proposed, early consultation 
should be promoted to encourage designers to discuss their proposals with the fire service 
so that agreements can be made as to acceptance of the deviations. 
However, what needs to be stressed is that no fire service, which includes the NZFS, should 
accept any deviation from the prescriptive solutions unless an appropriate level of 
justification is provided to support the deviation.  The FBIM should be used to support such 
justification and to show that fire brigade intervention will not be adversely affected by any 
proposed deviations.  An FBIM analysis, however, can be time consuming and relatively 
expensive from a consultant‘s perspective and so should only be considered if the deviation 





6.6.1. Minor Deviations from the 'Deemed-to-Satisfy' Provisions of the BCA 
 
The FBIM was never intended to be used in every situation where there is a departure from 
the prescriptive requirements, nor does it need to be used in every case where a minor 
departure is proposed.  It is essential, however, that discussions be held with the fire service 
over any proposals to understand if the variation has any effect upon fire brigade 
intervention and to what extent the effect may be. 
No fire service visited was found to be requesting or requiring a designer to go through the 
FBIM process for every design in which a departure from the 'Deemed-to-Satisfy' 
requirements occurs.  Small deviations that only have minor effects on the fire service to 
undertake their statutory duties, as in New Zealand, are typically addressed by discussions 
directly with the fire service and resolved using qualitative descriptions of the effects and 
reasoning behind what effects the deviations will have upon the fire service‘s ability to 
respond and intervene. 
For example, small increases in escape route lengths above the prescriptive requirements 
may not have a significant impact upon fire service activities.  In such situations the designer 
may or may not be proposing additional compensatory features or can readily qualitatively 
describe why the building has features that alleviate the minor deviations as proposed. 
However, it must be stressed that in such circumstances, discussions must be held and 
agreements made with the fire service to ensure that they are in a position to accept and 
support such deviations.  It is further stressed that any such discussions and any 
agreements made need to be fully documented by the designer within the documentation 
required to demonstrate compliance with the relevant BCA performance requirements.   It 
was found to be increasingly important for the fire services to understand and thus require 
that any deviations be fully documented by the designer/proposer and that an appropriate 
level of justification be provided so that any decision made is based on sound technical 
justification. 
In conclusion, no fire service would support any deviation without first being provided with 







6.6.1.1. Selected Use of the FBIM Methodology 
 
Because the FBIM covers all fire-fighter activities from the time of arrival at an incident 
through to extinguishment and overhaul, and environmental protection, application of the 
entire model to every situation may not be necessary.  Where minor or very specific 
deviations are proposed that only affect clearly defined aspects of fire brigade intervention, 
the FBIM may only be required to be analysed until that aspect has been investigated and 
proven.  The model should also be seen as a flexible tool in that only those aspects affecting 
the essential intervention aspects need to be taken into account within the analysis.   
It would not be expected, for example, to assess the actions of multiple appliances and their 
attendance at an incident where the FBIM assessment was only required to understand the 
arrival or set up times associated with a single pumping appliance. Additional appliances and 
fire fighters present at the scene, whilst providing additional responses, equipment and 
resources to the incident, could be ancillary to the appliance and fire fighters who would 
likely arrive first and be of principle interest to the analysis.  
Also, the analysis may only need to be undertaken up to a point of specific interest as 
agreed with the respective brigade.  For example, depending on the alternative solutions 
proposed, the fire brigade may only be primarily interested in ensuring that the fire is within 
the fire suppression capability of the closest responding appliances.  In this situation, only 
the predicted arrival time versus fire development may be of interest.  However, should the 
alternative solution modify smoke extraction and egress path lengths, for example, a fire 
brigade may wish to ensure that they would have sufficient time to be able to conduct search 
and rescue activities within a certain area of the building before untenable conditions for fire 
fighters were reached.  
 
6.6.2. FBIM Application 
 
Application of the FBIM differs slightly from state to state and it appears dependent on how 
each fire service becomes involved with the design.  More often than not, FEBs are 
requested by the consultants early in the design phase.  FEBs are a regular occurrence 
throughout Australia on most, if not all, designs that propose significant alterations to the 
‗deemed-to-satisfy‘ requirements.  The IFEG FEB process is strongly reinforced by all the 
brigades and is written into most guidance documents and policies provided by the 




the FEB process, the IFEG requires assessment of fire service intervention; as such, the 
liaison with brigades becomes a formality in most designs.  Dependent on the scale and 
scope of the project, the need to undertake an FBIM analysis will typically be discussed, 
including the parameters and expectations of the analysis.  It is important to note that in 
most if not all of the brigades, the FEB meeting is attended by at least two fire brigade staff, 
typically those with appropriate experience in operational matters, fire safety and fire 
engineering.  With this range of experience and knowledge, a decision can normally be 
made as to whether the designs proposed will require an assessment using the FBIM.   
An FEB meeting is important for all the stakeholders as it provides the fire brigade with an 
opportunity to understand the requirements and needs of the architects and client and also 
the methods proposed by the fire engineers of how they intend to address the alternative 
solutions.  Once the fire brigade has a clear understanding of the issues it should be in a 
position to either recommend that an FBIM assessment will be required or to discuss 
alternative methods if such an analysis is unnecessary.   
Once the need for an FBIM is clearly established, the parameters required and information 
needed by the consultant to undertake the FBIM can be discussed.  Depending on the 
nature of the proposal, these need not be detailed as the FBIM manual contains enough 
data for the assessment to be run without further input from the fire service.  In these 
circumstances, discussions and checking by the brigades only need to be undertaken on the 
assumptions made within the model and assessment undertaken based on the individual 
brigade‘s standard operational procedures. 
Where designs are brought to the fire brigades on the basis that an FBIM will be required, 
again discussions can be held over any significant issues that the fire service believes 
relevant to the proposal, otherwise assessments can be submitted electronically or by other 
means so that the fire service can check and verify that the results are meaningful.   
There are a number of essential elements that are required to make sure that an FBIM 
analysis is first of all needed and secondly beneficial to all the stakeholders.  Following a 
proper process and undertaking an FEB is essential to gaining fire service approval for the 
project design basis.  Secondly, if an FBIM is required and if an FBIM cannot be avoided by 
other means it should ensure that any analysis is fit for purpose.  The most important aspect 
of this whole process however, is that the fire services endeavour to provide the three key 
ingredients to the process.  Without the appropriate knowledge in operational matters, fire 
safety and fire engineering, the process runs the risk of not identifying important issues that 




6.6.3. FBIM Education and Training 
 
If the FBIM was to be used appropriately then education and training in its use was found to 
be essential(1).  During development of the FBIM it became obvious that a combination of 
knowledge of both fire-service operations and fire-engineering principles would be required.   
The FBIM committee has maintained a broad range of skills and backgrounds including 
those in fire brigade operations and fire engineering, and so the FBIM was developed with 
the intention of assisting both the fire service and fire industry with assessment of 
performance-based designs.  The FBIM committee acknowledged that if the fire industry 
lacked knowledge of fire brigade operations they would require training.  Likewise, the fire 
service would require training in fire engineering to ensure that they would understand the 
FBIM and could provide relevant input into the engineering aspects associated with 
performance-based designs.  Once both parties obtain the appropriate level of knowledge, 
specific training can then be given in the mechanics of the FBIM and its application to 
performance-based designs.   This was recognised in a paper discussing the FBIM 
presented at the 1st International Conference on Fire Service Deployment Analysis in 1999 
(52).  Of relevance was the reference to the NZFS providing training material to support the 
Training Package being developed at that time.   
Tertiary education and formal training is provided in Australia by three universities in Victoria, 
New South Wales and South Australia that provide courses specifically regarding fire 
brigade operations based around the FBIM.   
Victoria University provides three fire engineering courses including a Master of Engineering 
in Building Fire Safety and Risk Engineering, a Graduate Diploma in Building Fire Safety and 
Risk Engineering and a Graduate Certificate in Performance-Based Building and Fire Codes.  
A paper covering fire brigade response and operations is taught on all three courses which 
includes presentations given by the MFB on the FBIM. 
The University of Adelaide does not provide a specific fire engineering qualification, but as 
part of its Mechanical Engineering degree provides a fire engineering course that specifically 
covers the FBIM.  This course is given by Roger Marchant, formally of the MFS. 
The University of Western Sydney provides both a Graduate Diploma and Masters Degree in 
Fire Safety Engineering.  A specific course on fire brigade intervention and operations based 




From these findings it is considered that education of the FBIM or at least its general 
principles is essential if it is to be used properly within New Zealand.  
 
6.6.4. Who Can Use the FBIM 
 
As part of the requirements to use the FBIM it is recognised that it should always be 
conducted in liaison and/or verified with the relevant fire service‘s fire safety/engineering 
department. Use of the FBIM in Australia to date indicates that only those individuals with 
sufficient knowledge of fire service operations can fully appreciate the inputs required to 
support the FBIM appropriately.  If persons unfamiliar with fire service operations use the 
FBIM, the analysis risks becoming irrelevant or worse, dangerous.  To support the FBIM 
appropriately, any fire service using the FBIM or offering advice on its application should be 
well informed on its use within a performance-based design environment.  Likewise, a 
designer using the FBIM who has little or no understanding of fire service operations in and 
around buildings may produce meaningless or undesirable results.  However, to aid in the 
application of the FBIM, AFAC produced the FBIM computer program intended to reduce the 
misapplication of the FBIM methodology.  As with any computer package or design 
application, however, a fundamental understanding of its basis and education of its 
application are still essential to achieving the appropriate results. 
 
6.6.5. Concerns Raised With the Use of the FBIM 
 
As with any model used within fire engineering there is scope for misuse, be it intentional or 
otherwise.  Alexandrovski (1)  researched the use of the FBIM and whether it was being 
appropriately applied within NSW.  Findings of the author and those of the NSWFB would 
suggest that they both have concerns that the FBIM is not being consistently applied and in 
accordance with an appropriate fire engineering process such as the IFEG (14).  The results 
of such concerns were that assumptions made within the FBIMs presented by consultants 
were inconsistent with the Standard Operational Procedures of the NSWFB and that they 
lacked proper contextual value. 
Time spent with Alexander Alexandrovski as part of this research trip and reading through 
his research material provided reasons for why the model is not being used as intended.  




operations and the effect that any deviations in building designs will have upon fire service 
operations.   From this perspective it can be seen that involvement of the appropriate fire 
services operational personnel is crucial to a successful outcome of the FBIM.   
 
6.6.6. Fire Services Providing an FBIM 'Consultancy' Service 
 
The FBIM requires knowledge of fire service operations, current fire service capabilities and 
response characteristics as well as fire engineering knowledge.  Fire brigades themselves 
are seen to be in a key position to not only offer advice on the model and undertake a review 
but also to provide the assessment on behalf of the consultant for a fee.  At this time, only 
the MFB offer such a service to the design community and will provide an FBIM analysis by 
charging for this service.  It is understood that the MFB have undertaken the analysis on a 
number of occasions but that this has not been done for some time.  It would appear from 
the anecdotal evidence that such analyses were undertaken when the FBIM was first 
starting to be required by the brigades.  The analyses were typically undertaken for 
consultants with little or no knowledge of the FBIM.  These consultancies have since 
stopped requesting such assistance given that they now have the model and the experience 
in its use and application for building designs.  The market for such assessment from a fire 
service perspective would therefore be somewhat limited.   
The NSWFB are also considering charging for similar advice but are not currently doing so.  
Research undertaken by Alexandrovski (1) in association with the NSWFB suggests that the 
FBIM is not being applied as intended, and this is a key driver behind the NSWFB 
considering providing such a service.  However, the author of this project is not in favour of 
this approach as it removes fire brigades‘ independence from the design process.  Such 
independence is considered important to ensure that any fire service does not unreasonably 
drive the design requirements of a building and to ensure that they do not become liable for 






6.6.7. Other Uses of the FBIM 
 
6.6.7.1. Use of the FBIM in Building Appeals Processes 
 
Similar to the Determination process in New Zealand, the building appeals process in 
Australia is used to determine compliance against the BCA if any of the parties involved in 
the building design, such as the developer, private certifier or fire service raise a matter of 
dispute over a compliance issue.  The FBIM has been successfully used on a number of 
occasions, particularly by the MFB, to argue and show that fire brigade intervention 
requirements have not been met within the proposed design.    
Although the NZFS has taken a number of determinations relevant to fire brigade 
intervention, it has not to date referenced or used the FBIM to argue any matters of dispute.  
Although not necessary in any cases in the determinations to date, an FBIM analysis could 
have been used to illustrate issues within the building‘s design relevant to any matters of 
dispute. 
 
6.6.7.2. Use of the FBIM for Post-Incident Analysis and Fire Investigation 
 
As the FBIM quantifies fire brigade operations and provides a time line of the anticipated 
events at an incident, it is possible that the FBIM can be used for more than just building 
designs.  Although the use of the FBIM for these types of applications is not widespread and 
relatively rarely used, a number of fire services have either used the FBIM for post-incident 
analysis purposes or are considering incorporating such an analysis of part of an operational 
review if required. 
Given that the FBIM provides an accepted methodology to quantify fire brigade operations, it 
is understood to have been successfully used on a number of occasions to support the times 
taken for fire brigade operations at incidents.  Such analyses have been undertaken where 
the fire brigades have found themselves subject to criticism regarding the length of time it 
has taken them to respond and undertake certain activities at emergency incidents.  Where 
the FBIM has been used for this particular purpose it is understood that, on each occasion, 
issues such as travel times to the incidents and times taken to set up and access and 
assess the situation were not unexpected to members with operational experience and were 
within accepted fire service response policies.  However, at some incidents the fire services 




such cases the FBIM model has been assessed based on the incident and the operations 
undertaken at the time compared with those assumed within the model and the times 
predicted by the outcome.  Although it was never intended for the FBIM to be used as a 
design approach to influence fire service operational decisions, the outcome of such analysis 
is that the times associated with the incidents were similar to those predicted by the model 
based on a certain percentile approach.  The result of this type of application provided those 
brigades not only with evidence supporting the actions undertaken at those incidents but 
also substantiation of the times in which it took the fire services to carry out those actions.  
It is also important to recognise that the use of the FBIM in this manner has served to 
validate the model and provide some confidence in the methodology and times provided to 
support it. 
 
6.6.7.3. Tactical Command Training 
 
It is not expected that the use of the FBIM as a design approach will influence fire service 
deployment decisions.  However, use of the model for operational training purposes and pre-
incident planning is a possibility being considered by some brigades.   Although not tried or 
tested at this time, it is expected knowledge of the FBIM in joint use with training packages 
such as VECTOR Tactical Command training (53) could help officers gain a better 
understanding of the times associated with specific deployment decisions so that they could 
possibly use this to influence their decisions depending on how incidents are unfolding in 
real time.   
 
6.7.  Australian Research Findings 
 
6.7.1. Fire Service Staff Opinions of the FBIM 
 
It is clear after speaking with the various brigades and many individuals within those 
brigades that there is a wide and varying opinion about the FBIM and not all of it is positive.  
It is clear that the opinions expressed to the author have been made depending on the 
individual‘s level of exposure to the FBIM and understanding of the model and the context to 




There are a number of variables that can explain why such a wide range of opinions exist 
within the brigades., including: 
 the respective state and fire services legislation and understanding of how the FBIM 
fits in with this legislation; 
 the individual fire service‘s involvement in the building design process and the effect 
that this has upon the use of the FBIM in the design process; 
 the individual‘s exposure to the FBIM including training and length of involvement 
with the FBIM; 
 the individual‘s understanding of performance-based engineering and its effect upon 
the built environment; 
 the enforcement powers of the individual fire services and use of these to lever the 
FBIM as a design tool as and when required. 
 
As the author‘s time with the brigades was mostly spent with staff members familiar with the 
FBIM, it could easily be argued that with regards to trying to gain a balanced view of the fire 
brigades opinion of the FBIM, the results would be biased.  This is certainly true.  However, 
mixed opinions were found amongst those persons talked to.  Such opinions ranged from 
the belief that the model represented realistic fire brigade times as accurately as could be 
expected, to the other end of the scale where individuals believed that the times predicted by 
the model were typically excessive and not realistic.  Some people considered that this type 
of model was unnecessary, while others considered it essential to the life safety of fire 
fighters. 
There are a number of reasons why the author feels that concerns regarding the model 
exist, and why those individuals expressed such beliefs.  An understanding of the design 
environment and the background to the FBIM is crucial to understanding why there is a need 
for the FBIM and why the model is structured in the way it is.  The individuals who expressed 
concerns over the need for the FBIM and those that expressed concerns over the times 
predicted by the model did not appear to be greatly involved in the design or fire-safety field, 
i.e. they had little real experience in building design and the implications of performance-
based design on fire-fighting operations or had not used the FBIM first hand in a challenging 
design environment.   
An example of this is the belief that the FBIM does not reflect reality and that it predicts 
unrealistic and excessive intervention times.  This opinion stems from operational 




themselves with times that appear excessive and could be detrimental to the public's 
perception of their ability.  However, as with any building design egress analysis, it is not 
appropriate to always consider best-case scenarios and times which are only attainable 
during normal conditions. 
An example of how the FBIM should be applied, and in which the times can appear 
excessive, is considering the response times from fire stations given the proximity of the 
building to the fire station.  If, for example, the building being analysed is only 100 m from 
the nearest fire station, it might not be appropriate to only assume a vehicle response 
distance of 100 m.  Some scenarios might need to consider that the station is not manned at 
the time of an incident and that the appliance is not available as a result of it being 
committed to another incident, for example. A second fire station or even a third might need 
to be used for the FBIM analysis, increasing times from what a designer or even a fire 
service person might have expected.  However, issues such as this need to be taken into 
account to ensure that a credible worst-case scenario is being considered. 
   
6.7.2. Consultants’ Views of Fire Brigade Intervention and the FBIM 
 
As was to be expected, the opinions expressed by the consultants were variable.  
Disagreements arose over what actually constituted fire brigade intervention and to what 
degree fire service involvement was required within the building design process.  A 
proportion of the consultants visited had fire service operational experience and their views 
were slightly more biased towards the needs of the fire services within designs.  However, 
the common theme expressed by all those consultants was that they considered the fire 
services to be important stakeholders and as such needed to be incorporated in the design 
process. 
Another significant difference that became apparent from the time spent with the consultants 
in Australia in comparison with the design fraternity in New Zealand is that the Australian fire 
engineers appear to reinforce fire-service requirements and see these as positive design 
factors.  An example would be hose run distances from hydrant outlets and the 
acknowledgement from consultants that distances prescribed by building codes are 
‗maximums‘ as they reflect the upper limit of capabilities during intervention and not the 
minimum.  Typically, extending hose run distances is not acceptable and so it is not possible 





During the time with the Australian fire services the author was given the opportunity to sit in 
on FEB meetings.  The previous view was reinforced within these meetings as the 
consultants appeared to respect and understand the needs of the fire services.  The FBIM 
was not specifically discussed within any of the meetings attended.  However, the tone of the 
meetings and designs put forward were such that it was clear the consultants were spending 
considerable effort designing fire service facilities into the buildings rather than spending that 
effort trying to design them out. 
All the consultants talked to had undertaken FBIM analysis for building projects they had 
worked on.  However, the common view expressed between them was the desire not to 
have to undertake such analysis.  This view was partly formed as a result of the added costs 
associated with undertaking the additional analysis but could also be put down to the 
opinions that they did not want to propose alterations that would ultimately affect fire service 
intervention. 
 
6.7.3. Concerns Relating to the Assumptions Made Within the FBIM 
 
A number of concerns have been raised by both fire brigades and designers over the values 
and assumptions that are made within an FBIM analysis should these assumptions change 
over time.  For example, if travel times from a fire station are used within the model, 
concerns have been expressed as to the implications of moving the station location in the 
future.  Similar issues are also relevant to other assumptions within the model that relate to 
the capabilities of the fire services with respect to resources and equipment and the 
implications of these changing over time.  However, the assumptions on which the FBIM are 
based should not be that sensitive to changes that could be reasonably expected, including 
inputs such as fire station location.  It should also be recognised that with any performance-
based design, assumptions regarding the basis of the design have to be made.  Therefore, 
defining fire-service operations does not mean that these are locked in for the remaining life 
of that building.  If any significant changes do occur that alter the design base assumptions 
significantly, then as with other aspects of the design, these should be rechecked and the 
design changed accordingly. 
Similarities with other building design aspects can be made, for example with water supplies.  
When a building is constructed the design of systems (including sprinkler systems) are 
typically based on the flows and pressures of the water infrastructure available at the time of 




companies which are reducing water supply pressures as much as possible for various 
reasons.  This has an effect on sprinkler systems that may induce required changes and 
alterations to the systems to take such changes into account.  To reduce the impact that 
such issues could create, appropriate safety factors need to be applied to an FBIM 
assessment.  The involvement of appropriate fire service personnel should also help reduce 
such issues. 
 
6.7.4. Use of the FBIM to Remove Fire-Fighting Facilities 
 
Because the FBIM quantifies fire service activities, it could be possible using the FBIM to 
demonstrate that the fire services have sufficient time available to undertake required 
operations without using specific equipment.  Such examples could include manipulating the 
model in an attempt to show that the fire service may have the time available to extend 
hoses through and up buildings without the need to use internal hydrant risers, for example.  
It should be stressed that this is not the intention of the FBIM and that no fire services were 
found to accept such an analysis in Australia.  Many fire-fighting facilities including hydrant 
facilities are provided due to inherent limitations in the capabilities of fire service equipment 
and physical ability of fire fighters.  A time-based analysis in this circumstance may not 
always be appropriate. 
For example, fire hoses have the capability to be extended almost indefinitely to any length.  
However, practicable limitations exist given the safe working pressures of the hoses and 
pressure losses and also the limitations in the ability of fire fighters to manoeuvre hoses due 
to their increasing weight with increasing length.  Such factors are not included within the 
FBIM as consultation with the local fire services should ensure that their standard 
operational procedures are followed which would incorporate any equipment limitations. 
The FBIM should be seen solely as a tool for assessing fire-fighter safety given the proposed 
building design.  If fire-fighter safety cannot be proven, the building design should be 
adapted accordingly.  The FBIM should not, therefore, be used to remove or reduce the level 






6.7.5. Buildings Reliant on Fire Service Response 
 
The safety of occupants within buildings should never be predicated on the attendance of 
fire brigades and based on assumptions that persons will be rescued. This is identified within 
many performance-based codes throughout the world as identified in chapter 5.  However, 
situations will always occur which require fire brigades to undertake rescue operations, and 
specific building types, such as hospitals and tall buildings, will always to some degree rely 
on fire brigade intervention in the event of a fire.  However, a building design should 
ultimately be ‗self sufficient‘ and not rely on fire brigade intervention.  In the future, it is likely 
that the funding and strategic direction of fire services will change as a result of ever-
increasing financial pressures and increasing efforts in other non-traditional emergency 
service responses, including environmental protection and vehicle incidents.    This further 
enforces the intent of the FBIM in that it should be a tool used to assess the life safety of fire 
fighters and to facilitate their role rather than a means of designing these features out of the 
buildings.   This argument may be perceived to be contradictory by some, but is an important 
aspect of the intended use of the model as it relies on fire services‘ standard operational 
procedures as a critical part of the analysis. 
An example of this is the consideration of the fire service as an ‗active suppression‘ system 
similar to that of a sprinkler system.  For example, many building codes allow the reduction 
of fire ratings if sprinklers are provided.  However, they do not remove the need for such 
ratings and typically only allow them to be halved, even though it could be shown that no 
ratings are required should the sprinkler system work.  The redundancy provided in this 
requirement takes into account the fact that such systems are not 100% reliable and 
dismisses the actions of the fire services, even though it could be shown by the FBIM that a 
fire service could potentially suppress the fire, reducing the need for higher fire ratings.  In 
this example, the FBIM could be used to argue that the fire service should be able to 
extinguish the fire in a given time given the resources available and thus determine any fire 
ratings on this basis.  However, such a design approach would significantly deviate from any 
currently accepted design approaches and insufficient data is currently available that could 









Response times to buildings and incidents have historically been perceived to be a key 
factor in the ability of emergency responders to effectively respond to fire.  It is also apparent 
that in an emergency there is a public perception that when the emergency services arrive 
the situation will instantly be brought under control and made safe.  It is becoming well 
known throughout emergency services worldwide that the time taken to reach the scene of a 
fire may not always represent the most significant proportion of the time taken for the fire 
brigade to commence fire fighting or rescue operations and start to bring about control over 
the situation.  PD7974-5 (4) suggests that a time upwards of ten minutes can be expected 
between arrival and commencement of fire-fighting activities in a high-rise building.  
However, fire station location and resource allocation are in many cases still based on the 
travel distances to incidents, assuming that the time taken to arrive at the incident location is 
the most significant factor in determining the overall intervention times.  For large, 
complicated buildings, especially those requiring fire fighters to travel large distances either 
horizontally or vertically up stairs and with equipment, the travel time in a fire appliance to a 
specific address point may not constitute the most significant proportion of the total 
intervention time.  It is important, therefore, to understand the overall fire brigade intervention 
time so the appropriate resources can be made available and to ensure that the most 
efficient operational response to an incident can be undertaken without unnecessary delays.   
This chapter presents the analysis of New Zealand data required to populate the FBIM and 
that relevant to assessing fire service response characteristics within building designs.  
 
7.2. NZFS Fleet and Hose Equipment 
 
As an introduction to the NZFS fleet and equipment, the following section briefly discusses 







7.2.1. NZFS Fleet 
 
In the NZFS, fire engines or trucks are commonly referred to as fire appliances.  There are 
six classifications of appliances within the NZFS operational response fleet classed as:  
 Type 1 < 10,000 kg small pump – urban/rural;  
 Type 2 < 12,000 kg medium pump – urban/rural;  
 Type 3 < 14,000 kg heavy pump – urban; 
 Type 4 > 14,000 kg heavy pump elevating monitor – urban;  
 Type 5 > 14,000 kg aerial without a dedicated pump – urban; 
 Type 6 > 14,000 kg heavy aerial – with full crew cab, tank supply, hose reels and 
dedicated pump. 
 
Although each type of appliance has slightly different crew and equipment characteristics, it 
is not necessary to differentiate between these appliances when undertaking an FBIM 
analysis as NZFS procedures and polices ensure that the minimum number of staffing and 
equipment will be present and can be assumed as available when an appliance is in 
attendance at an incident.  The only exception to this is for aerial appliances and the number 
of crew that will be present to operate the specific aerial appliance available within a specific 
fire area as discussed below in section 7.7.  Further information on NZFS vehicles and their 
specific characteristics can be found on the NZFS website.  Where necessary, the relevance 
of operational fleet to the FBIM is discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.2.2. Hose Equipment 
 
The NZFS uses a range of hoses that can be divided into the following main categories: 
 feeder hose; 
 delivery hose; 






7.2.2.1. Feeder Hose 
 
Feeder hose is used to supply water from a pressurised water source such as a municipal 
supply accessed using a standpipe.  Feeder hose used to supply a fire appliance is typically 
larger than delivery hose used to fight fires and is typically 90 mm (actually 89 mm) in 
diameter and 30 m in length to maximise flow capacity.  A 25-m long, 70-mm diameter hose 
is also starting to be used as feeder hose on some appliances, typically in use with newer 
Type 1 and 2 volunteer appliances, and has replaced the conventional 90-mm feeder hose 
due to weight and handling advantages.   
 
7.2.2.2. Delivery Hose 
 
Low-pressure delivery hoses used to attack larger fires typically consist of a number of 70-
mm hose with a final 25 m length of 45-mm diameter hose provided for manoeuvrability.  
The last section of hose, named the branch man's length, will typically be run out on the 'bite' 
to allow for the fire fighters to approach the fire from this location with up to 25 m worth of 
manoeuvrable hose.  All NZFS lay flat hose are non-percolating and are specified to comply 
with BS 6391 (54). 
One of the main differences identified between Australian fire brigades and NZFS equipment 
is the slight differences in the hose type, length and diameter and the couplings used.  The 
FBIM provides data associated with the use of 90-mm, 65-mm and 38-mm diameter lay flat 
hose which is all 30 m in length and 3-m long rigid suction hose.  This has implications for 
building designs and for FBIM analysis as the differences in hose lengths may need to be 
factored into an analysis of building design considering the effective reach of hoses.  The 
most significant difference found to date is that between a typical Australian high-rise hose 
pack and an NZFS hose pack.  Further information regarding the use of high-rise hose 
packs is discussed in Section  0; however, for comparison a standard high-rise pack in 
Australia consists of two 30-m lengths of 38 mm duraline hose providing a maximum of 60 m 
reach not including the reach of the water jet. The NZFS high-rise pack consists of one 
length of 70-mm hose and a single length of 45-mm hose for the branch man's length, 
providing for 50 m of effective reach.  The differences between the use of these hoses, 
considering the difference in length versus hose diameter, is unlikely to impact on the 
deployment time considering both systems use only two hoses.  However, for design 




limitation of the equipment used and compartment sizes and layout designs that are not 
inclusive of this limitation would be outside the reach of fire-fighters‘ capabilities. 
There is no distinction between the types of couplings used and thus it is assumed that any 
difference between the use of different coupling types would be negligible.  There are seven 
different coupling types used throughout Australia, excluding suction hose.  These are 
identified within various Australian standards including Table E1 of the fire hydrant 
installations replicated below in Table 1.  The NZFS uses 65-mm British Instantaneous 
Couplings (BIC) for lay flat hoses as shown in Figure 16 with Australian Storz hermaphrodite 
couplings.  
 
Table 1 Types of fire hose couplings used within Australia 
 




1 British instantaneous to BS 336 
2 Storz hermaphrodite 
3 64 mm × 4.88 mm pitch (2½ × 51/5 TPI) 
4 64 mm × 5.08 mm pitch (2½ × 5 TPI) Whitworth form 
5 63 mm × 8.47 mm pitch (2½ × 3 TPI) 
6 Queensland round thread 
7 SA round thread 
 
Lay flat delivery hose is stored on an appliance in rolled coils, which require running out 
between specific locations or in pre-connected flaked arrangements, allowing the hose to be 
pulled straight out from the appliance direct to the required location.  As BIC are classed as 
male and female couplings, they are stored so that they are rolled out from the appliance to 
the location of the fire holding and the hose rotated around the female coupling.  Figure 16 
shows the Storz hermaphrodite couplings and hose rolled in a 'Dutch' roll configuration 
allowing any coupling to be connected to another piece of waterway equipment with the 





Figure 16 NZFS BIC (left) and Australian Storz couplings (right)  
High-pressure deliveries are carried on most fire appliances. Typically, two 60-m high-
pressure hose reels are mounted on either side of the appliance to allow them to be taken 
quickly and directly from the appliance to the fire location.  High-pressure deliveries have an 
internal diameter of approximately 25 mm and operate at a maximum working pressure of 
around 3500 kPa.  For smaller fires and ones which can be accessed within the length of the 
reel, they allow a quicker attack on a fire as they are lighter and more manoeuvrable than 
using 70 mm/45 mm low-pressure deliveries.  It should, however, be recognised that high-
pressure deliveries need to be dragged from the appliance and along the ground which 
becomes difficult towards the end of the reel and around objects in some configurations.   
Other types of hose, including specialist forestry and percolating hose, are carried on 
specific appliances.  These are not discussed here further and are not incorporated into the 
FBIM as they are not typically used for urban fire fighting. 
 
7.2.2.3. Suction Hose 
 
Suction hose is used to draft water from open water sources or no elevated static supplies. 
Hard suction, as it is also known, comes in various sizes ranging from 100-mm to 150-mm 
internal diameter sizes and is typically 2.5 m in length.  Normally four lengths are carried on 
a fire appliance allowing for a maximum reach of 10 m from the appliance inlet.  The 




access arrangement normally restricts the ability and lift available for use of open water 
sources further than 6–7 m from the appliance inlet. 
 
7.3. Data Collection Methods 
 
The type of data required to populate the FBIM and to allow quantification of fire brigade 
intervention times across the broad spectrum of responses to fires that could occur is 
significant, and requires different types of methods to collect and analyse the different types 
of data sets.  The data currently provided within the FBIM manual contains the following 
different types of data sets: 
 times associated with the operation and notification delays of detection and 
suppression systems; 
 processing times within emergency communication centres and times associated 
with notification of the relevant fire appliances; 
 travel distances and response speeds associated with responding fire brigade 
appliances; 
 times associated with individual fire ground tasks, from running hose to search and 
rescue activities including those associated with specialist fire appliances such as 
aerial appliances. 
The collection of data presented herein has been established through a number of different 
methods including: 
 analysing the latest statistical data available from the NZFS Intergraph Computer 
Aided Dispatch System (ICAD) over the period from July 2008 to June 2009; 
 use of various software packages including the TransCAD Facility Location software 
tool and Google™Maps to provide information on fire appliance distances travelled to 
incidents; 
 preparation and trialling of operational exercises to allow individual brigades to 
undertake exercises and record the times associated with specific operational tasks; 
 undertaking specific large scale operational exercises including mock incidents within 
buildings; 
 attendance at fire incidents and observing fire ground tasks; 
 observing incidents on appliances at different fire stations in different locations; 




To compare and produce useable results from the data collected for use in the FBIM and a 
probabilistic analysis, the Palisade software package @Risk (55) was used to fit distributions 
to the data.  The @Risk software ranks all the fitted distributions using a number of fit 
statistics allowing comparison and a measure of how well the distribution fits the input data.  
For each of the data sets collected, the fitted distributions and resultant functions were 
visually compared and consideration was given to the type of distribution function considered 
appropriate based on the @Risk calculated fit statistic and nature of the data collected.  For 
the majority of the distributions proposed, the distribution that returned the lowest calculated 
fit statistic and therefore the best fit has been used, calculated using either chi-squared or 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov fit statistics.  
This chapter presents the data that has been collected as part of this research and describes 
each of the methods in more detail with each set of data collected.  The following sections 
provide information to support the FBIM based on the data entry tables given within the 
FBIM manual.  For ease of reference, the following information has been provided in the 
same order as that given within the FBIM manual and reference is given to the appropriate 
FBIM chart and where data is proposed for use within an FBIM analysis it is provided in a 
similar format as given within the FBIM.  Where data has not been collected to date, the 
existing Australian data has been re-evaluated using @Risk and the distributions found to 
best fit that data is discussed.  Where considered relevant for use in the New Zealand 
context, the @Risk distributions from the original FBIM Australian data has been provided 
for use within a probabilistic analysis. 
 
7.4.  Activities Required for Fire Brigade Notification 
 
The following sections relate to those activities required to occur before notification and 
dispatch of fire fighters can occur and consider the various methods available and necessary 
process times associated with each individual component. 
 
7.4.1. Time Taken for Initial Brigade Notification 
 
Table A within the FBIM presents times associated with an automatic suppression system 
operation with regards to the requirements of the Australian sprinkler standard.  The FBIM 




with the Australian Standard AS 2118.1 and three times for ordinary hazard systems 
depending on the floor area of installation.  These are given as 10, 20 and 50 seconds for 
installation areas of less than 1000 m2, between 1000 and 2000 m2 and above 2000 m2, 
respectively. 
In New Zealand, commercial automatic fire sprinkler systems are generally installed to 
comply with NZS 4541 (55) which provides no alarm response time requirements for 
sprinkler activation. Unlike other sprinkler systems designed to meet other international 
standards such as Factory Mutual and NFPA systems, NZS 4541 systems do not have an 
inspector‘s test cock at the furthest remote point in the system allowing for this specific value 
to be readily established. Typically, the majority of the sprinkler systems installed in New 
Zealand are classed as 'Type X' systems, which employ super-pressurised systems with no 
time-related specifications required. NZS 4541 does provide performance levels for 
signalling when 'Type Y' alarm systems are used; however, these are relatively rare and are 
generally only utilised where water supply pressures exceed 800 kPa.  For 'Type Y' alarm 
systems, the standard requires that an alarm signal must be generated within 20 seconds of 
the alarm valve lifting (Clause 407.2.2.2(iv)).  However, it is understood that this 20 seconds 
is taken from the time when the alarm valve lifts until the NZFS notification and evacuation 
sounders signals are sent. The standard does not provide any requirement for how long the 
time delay is from when the sprinkler head operates until the system drops enough pressure 
for the alarm valve to lift.  
Factors that influence the alarm signalling time after sprinkler operation have been 
established to include: 
 the system volume; 
 super-pressurisation level; 
 the amount of trapped air; 
 sprinkler orifice size, reticulation routing and its height relative to the valve set;  
 the number of heads that open; 
 the actual system standing/design pressure; 
 the performance and setting of the pressure switch. 
 
This specific item has been discussed with a number of sprinkler experts and committee 
members involved in drafting the NZS 4541 standard who have all stated that this time 
period can be considerable and is likely to exceed 60 seconds for many 




not be (and are not) met, particularly when the system incorporates automatic jacking 
pumps.  Because of the lack of data that exists for NZS 4541 systems and because of the 
level of variability that could impact on this response and signalling time, it is difficult to 
establish a time period or nominal value for an NZS 4541-compliant sprinkler system 
irrespective of basic design information such as the size of the building and area to be 
covered, for example.  However, anecdotal evidence provided by persons well experienced 
in the testing and commissioning of various different types of sprinkler systems suggests 
values and ranges that would be considered appropriate given the range of variables that 
are known to affect this time.  Based on the information supplied and the knowledge that 
systems such as NFPA 13 and Factory Mutual have performance standards for this time 
period, it is suggested that a range between 60 and 360 seconds be used for wet pipe 
sprinkler systems that comply with NZS 4541.  For dry pipe systems complying with the 
same standard, a single time delay of 90 seconds has been advised as appropriate.  For the 
purposes of the FBIM data, these values are given below in Table 2 and shown in Figure 17 
as a uniform distribution for use within a probabilistic analysis.   
Table 2 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table A 
Activity Floor area of 
installation 
Time (s) 
NZS 4541 compliant system – Wet pipe system n/a 60-360 
NZS 4541 compliant system – Dry pipe system n/a 90 
 
 
Figure 17 Proposed uniform distribution min 60 s, max 360 s of the time taken to 




Until specific research into this aspect of sprinkler system operation is established for NZS 
4541 compliant systems, a uniform distribution is considered appropriate to take into account 
the probability of the actual value falling within the proposed range.  If the distribution is used 
within an FBIM analysis, a sensitivity analysis of the result should be undertaken to 
understand how sensitive the result is to this specific and other input variables.  If it is found 
that this specific value is of significance to the output then additional analysis could be 
undertaken to further refine the confidence in the value used. 
 
7.4.2. Times for Alarms/Fire Verification and any Notification Delays 
 
FBIM Table B provides only a single value of 20 seconds for the 'time delay for alarm 
verification' which is recommended to be incorporated for both detection and suppression 
systems.  This verification period is incorporated into the time period given in Section 7.4.1 
and does not need to be repeated for an NZS 4541 sprinkler system. 
The New Zealand standard for fire detection and alarm systems in buildings NZS 4512 (59) 
provides maximum times for both system response to activations and alarm verification.  
Once a detector activation time has been calculated, NZS 4512 requires that the systems 
respond within a maximum time of 15 seconds.  Once a device has activated, the standard 
then requires verification of activation.  Unless an analogue detection algorithm is used 
within the system to minimise spurious alarms, the standard requires a smoke detector 
circuit to activate twice before a fire alarm signal is generated.  The standard specifies that 
this verification period cannot take longer than 15 seconds, allowing for a combined 
maximum delay of 30 seconds for a detection system installed in accordance with this 
standard.   
Depending on the design of the detection system and not accounting for any specifically 
designed systems that may incorporate additional 'double knock' type verification delays or 
'managed' time delays which are common in New Zealand, it would be conservative to allow 
for a 30-second verification-delay time period without further investigation or research into 
this delay period.   
FBIM Table B also provides for four other time steps that are associated with verifying a fire 
when no automatic suppression system or detection systems are installed.   The FBIM 
recommends that these times be supplied by designers as they will be specific to the project.  
Should an automatic detection system not be installed, it is difficult to establish a time that 




recommended to undertake designs that do not incorporate a reliable means of notification 
unless these can be appropriately substantiated.   
The following time is therefore recommended to be included into the FBIM Table B. 
Table 3 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table B 
Activity Time (s) 
Time delay for heat and smoke detection response and verification, 
NZS 4512 compliant system 
30 
 
7.4.3. Times for Receipt of Information and Dispatch 
 
FBIM tables C and D provide various times for the receipt of information and dispatch 
components, depending on the specific nature of the emergency call or way in which the 
relevant fire service is notified of an incident.  In Australia, the different brigades use a 
number of different systems which vary from state to state and can also vary according to 
whether the incident occurs within a rural or urban area.  New Zealand uses a fully electronic 
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system for which the FBIM manual suggests removing all 
additional notification delays.  However, this project has identified a time component 
associated with the dispatch system used within New Zealand and therefore proposes in the 
next section a distribution associated with this dispatch time component.   
It is also worth recognising that the use of centralised communication systems and those 
shared with the other emergency services in New Zealand reduces the methods in which the 
NZFS would be potentially notified of an incident.  Other methods might include members of 
the public calling a local fire station, either by phone or by person, for example.  In these 
circumstances, NZFS policy requires that the call be redirected and placed through the 
communication centres so that the appropriate responses can be dispatched following the 
correct and standardised procedures.  The times associated with emergency 111 calls, 
notifications provided by private or intermediate monitoring companies and those associated 
with dispatch using the CAD system are addressed in further detail in section 7.5.3.  For 
purposes of the FBIM manual, the methods of communication and dispatch of NZFS 
resources using a fully electronic CAD system is simplified and removes the need to use 









This section provides the data required for a time component to assess the time taken for a 
fire appliance to arrive at a specific location from the time the NZFS first becomes notified of 
an incident. 
This research used the latest data available for approximately 6,410 fires in structures 
throughout New Zealand attended by the NZFS over the period from July 2008 to June 2009 
(60).  Comparisons between response times within urban and rural fire districts are 
presented and comparisons between the main New Zealand cities and their central business 
districts and outer suburbs are compared.  Distributions have been fitted to the data using 
the software package @Risk (55).   
 
7.5.2. Historical Background to Fire Service Response Times 
 
Historically, fire-station locations were based on the limitations of the equipment and 
appliances and the time taken to get to the location of the fire.  Many fire-station locations 
around the world including some surviving today were based on the ability of fire horses to 
haul equipment and steamers in five minutes (61).   
Modern day international standards of response coverage can differ significantly.  In Ontario 
Canada (62), standards of coverage are specifically noted to be primarily influenced by 
distance and travel time for selecting a fire station site.  Examples given include 
requirements for the fire department to reach the downtown core in 3 minutes, the urban 
boundaries in 5 minutes, 75% of the rural area in 8 minutes and the remainder in 10 
minutes.   Figure 18 illustrates the differences between using the traditional circle drawn on a 





Figure 18 Canadian method to illustrate the differences between a circle and a 
diamond from a fire station that has used 4 minutes as the desired initial response 
time 
In the 1970s, Kolesar and Walker (63) studied the relationship between time and distances 
of 2000 incidents attended by 15 units within New York City at different times of the day.  
This study found that for short distances travel time increased with the square root of the 
distance and that for long travel distances the travel time increased linearly.  The study also 
concluded that travel times differed between the times of day but these were relatively small 
differences and could be ignored for planning purposes.  The travel times found between 
different parts of the city were also so small that the average velocity that was obtained was 
almost constant throughout all parts of the city.  Whilst this study was based on data from 
the 1970s, more recent studies in other parts of the world have used these findings and 
concluded that the relationship is also true for many other cities (45; 42).  
NFPA 1710 (64) provides standard response criteria and expectations for the deployment of 
fire brigade resources including, amongst other criteria, that the first arriving fire appliance or 
‗Initial Arriving Company‘  shall arrive within 240 seconds to 90% of the incidents.  The 
criteria established within NFPA 1710 is of particular interest given that it is being informed 
by research (65) that is being undertaken in an attempt to quantify fire brigade intervention 
which shares similarities to that of the FBIM. 
In the UK, the national standards of fire cover comprised four categories of risk (A, B, C and 
D) and specified a time of response for each risk type.   A further category ‗Remote Rural‘ 




volunteer assistance, are made.  The standards originated before World War II and were 
implemented in 1947; they were subsequently reviewed but not significantly changed (66). 
Essentially, the standards originally required the first arriving appliances to be at the scene in 
5, 8, 10 and 20 minutes, respectively, for each risk (4).  However, the introduction of 
Integrated Risk Management Plans (IRMPs) in 2004 (67) removed the national standards of 
fire cover and required individual county brigades to undertake an Emergency Planning 
Process to define response times.  IRMPs require brigades to incorporate risk assessments, 
response planning, resource allocation and the assessment of effectiveness of the resources 
available when deciding on resource allocation. 
In New Zealand, the NZFS stipulates that response times for fire incidents inside fire districts 
be monitored for performance against the national service delivery guidelines of: 
 7 minutes, 30 seconds 90% of the time for permanently manned stations, and 
 10 minutes 90% of the time for volunteer stations. 
 
7.5.3. New Zealand Fire Service Response Times 
 
The NZFS collects response time data using time stamping by an electronic dispatch system 
based on radio-transmitted codes.  NZFS response starts automatically at the moment an 
emergency call signal arrives at the Fire Service communication centre and includes time to 
answer the call, time to verify the location of the incident, time to alert fire stations, time for 
crew to dress and leave the fire station and time to travel and reach the incident location.  
Fire appliances use a touch-screen mobile status unit as shown in Figure 19, allowing for 
operators to provide confirmation of appliance status (such as arrival at an incident) instantly 
and with visual verification that the transmission has been made.  These units reduce the 
incidents of accidental operation and allow for accurate time/date stamping of specific 






Figure 19 Typical NZFS mobile status unit 
From the NZFS Incident Data, the following times for every structure fire have been 
obtained: 
 incident date/time;  
 confirmed time; 
 station alert time; 
 enroute time; 
 arrival time.  
From each of these times, the distributions have been analysed for incorporation within the 
FBIM for the following data requirements: 
Table C – times for receipt of information;  
Table D – times for dispatch; 
Table E – times for fire-fighter response. 
Whilst certain mandatory data fields are required to be collected for structure fires, the NZFS 
Incident Data does not require that the distances travelled to the incident be recorded.  
Whilst data on reported distances travelled is collected, this is not accurate and cannot be 
used to calculate an average travel speed for each incident attended.  To obtain the travel 
distances to every incident attended over the period from July 2008 to June 2009, the 
TransCAD Facility Location software tool (68) was used to calculate the shortest route 
possible between the first arriving fire appliance from the nearest fire station and the incident 
location.  This allows for analysis of the average travel speed of the first arriving fire 
appliance and provides data to populate Table F – speed data for brigade travel – of the 
FBIM. 
The NZFS is comprised of eight different regions which includes 345 urban fire districts with 




analysis considered a number of different factors to identify the need to establish different 
response times for different areas.  The analysis considered specifically the difference in 
response time between UFD and RFD.  The data was obtained from the main city centres 
including Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch and from any differences found between 
the central business districts (CBD) of each of these cities and their outer suburbs.  For the 
CBD and outer suburb analysis, the busiest fire appliances for each area (those that 
attended most structure fires during the July 2008 to June 2009 period) were isolated from 
the data and the respective response times specifically assessed. 
 
7.5.4. Times for Receipt of Information  
 
Once an NZFS communications centre receives information that a fire incident has occurred, 
either by direct communication from an automatic alarm system or from an emergency 111 
phone call, the time is logged until the incident location has been confirmed.   The NZFS 
incident data differentiates between 13 different types of alarm methods used to call the 
NZFS.  Table 4 indicates the alarm methods used to call the NZFS as recorded from all of 
the 2007–2008 incident data assessed and the number and percentage of times those alarm 
methods notified the NZFS of the structure fires. 
Table 4 Alarm methods used to call the NZFS for all structure fires  




111 Telephone call 5487 86 
Automatic private fire alarm (PFA) call 270 4 
Manual PFA call (operation of a manual call point) 224 3 
111 Telephone call made from a private 
monitoring company 
109 2 
Police call 103 2 
Exchange phone call 56 1 
Sprinkler PFA call 48 1 
Running call 42 1 
Ambulance call 34 1 
Vehicle call on radio 21 0 
Other PFA call 13 0 
Airport call 1 0 




Table 5 shows the same alarm methods use to notify the NZFS but with the data isolated for 
the six appliances specifically assessed within the main cities.  As is to be expected, the 
percentage of incidents notified from private fire alarms (PFA) is greater, especially for 
smoke detection systems, as there is a greater proportion of high-rise buildings that have 
such systems which places less reliance on emergency 111 phone calls. 
Table 5 Alarm methods used to call the NZFS in main cities 





from whole country 
111 Telephone call 305 70 −16 
Automatic PFA call 51 12 7 
Manual PFA call (operation of a 
manual call point) 
39 9 5 
111 Telephone call made from a 
private monitoring company 
12 3 1 
Police call 9 2 0 
Exchange phone call 7 2 1 
Sprinkler PFA call 4 1 0 
Running call 4 1 0 
Ambulance call 3 1 0 
Vehicle call on radio 1 0 0 
Other PFA call 1 0 0 
Airport call 0 0 0 
111 from security company/agent 0 0 0 
 
For the purposes of FBIM data and assessment of notification methods, the times of most 
interest include those times taken to receive and verify the location of fire incidents from the 
receipt of emergency 111 calls from both members of the public (including building 
occupants and passers-by) and security companies notified by a non-brigade-calling fire-
alarm system and from PFAs (either from operation of manual call points, automatic smoke 
detection or sprinkler systems). 
The FBIM provides two values for the times taken to receive and confirm the incident 
location.  These are given in Table C, section 7 and are not accompanied by any statistical 
distributions.  This table is replicated below in Table 6 and provides values for the times 
expected for an emergency call centre operator to receive and take down the information 




Table 6 FBIM Table C times for receipt of information  
Activity Time (s) 
Time to receive and take down verbal information 60 
Time for alternative option to be received and understood to be advised 
 
The NZFS operates using a fully electronic Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.  The 
time taken to receive and confirm the location of the incident and specific building location is 
recorded within the incident database as between zero and one second.  As this is instant, 
this time period can be considered as zero within any analysis.  The times taken for the CAD 
system to dispatch the specific fire appliances that are available to attend and are closest to 
the fire are considered in the next section. 
Times required to be included within any analysis for where a PFA is not provided in the 
building include emergency 111 telephone calls made from either the public or from private 
monitoring companies if the building is provided with an alarm system that notifies a private 
monitoring company of a fire.  Where buildings are not provided with a direct connection to 
the NZFS, the time taken to verify the location of the fire from receipt of a telephone call is 
variable and will depend on a number of factors including: 
 the quality and clarity of the information provided by the caller; 
 availability of emergency call centre staff;  
 training and competency of emergency call centre staff. 
 
If the alarm system within the building is being monitored by a private monitoring company, 
details of the agreement by which the monitoring company calls the NZFS will need to be 
ascertained as any additional delays in fire verification undertaken by the company before 
notifying the NZFS are not included in this analysis.   
Of the 5,487 incidents notified to the NZFS by emergency 111 telephone calls, 17 data sets 
(0.02%) were removed as they had taken significantly longer than 200 seconds to verify the 
location of the incident. These were discounted to prevent the distributions from being 
skewed.  In one case, a time in excess of 10 minutes was recorded, indicating a possible 
error in the data associated with these 17 data sets.  Figure 20 shows the input data and the 





Figure 20 Fitted lognormal distribution - µ=39, σ=22.3, Shift -2.2 to incidents notified 
to the NZFS by emergency 111 telephone calls  
 
Incidents notified to the NZFS by emergency 111 telephone calls made by private monitoring 
companies are shown below in Figure 21.  For the 109 records, a lognormal distribution fits 
the data set well with no data sets removed.  Only two incidents in this data set took over 
200 seconds to verify the location of the incident; these have an insignificant impact on the 
fitted distribution and have therefore not been discounted from this distribution.  These 
results are reported in Table 7 below and would replace those from the FBIM provided in 
Table 6. 
For notification times associated with the receipt and confirmation of any incident locations 
requiring an emergency 111 telephone call, a lognormal distribution for the following types of 





















Table 7 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table C 
Location of incident (seconds) µ σ Risk shift Sample 
size 
Automatic PFA (instant) - - - 542 
Emergency 111 telephone calls 39 22 −2 5470 
111 from private monitoring company 35 34 16 109 
 
 
Figure 21 Fitted lognormal distribution µ=35.4, σ=34.2, Shift 16.3 to incidents notified 
to the NZFS from private monitoring company 
 
7.5.5. Times for Dispatch  
 
For incidents in UFD, 99% of fire appliances were dispatched by the CAD system in under 
200 seconds.  Times greater than 200 seconds were removed from any analysis to prevent 
the distribution from being skewed.  Again, a small number of data sets indicated a possible 



















For incidents in the RFD, dispatch times slightly increased with a smaller frequency of values 
occurring below 10 seconds.   While a number of values above 200 seconds were found, 
these did not significantly alter the fitted distribution compared with that found within the 
UFD. 
Relatively short values are thought to be a consequence of fewer available resources within 
the location relative to the incident and a consequence of there being less choice and a 
higher chance of the closest appliances being available allowing for a quick and simple 
decision.  In UFD, and especially in areas served by many fire stations and appliances, the 
CAD system must decide which appliances are closest to the incident and also which are 
available at the time of the incident.  This choice of appliance becomes increasingly difficult 
and more complex the greater the number of appliances relative to the incident in question 
and if other incidents are occurring simultaneously or if appliances are unavailable.    
The FBIM provides three values for the fire-fighter response times given in Table D, section 
7 but provides no statistical distribution for these times.  This table is replicated below in 
Table 8 and provides three time values and a user-specified value dependent on the system 
used by the agency responsible for dispatching fire-fighting resources.  As the NZFS 
operates a single CAD system throughout the country only a single specified value is 
required. 
Table 8 FBIM Table D times for dispatch 
Times for dispatch Time (s) 
Special dispatch time to be assessed to be advised 
Time to relay dispatch information by fully electronic CAD 
system 
0 
Time to relay information by part manual CAD system 15 
Time to relay dispatch information by phone or radio 30 
 
As shown above, the FBIM assumes that for a fully electronic CAD system the time to 
dispatch resources should be taken as zero.  However, in New Zealand data suggests that 
this is not the case and that a time distribution needs to be considered.  This difference is 
likely to be due to the difference in data collection methods used to capture the data.  The 
FBIM data is partly sourced from the Australian Incident Reporting System, refer section 4 of 
the FBIM manual (5 p. 34).   Figure 22 shows the distributions for dispatch times in UFD and 




and 716 records for dispatch times in RFD.  The dispatch times were also isolated for the 
incidents that occurred within the main cities and again no significant distinction was found 
between the times.  As such, all data sets have been assessed and the fitted lognormal 
distribution (µ=26.8, σ=14.6, Shift(−0.85)) representing the dispatch times for all incidents for 
the 2008–2009 period are recommended for use. 
 
Figure 22 Fitted lognormal distribution for dispatch times in urban and rural fire 
districts 
For times associated with dispatching of the responding appliances a lognormal distribution 
is recommended as follows: 
 
Table 9 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table D 
Time for dispatch (s) µ σ Risk shift Sample size 






















7.5.6. Times for Fire-Fighter Response  
 
Once the fire station has been notified or 'turned out' to an incident, fire fighters need to 
assimilate the information provided and dress in structural fire-fighting clothing before 
mounting the fire appliance and leaving. The time taken for fire fighters to respond and leave 
for the incident can depend on the other activities being undertaken at the time of the 
incident call.  Fire fighters undertake many duties other than responding to fire calls, such as 
fitness training and public fire safety work amongst other tasks.  Also, should the incident 
occur at night, fire fighters may be asleep at the time of notification.  These different duties 
and conditions incur different response delays and need to be factored into the overall 
response times. 
Volunteer fire fighters may also have to respond to the fire station from their place of work or 
home and NZFS procedures require that a fire appliance cannot respond to an incident 
unless the appliance is appropriately manned and provided with the appropriate number of 
fire fighters to attend an incident safely.  Before an appliance can be dispatched, four fire 
fighters are required to staff an appliance.  For any design it needs to be established 
whether the incident will occur in a volunteer or career fire fighters‘ first response area, as 
this may incorporate additional delays and uncertainties with responding fire crews that 
could be detrimental to the safety of the attending fire crews or ability of the responding fire 
fighters to undertake their statutory functions. 
NZFS data indicates that approximately 1300 of the incidents analysed here recorded fire-
fighter response times of less than 60 seconds and that 3000 incidents were responded to in 
less than 90 seconds.  200 incidents indicated times of less than 10 seconds indicating that 
either the fire fighters were in the appliance at the time of the call or there are anomalies in 
the data.  Personal experience would indicate that it is not possible to attain response times 
of much less than 60 seconds unless fire fighters are already on the fire appliance or in 
situations such as training exercises that permit them to mount the appliance and leave 
almost immediately.   
In some areas, the NZFS operates composite fire stations where full-time fire fighters share 
a station backed up by a secondary appliance manned by volunteer fire fighters.  Also, some 
locations that are served by volunteer stations may also receive responses by fire 
appliances manned by full-time staff.  In these cases where the response times of volunteer 
appliances result in long attendance times, confirmation should be made as to whether other 
appliances including responses from career fire fighters may be made from stations further 




appliance to an incident is already committed to another task and therefore the first 
responded appliance may not be the closest located geographically to the incident location.   
As the NZFS will dispatch more than one appliance to any confirmed structure fire, it is 
possible that the closest situated fire appliance may not be the first arriving appliance.  Of 
the 6,410 structures fires assessed, the first arriving appliance at the incident in 656 or 10% 
of all calls was not from the closest situated fire station.  In UFD, the first arriving appliance 
was from a fire station located further from the incident in 574 or 10.8% of the incidents.  
Therefore, where the calculated response times for responding appliances are excessively 
long, the attendance and arrival of multiple appliances from different locations can be 
assessed to provide further assurance of a response time for any appliance that would likely 
be dispatched.  This can then be taken into account when assessing the tasks and 
manpower required at the event.  The FBIM provides three values for the fire-fighter 
response times given in Table E, section 7 but provides no statistical distribution for these 
times.  This table is replicated below in Table 10 and provides three time values; the first of 
480 seconds representative of a volunteer response from fire fighters not based at the fire 
station full time which therefore includes travel time to the fire station, a second time of 90 
seconds being the expected time for a fire fighter based at a fire station which would include 
response times from sleeping and a third time of 60 seconds to allow fire fighters to make up 
equipment assuming that they have been training and/or are around the appliance etc. 
Table 10 FBIM Table E time for fire-fighter response 
Time for fire-fighter response Time (s) 
Time to travel to fire station, dress, assemble, 
assimilate information and leave station 
480 
Time to dress, assimilate information and depart 90 
Time to make up and become mobile 60 
 
To take into account the differences between volunteer and career fire fighters, the NZFS 
data was again split into UFD and RFD times to compare the differences in response times 
and was also specifically assessed for the appliances situated in the three major cites (CBD 
and outer suburbs).  Figure 23 shows the fitted distributions for the response times for the 
UFD, RFD and CBD and suburban appliances.  A log logistic distribution described each of 




The faster responses occurred in the order expected with 95% of the responses for the main 
cities occurring within 123 seconds compared with 271 seconds for all the UFD appliances 
and 459 seconds for the RFD appliances.  The mean responses times of 77, 113 and 224, 
respectively, and the shape of the associated distributions indicate the expected response 
times from career fire fighters compared with those that can be expected from volunteers. 
 
Figure 23 Fitted log logistic distributions for fire-fighter response times within the 
UFD: Γ=-12.7, β=103, α=2.9, RFD: Γ=-266, β=473, α=6.9 and CBD: Γ=-308.3, β=384.7, 
α=25.5 
 
Table 11 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table E (secs)  
Location of incident Γ β α Sample size 
Inside UFD −12.7 103 2.9 5308 
Inside RFD −266 473 6.9 817 





















7.5.7. Speed Data for Brigade Travel 
 
The average travel speed that a fire appliance can obtain to reach the fire incident depends 
on a number of factors.  Such factors include: 
 travel distance from the location of the fire station to the incident; 
 road type 
o CBD roads, state highway, motorway conditions, rural open roads 
o street arrangement including number and types of intersections; 
 weather conditions 
o dry, wet, snow and ice; 
 traffic conditions 
o peak rush hour traffic 
o congested traffic due to specific events 
o time of the day or night; 
 type of appliance 
o pump, aerial appliance, age, weight; 
 experience of driver  
o training  
o ability 
o choice of route. 
Tommasson et al. (45) and Yung (69) considered the factors affecting the response time of 
fire appliances and considered the most important factors to be the distance travelled to the 
incident.  The average travel speed obtainable however was found to vary significantly, with 
actual incident experience as reported in Chapter 8 indicating that average speeds found 
ranged from 20 km/h on city centre streets over short distances to as high as 70 km/h over 
longer distances using the motorway system.  For comparable distances, average speeds 
were found to vary by as much as 20 km/h.   
The data obtained was checked for anomalies; any negative response times (20 out of the 
6,410 data entries, which can occur due to data entry errors) were excluded as were any 
response times that appeared to be excessively long (typically over 60 minutes, of which 
there were three). It is noted that a very small number of response times can exceed 60 
minutes, particularly in remote rural areas or fires on remote islands without fire stations, 
such values were excluded from the analysis on the grounds that they can be due to data 
entry errors and they will unreasonably skew the analyses.  Analysis of fire brigade 




FBIM and special consideration would be required if attempting to undertake a fire brigade 
intervention assessment for such locations.  Also, spurious data entries that returned 
anomalies between the data points were removed, leaving 6,125 data sets available for 
analysis.  These included travel speeds that were either below 0 km/h or well in excess of 
100 km/h.  100 km/h was considered an appropriate bounding speed used for this analysis 
as this was witnessed to be the maximum approximate travel speed that an appliance could 
obtain on a flat, non-congested motorway and is the maximum safe allowed speed of most 
appliances under NZFS policy. 
 
7.5.8. Urban and Rural Fire District Response Speeds 
 
Of the 6,125 structure fires over the period from July 2008 to June 2009, 5,309 occurred 
within the UFD and 817 within the RFD.  The distance for each incident calculated using the 
TransCAD software (68) divided by times taken for the appliances to travel to the incident 
provides the calculation of the average appliance speed to each incident. These times and 
distances are shown in Figure 24 below and indicate the positive correlation that would be 
expected between distance and the travel time. 
 
Figure 24 TransCAD predicted distances versus reported travel distances to 6,125 




Figure 25 below shows the fitted distributions to the data.  A normal distribution described 
each data set well with the data set truncated to return minimum travel speeds of 0 and 
100 km/h, respectively.  It is recognised that use of a travel speed of 0 km/h within an 
analysis will return an infinite travel time.  However, for the purposes of a probabilistic 
analysis this would occur in only a minimal number of iterations and could be used to 
acknowledge breakdowns and other situations that would prevent an appliance reaching the 
incident, as does occur and is reflected in the statistics. 
 
Figure 25 Fitted normal distributions of urban µ=38, σ=15.6 and rural fire districts 
µ=54, σ=20.4 response speeds compared with all the data sets in km/h 
The average response speeds were found to be higher within the RFD by 13 km/h compared 
with those found within the UFD.  This is to be expected given the congestion and slower 
road speeds found within the UFD.  The travel distances considered for each incident are 
also of interest given the different speeds found between the urban and rural areas.  These 
are reported below in Table 12. 
Table 12 Reported incident travel distances for urban and rural fire districts  
Travel distances (km) Minimum Maximum Average 
Urban fire district 0.01 11.9 2.2 



















As would be expected given the greater density of fire appliances in urban areas, the 
incident travel distances within the UFD are significantly shorter than those travelled in the 
RFD.  As would also be expected, higher average speeds are found over longer distances 
due to longer roads and less angled turns. 
 
7.5.9. CBD Fire Appliance Response Speeds 
 
Average response speeds for the busiest CBD appliances within Auckland (79 records), 
Wellington (85 records) and Christchurch (118 records) were compared.  Figure 26 below 
shows the fitted distributions again using a normal distribution with the data set truncated to 
return minimum travel speeds of 0 and 100 km/h, respectively. 
 
Figure 26 Fitted normal distributions of CBD fire appliance response speeds in 
Auckland µ=35.7, σ=11.5, Wellington µ=30.2, σ=12  and Christchurch µ=41.2, σ=14.9 in 
km/h 
Considering the geography, population and density of each of the cities, the average travel 





















7.5.10. CBD and Suburban Fire Appliance Response Speeds 
 
Average response speeds for the busiest CBD appliances have also been compared with 
each of the main suburbs within the three cities. For each of the outer suburbs specific 
representative fire appliances with a representative number of data sets were used including 
in Auckland (42 records), Wellington (46 records) and Christchurch (45 records).  The 
number of structure fires attended for the first-arriving appliances in the suburbs is 
approximately half the number of first-arriving appliances in the respective CBDs.  Figure 27 
shows the fitted distributions, again using a normal distribution, with the data set truncated to 
return maximum and minimum travel speeds of 0 and 100 km/h respectively. 
 
Figure 27 Fitted normal distributions of suburban fire appliance response speeds for 
Auckland µ=39, σ=22.2, Wellington µ=43, σ=16.9 and Christchurch µ=44.7, σ=14.9 in 
km/h 
 
Comparison between each of the specific cities and suburban travel speeds are shown in 




















Figure 28 Fitted normal distribution comparisons between Auckland CBD µ=35.7, 
σ=11.5 and suburban µ=43, σ=22.2 fire appliance response speeds, km/h  
 
 
Figure 29 Fitted normal distribution comparisons between Wellington CBD µ=30.2, 




































Figure 30 Fitted normal distribution comparisons between Christchurch CBD µ=39, 
σ=8 and suburban µ=41.2, σ=8 fire appliance response speeds km/h  
 
As can be seen from the distribution comparisons, there are significant differences between 
the average speeds attained within the suburbs of Auckland (7.3 km/h difference) and 
Wellington (14.5 km/h difference) compared with the CBD response speeds.  However, the 
Christchurch data indicates little difference in response speeds between the CBD and 
suburbs (2.2 km/h difference).  Given the differences in geographies of the three cities, 
perceived congestion issues and size of the respective CDBs, it could be expected that there 
would be a marked difference between the inner CBD speeds and outer suburb speeds for 
Auckland and Wellington.  Also, considering the relatively flat geography of Christchurch city 
compared with Auckland and Wellington, and the relative size of the CBD and perceived 
congestion issues faced in the city, it is not unexpected that there would be little difference 
between the CBD and suburb response times.  However, these results are not conclusive in 
this respect as the results have only been compared for specific stations in specific 
locations.  Further analysis and comparison of all available fire appliance response speeds 



















However, given the results presented it would appear appropriate that different response 
speed distributions be considered for incidents within the CBDs of Auckland and Wellington 
compared with their suburbs and that a single distribution only need be considered for 
incidents in Christchurch. Figure 31 shows the logistic fitted distribution for the combined 
Christchurch CBD and suburban average response speeds from 165 records. The travel 
speed distribution for Christchurch should therefore consider all data and include both the 
CBD and suburb data for this distribution. 
 
Figure 31 Fitted logistic distribution for all CBD and suburban fire appliance 
response speeds in Christchurch µ=40, σ=8, km/h 
 
7.5.11. Speed-Distance Relationship 
 
The data was analysed to determine whether any correlation between speed and distance 
existed as found in previous studies (63).  All data sets were analysed including comparing 
the results found between the UFD and RFD, CBD and suburban data sets.  The data was 
also assessed to find any resulting relationship and to try and define a 'short' distance and a 
'long' travel distance appropriate to New Zealand conditions by the method given by 



















values are not relevant to New Zealand given the variables that can affect response speeds.  
On this basis, given the large amount of data analysed, the fitting of distributions to this data 
is considered to be the most appropriate approach. 
Further data analysis for appliance speeds within the larger cities based on larger data sets 
could identify if any trends similar to those found in these previous studies exist within the 
larger cities such as Auckland and Wellington or within specific rural areas.  Further scrutiny 
of the data separated into evening and daytime responses could also warrant further 
analysis to identify any relationships that might exist.  However, for the purposes of this 
research and FBIM model data, such further scrutiny is not considered of substantial benefit.  
 
7.5.12. Minimum Response Speeds 
 
Lower and upper bounding speeds were considered from the data sets used which included 
removal of data sets returning values below 0 km/h or those with no returned speed, of 
which there were 25 records.  Also, calculated average speeds well in excess of 100 km/h, 
of which there were 225, were removed as many of these times exceeded the maximum 
obtainable appliance speed and that set down within NZFS driver policies.  For example, 
145 values returned indicated average travel speeds in excess of 140 km/h, which is 
extremely unlikely.  For the purposes of using the distributions found within the data sets, the 
distributions found must be truncated to remove travel speeds of 0 km/h, otherwise the time 
taken to respond to any incident will for some instances return an infinite response time.  
Whilst upper bounding response speeds of 100 km/h were used, this speed is possible 
under certain conditions for responses in all areas, albeit in very few cases and in few 
circumstances.  However, such high average response speeds are reflected in the 
distributions found and would produce the very shortest response times that would be 
possible in reality but which should be discounted in any FBIM analysis as these would 
represent the very shortest possible response times and a ideal response time to any 
incident.  Thus, it was considered to maintain the 100 km/h maximum response speed which 
corresponds to New Zealand maximum legal speed limit and that typically specified for the 
majority of NZFS appliances by NZFS policy. 
Consideration therefore needs to be given to the use of a minimum value for the response 
speed used as part of the FBIM distribution.  The minimum values for each data set were 
analysed as well as the fifth percentile minimum speeds considered.  It was found that the 




consideration for the minimum speed as this data set was drawn from specific appliances 
that were the first arriving appliance within their own area, therefore minimum response 
speeds would be optimised to a certain degree within this data set.  As a result, the larger 
data sets for the UFD and RFD were used.  Fifth percentile speeds were chosen as 
representative of the minimum response speeds, as this removed the data at the end of the 
tail distribution arising from possible anomalies.   
The returned fifth percentile average lower response speeds were found to be 12 km/h for 
appliances within the UFD and 15 km/h for appliances within the RFD.  The lower speeds 
are considered appropriate given that other appliances should be able to respond to an 
incident should the closest fire appliance respond at such a slow speed due to traffic 




The average fire appliance response speed distributions to actual incidents for the July 2008 
to June 2009 period have been shown assuming that appliances have travelled the most 
direct route from the fire station where the appliance is located to the incident.  Travel 
speeds have been attained for all locations within the NZFS Urban and Rural Fire Districts 
and for city locations including Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.  As the data is 
appliance-specific only, single appliances with sufficient data samples to conclude a suitable 
distribution have been used.  As these appliances are located in the CBDs of New Zealand's 
main cities, they experience the greatest number of fire attendance and thus provide suitable 
data for analysis.  For design purposes, where the building or proposed incident location is 
known, the distribution speeds presented should be used together with knowledge of the 
relevant fire station address and shortest travel distance between the two locations to find 
the travel time.  A suitable software tool such as Google™Maps (70) can be used to 
ascertain the shortest distance and likely route an appliance will take from the fire station to 
the incident location.   
For any analysis requiring consideration of fire appliance response speeds to incidents, the 







Table 13 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table F (km/h)  






Inside UFD 37.8 15.6 12 100 5308 
Inside RFD 54 20.4 15 100 817 
Auckland – CBD 35.7 11.5 12 100 79 
Auckland – Suburb 41.8 22.2 12 100 42 
Wellington – CBD 30 12 12 100 85 
Wellington – Suburb 44.5 16.9 12 100 46 
Christchurch 40.5 14.9 12 100 163 
 
The FBIM provides for response times to be estimated based on a radial distance option and 
also suggests that the distances used from the responding stations should be calculated 
using the station location if assuming a volunteer appliance response, or to base the 
calculated response distance from the furthest location from the building of interest within the 
appliance‘s designated turnout area if assuming a career fire-fighter response.  At the time 
the FBIM was produced, software was not easily available to calculate the directions and 
distance between specific locations.  To provide a reliable and relatively straightforward 
means of calculating the distance and response time using the given appliance travel 
speeds, a 1.5 multiplier was recommended where the straight line between locations was 
known or could be easily measured from a street directory or map.  As software is now 
available via the internet to calculate the quickest route and distance between address 
points, this calculation method is no longer required.  Also, given that the derived speeds 
have assumed that the appliance is located at its specific station and have taken into 
account response times that have occurred when the appliance was not at its station, 
assuming a response from a location other than the appliances‘ designated station is not 
necessary for a New Zealand FBIM calculation using this proposed data.  This specific issue 






7.6. Fire-Fighting Activity Data 
 
This section presents data and fitted distributions, where relevant, to the times associated 
with individual tasks undertaken by fire fighters at fire incidents.  The data presented in this 
section follows that presented within Tables G to Z from section 7 of the FBIM manual 
required for population of charts 5 onwards.  The data presented in this section has primarily 
been taken from data collected using specific exercise drills formulated to collect the 
individual times associated with each activity.  Eight standard proforma FBIM exercises were 
originally developed to collect the data that is currently presented within the FBIM manual.  
These exercise sheets have been significantly modified and extensively trialled to reflect 
current NZFS equipment and operational procedures.  The latest version of these exercise 
sets are provided in Appendix F. 
The drills have been made available throughout the NZFS to allow for data collection from as 
many individual brigades as possible.  Whilst data collection is ongoing, this section presents 
the data collected to date and provides an analysis of the following type of operational data: 
 fire-fighter horizontal travel speeds including 
o travel in personal protection equipment (PPE) 
o travel in PPE with equipment 
o travel in PPE including BA with or without equipment 
o travel in BA with hazardous incident suit; 
 fire-fighter vertical travel speeds including  
o ascending stairs in BA with equipment 
o ascending stairs in BA with hose including high pressure hose reel and low 
pressure deliveries 
o descending stairs in BA 
o rest breaks required; 
 hose operations 
o removal, connection and charging of feeder hose between hydrant and 
appliance 
o removal and connection of supply hose from appliance-branch 
o removal and connection of hose from appliance to hydrant inlets 
o charging of delivery hose from appliance 




o travel with high pressure delivery; 
 specific equipment times  
o removal of equipment for establishing hydrant supply 
o preparing and flushing in ground hydrant 
o removal of high rise pack including associated tools; 
 breathing apparatus and equipment 
o donning BA and preparing for entry  
o donning BA and hazardous suit 
o decontamination unit and setup 
o assembling safety equipment 
o obtaining hazardous materials information from communications centre; 
 search and rescue operations 
o building perimeter search times 
o rescuing missing persons; 
 aerial appliance times 
o positioning of aerial appliances after initial arrival 
o appliance setup for each available aerial appliance 
o preparation and safety checks associated with aerial appliances 
o times taken to train and elevate aerial appliance 180o  
o times taken to charge monitor; 
 obtaining water from static water sources 
o positioning of appliance  
o removal of suction hose and connection to tank and appliance  
o time taken to prime suction hose from tank  
o time taken to secure hard suction  
o time taken to lower and charge suction hose from open water. 
 
So direct comparison with the data currently presented within the FBIM manual can be 
made, the following data is presented in the same format and headings as that given in 




7.6.1. Set-Up Times 
 
Data regarding setup times has been historically lacking, although it has been recognised 
that the time it takes to set up at a fire scene may be two to three times longer than the time 
taken to respond to the incident (61). FBIM analysis prepared for various building consent 
applications have also identified that the response times for fire appliances to travel to the 
incident locations may account for only 20% of the time taken between the incident 
commencing and water application.  Where incidents are located on the upper levels of high-
rise buildings it could be expected that the response times for fire appliances to travel to the 
incident locations may be insignificant when the overall fire service response times including 
travelling up stairs (if required) and set up times were to be assessed.  The following section 
presents the data associated with FBIM charts 5–12. 
 
7.6.2. Time Delay for Building Entry and Warden Communications 
 
Table G of the FBIM considers the time delays associated with any security procedures that 
may delay entry of fire service personnel into the building.  The FBIM requires that the 
designer consider and supply information relating to any delays associated with making 
entry to a secure building.  Depending on the level and nature of security systems or 
features in place, this can potentially add a substantial delay in providing access to a 
building for arriving fire fighters.  However, where secure facilities include permanently 
manned facilities and fire wardens, such as prisons, there can be advantages and increased 
efficiencies provided to fire brigades by advanced notification of the situation as it develops 
and reduced time delays in identifying the specific location of the incident.  Such time delays 
can be difficult to establish; however, for specific security features such as gaining access 
through doors, designers should be able to provide specific time delays for each individual 
secure component restricting access to specific areas of a building.  Where wardens or 
security guards are present, information relating to their availability and the times taken for 
them to establish communications and confirm the nature of any incident can normally be 
provided in New Zealand by evacuation consultants and those familiar with similar existing 
facilities using established procedures and protocols. 
The NZFS is legislated under the Fire Service Act to make entry to any land and buildings 
under emergency conditions, which includes breaking into any building or structures.  
However, if on arrival at a secure building a fire is not visibly identified, fire fighters will not 




other emergency cannot be readily established, contact with a designated key holder such 
as a security company will try and be established. This could cause significant delays in 
making entry if wardens or staff are not permanently located on site and available at the 
building‘s main entrance on arrival.  The NZFS can also be provided with keys and access 
codes to specific buildings which can reduce the time taken to make access.  However, any 
keys held will typically be located at the fire station which is within the first response area of 
the building, identified by a 'key box number'.  Due to the number of keys held, they are not 
carried on fire appliances and need to be specifically identified on the turn out and 
notification procedure when called to a specific building.  Once the key box number has 
been identified, they need to be located and picked up by fire fighters responding from that 
specific station.  These issues affect the reliance on the use of keys given to the NZFS and 
having to ensure that they remain current makes it difficult to establish confidence in relying 
on this as a method for reducing any delays that can be associated with accessing land and 
buildings.  Keys are recommended to be supplied to the NZFS as they should minimise 
damage that could be caused when responding to unwanted alarms at buildings.  However, 
they should be ignored for the purposes of any FBIM calculation and not factored in to any 
times provided by designers and agreed as appropriate by the relevant fire brigade who may 
also have working knowledge of similar facilities. 
 
7.6.3. Time to Force and Make Entry  
 
Table I within the FBIM manual provides eight different time values associated with common 
types of doors and gates that fire fighters need to open to make entry into buildings.  It is 
understood that the times provided within the FBIM were provided by experienced fire 
fighters using the Delphi method.  The time taken to force entry through a door or other 
feature designed to prevent entry can vary significantly depending on the level of security, 
type of feature and many other factors including the level of urgency which may dictate the 
methods used to gain entry.  Forcible entry tools are generally standard across the NZFS 
fleet, of which a typical selection of 'striking and prying tools' as carried on a typical NZFS 





Figure 32 Typical  NZFS rescue tools 
During the course of this research, using available video footage and witnessing emergency 
incidents, two values have been validated including that associated with opening an 'outward 
opening, side-hung fire door' and a 'chained gate' using forcible entry tools from an 
appliance.  For both of these features, the times witnessed were within five seconds of the 
reported values of 180 and 45 seconds, respectively, given in the FBIM.  This indicates that 
the times are appropriate for use in New Zealand.  Given the difficulties associated with 
determining such times due to the damage associated with forced entry techniques 
employed by emergency services, it is difficult to establish specific times for the individual 
characteristics associated with specific features.  For the purposes of an FBIM analysis 
however, and until other research can be undertaken and shown as appropriate, the times 
given within table I of the FBIM as reproduced below are still considered reasonable values 
for this specific time component. 
Table 14 Times to force entry FBIM Table I  
Door type Time (s) 
Inward opening, side-hung door 30 
Outward opening, side-hung fire door 180 
Outward opening, side-hung, solid-core door 90 
Inward opening, hollow-core door 15 
Outward opening, hollow-core door 45 
Glass door 15 
Roller security/steel door 220 





Access through doors and gates where keys are present will be determined on the specific 
nature of the door or gate and its locking mechanism and ease of use, etc. The level of 
variance associated with each individual door would, however, not be expected to vary so 
considerably that it would have a bearing on the FBIM predictions.  However, a time 
component does need to be incorporated for any known locked doors or gates that will need 
to be negotiated to make access to the location of any incident.  The three values provided 
within the FBIM Table J have not been verified specifically except for the common, everyday 
experience of opening locked doors.  Given the relatively insignificant times provided by the 
FBIM, there is no indication that they are not still appropriate for continued use and are 
appropriate for acknowledgement of an associated minimal delay that is likely to occur when 
accessing a locked door or gate should a key be available. 
Table 15 Time to gain entry (with keys) FBIM Table J 
Door type Time (s) 
Side-hung door 10 
Roller security door 30 
Gate 30 
 
7.6.4. Time to Resolve Way Finding 
 
The FBIM table K provides five different time components to take into account the difficulties 
that can be found with having to locate specific areas of complex buildings.  The addition of 
this time component is dependent on whether pre-operational planning has been undertaken 
by the relevant fire brigades and therefore whether specific knowledge of the building and its 
layout could be known by responding fire fighters.  The NZFS undertakes pre-operational 
planning to familiarise local fire crews with specific risks and buildings of interest within their 
relevant fire response area.  While all NZFS personnel undertake pre-operational planning, it 
is difficult to establish what level of benefit will be achieved if such operational planning has 
taken place prior to any incident.  Any perceived benefit is also reliant on the specific 
knowledge of the first responding fire fighters.  The FBIM discusses a number of issues 
associated with way finding and states that research has suggested the benefits of 
undertaking pre-operational planning and the expected benefits that this may bring to an 
FBIM calculation, such as increased travel speeds.  No reference is provided within the 
FBIM to enable scrutiny and validation of these specific references against New Zealand 




planning and the identification of higher hazard risks, such as hazardous substances and the 
like, whilst essential for emergency incident planning, hazard avoidance and incident control, 
would have little relevance to an FBIM analysis in way finding within a particularly complex 
building.  This can be partly explained given that there are four shifts worked at a career 
station and that not all fire fighters could be expected to be specifically familiar with buildings 
in their first response areas.  Also, considering other factors such as staff rotations and 
regular replacements by unfamiliar fire fighters, even when an appliance staffed by those 
that had undertaken pre-operational planning is first to arrive at an incident, it is likely that 
the fire fighters could still face some time delays when way finding in large and complex 
buildings.  It would therefore be considered appropriate and conservative to always consider 
an additional time component associated with way finding in complex buildings.   
The FBIM recognises that this can be a subjective issue depending on the specific nature of 
the building and its complexity for fire-fighting purposes.  The consideration of appropriate 
signage and facilities to access specific parts of the building including secure access will 
also provide additional problems depending on the specifics of each building.  Therefore, the 
FBIM recommendation to discuss these issues with the relevant local fire service is also 
considered appropriate; otherwise the times provided within the FBIM as repeated below 
should be incorporated. 
Table 16 Time to resolve way finding FBIM Table K 
Complexity/building size Time (s) 
Multi-level, numerous enclosures & passages 30 
Multi-level, open plan 10 
Single storey, numerous enclosures & passages, floor area > 5000 m2 45 
Single storey, open plan 10 
Single storey, numerous enclosures & passages, floor area < 5000 m2 30 
 
7.6.5. Time for Information Gathering 
 
The times associated with information gathering are based on the information that first 
confronts responding fire fighters at the building‘s main attendance or arrival point.  Typically 
buildings of any significance will be provided with some level of detection system requiring 
an FAP to be provided at the fire service‘s main or designated attendance point.  Some 
complex and tall buildings will also be provided with additional facilities such as sector 




specific building needs to be accessed.  Other buildings such as high-rise buildings will 
contain fire systems centres which are dedicated rooms containing any critical fire safety 
equipment or systems that could be expected to be operated by fire fighters during an 
incident and also detailed building information on plans and information to other specific 
building features that could be of relevance during a fire or other emergency.  There is much 
research available discussing and addressing what information is currently available to fire 
fighters on modern alarm panels and what is likely to be available in the future in new 
buildings, including the advantages that can be gained to improve the tactical decisions 
made by responding fire brigades as well as improving their effectiveness and the safety of 
the fire fighting (71)(72).  However, for the purposes of initial fire-fighter response to a 
building and initial determination of the location of a fire, of specific interest to an FBIM 
analysis is the information readily available on the FAP index which immediately identifies 
the type of system that has activated, i.e. sprinkler, heat or smoke detector activation and 
the specific location of the fire. The FBIM provides for three time values that are dependent 
on the size of the floor area and references compliance with the Australian Standard AS 
1603.4 Automatic Fire Detection and Alarm Systems – Control and Indicating Equipment.  
Since the original publication of the FBIM, there have been significant advances in fire 
alarm-indicating equipment and the requirements for FAP indexes.  Given the relatively 
basic and straightforward nature of modern FAP indexes irrespective of the complexity of the 
specific building, it is unlikely that there will be significant differences in the times taken to 
establish the location of the first detector activated.  Providing access to the FAP index is 
relatively straight forward and further interrogation and information gathering from more 
complex systems and from fire systems centres is likely to be undertaken by crews arriving 
after initial entry has been made.  Therefore, it is considered that only the time taken to 
establish the initial location of the incident is required for this specific component of the FBIM 
analysis.  For modern fire alarm panels complying with the relevant New Zealand standard 
which meets the approval of the NZFS, is likely to be accessible and information understood 
within 30 seconds, irrespective of the floor area of the building.  Therefore, a time of 30 
seconds is considered appropriate and recommended without further research or 
information. 
Table 17 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table L  
Activity Time (s) 
Time for information gathering from a fire alarm panel complying 






Chart 5 of the FBIM which shows the 'time taken for initial determination of fire location' 
does, however, suggest that the times taken to communicate with a fire warden and those 
taken to gather information from an FAP be considered in isolation from each other.  
Experience at incidents would indicate, however, that fire fighters would typically interrogate 
the FAP as a matter of course and best practice as well as seeking any information from 
available wardens.  Therefore, it is recommended to include both the times taken to 
communicate with any wardens and to interrogate the FAP in FBIM Tables H and L within 
any FBIM analysis. 
 
7.6.6. Time to Dismount Appliance and Don BA 
 
Table M within the FBIM provides a single statistical data set to represent the times taken for 
fire fighters to dismount from an appliance and don BA sets.  For any structural fire, fire 
fighters operating within or around any fire will be required to wear BA.  When arriving at an 
incident the donning of BA will be the first task completed.  In the NZFS, BA is either 
mounted within the seats of fire appliances allowing for BA to be donned before dismounting 
the appliance or will be located within a locker on the appliance, which requires donning after 
dismounting the appliance.  Typically, appliances for full-time fire fighters will contain seat 
mounted BA while BA in lockers are common for volunteer fire fighters.  Through 
observation and experiment this research has identified differences in the times associated 
with these two scenarios.  The distributions found within the data collected to date are shown 
in Figure 33 below, overlaid with the Australian data.  A normal distribution was found to fit 
all of the data sets well.  Although limited data has been collected, with fewer data sets for 
the seat-mounted BA times than for locker-mounted BA times, the differences reported here 










Figure 33 Distributions found for the times to dismount an appliance and don BA 
(seconds) 
Two separate times are therefore presented for the different types of appliances that may 
respond and require different methods of donning BA.  Once BA has been donned, safety 
procedures need to be undertaken before fire fighters will enter buildings, including the 
donning of BA masks and cylinder pressure tests as well as entry control procedures.  These 
safety procedures can be either undertaken immediately after donning BA or once other 
tasks have been completed such as the laying of hose up to the entry point of a building.  
The data collected as part of the project has allowed for the variability that occurs with the 
safety procedures dependent on the specific tasks undertaken before entry to a structure or 
before fire-fighting operations commence.  The times associated with the safety procedures 
have been added together and included in a single time for inclusion within an FBIM 
analysis. 
Table 18 presents the times taken to dismount an appliance and don BA for both seat and 
locker mounted BA with the FBIM data for comparison.  As can be seen, there are 
substantial differences and time savings associated with the use of seat mounted BA.  
Unless specific information is known or available about the appliances that would likely 
arrive at the building, when undergoing an FBIM analysis it can be assumed that an 



















volunteers will contain locker-mounted BA.  Given that the NZFS current and modern vehicle 
purchases are being based on this assumption, this should be appropriate for both current 
and future FBIM analysis. 
Table 18 New Zealand and FBIM Table M data represented using normal distributions 
for times associated with breathing apparatus  
Time for different BA 
configurations (seconds) 






NZ data – locker-mounted BA 184 32 134 236 8 
NZ data – seat-mounted BA 65 12 56 85 4 
Australian FBIM data 88.1 34.9 10 187 259 
 
Based on the minimal number of data sets collected so far, the Australian data compares 
relatively well with the NZFS seat-mounted BA times.  As would be expected with a larger 
data set however, the standard distributions found are larger with the larger number of 
Australian data sets.  The shape of the distributions for the locker-mounted BA times are 
similar to the Australian data, which is a function of both the larger number of records and 
the variation that could be expected with such a task.  It is unknown how the BA sets were 
mounted within the Australian distributions although given the comparison with the NZFS 
seat-mounted BA times, it would appear that they included seat-mounted BA arrangements 
or that there is another factor that allows Australian fire fighters to don BA faster than the 
NZFS equipment allows.   
The following distributions are recommended for these tasks until further research and more 
data sets are available to increase the confidence in these results: 
locker-mounted BA – normal µ=184, σ =32, min=134, max=236; 
seat-mounted BA – normal µ=65, σ =12, min=56, max=85. 
 
7.6.7. Time to Don Safety Equipment 
 
This specific task relates to the time component associated with donning BA worn either on 




chemical splash suit and BA will be worn in all situations where fire fighters are likely to 
come into direct contact with chemicals or other hazardous substances that are in a solid or 
non-vaporising liquid state.  Gas suits and BA are worn by fire fighters when they are likely 
to be exposed to chemicals or other hazardous substances that are either vaporising liquids 
or gases.   There are major differences between the two general types of suits required to be 
worn and individual makes of each type of suit.  These are all likely to have different donning 
times associated with each suit. 
  
At the time of completing this research, the NZFS was in the process of updating all of its 
hazardous incident suits and hazardous materials support vehicles.  Due to the currently 
employed 'long-life' gas suits nearing the end of their useable life span, the NZFS are 
changing to 'limited-life' suits which have significant characteristic differences that could 
affect fire-fighters‘ response times compared with the suits currently used.  Because of the 
ongoing trials of these new suits and related equipment, no data has been established for 
fire-fighter activities associated with hazardous substance suits or equipment at this time.  It 
is expected that during these trials specific data relating to each individual type of suit and 
the generic equipment used can be collected for future presentation within the FBIM manual. 
Given the expected variation of experience and issues associated with wearing hazardous 
incidents suits, there is no reason to dismiss the reasonably long times predicted by the 
current FBIM data.  Therefore, if an analysis considering hazardous materials is required to 
be undertaken and a value associated with the time to don BA and a hazardous incident suit, 
until further data can be established the following FBIM distribution is recommended to be 
used: 
N – lognormal µ = 584.4, σ = 298, min = 200, max = 1155. 
 
 
7.6.8. Time to Conduct Safety Procedures or Assemble Safety Equipment 
 
FBIM table O considers the 'time to conduct safety procedures or assemble safety 
equipment'.  These times are mainly associated with hazardous incidents and, as such, only 
data associated with the flushing of hydrants (a mandatory task required to be completed 
before supply water to a fire appliance from a street hydrant) has been collected.  Figure 34 
shows the normal and lognormal distributions fitted to the NZFS and Australian data 
respectively.  Only five samples of hydrant flushing have been collected to date and so 




similarities with the Australian data having a larger standard deviation as would be expected 
with a larger data set for a very similar task. 
 
Figure 34 Australian and NZFS distributions found for the times taken to flush a 
street hydrant (seconds) 
 
Table 19 provides the times taken from the FBIM manual table O with the data collected to 
date for the hydrant flushing task.  As the number of data points collected is so small but 
presently shows a close comparison to the Australian data, it is recommended to use the 
Australian data sets until further NZFS data is collected.  There is no information to suggest 
that there would be any reason for these times to be significantly different considering the 




















Table 19 FBIM Table O Time to conduct safety procedures or assemble safety 
equipment 
Safety procedure Time (s) Sample 





O1 – Flush hydrant 36.6 7.7 30 51 5 
Australian FBIM data 
O1 – Flush hydrant 32.8 20.6 4 100 124 
O2 – Obtain hazardous material 
information from communication centre 
701.0 409.5 153 1400 49 
O3 – Decontamination unit set up 764.9 186.1 624 1170 7 
O4 – Assemble miscellaneous safety 
equipment 
290.6 132.1 97 465 7 
 
The following distributions based on a re-examination of the existing Australian data are 
suggested for these tasks: 
O1 – lognormal µ = 37, σ = 20.3, shift −4.24, min = 4, max = 100; 
O2 – Weibull α =1.2, β = 591, shift 145.36, min = 153, max = 1400;  
O3 – lognormal µ =245, σ =1253, shift 623, min = 624, max = 1170; 
O4 – logistic α = 301, β = 79, min = 97, max = 465. 
 
7.6.9. Time to Remove Necessary Tools from Appliance 
 
FBIM Table P provides three times associated with removing forced entry tools, hydrant 
equipment and high-rise packs from an appliance. A single time to collect forced entry tools 
from an appliance is given in the FBIM as 25 seconds.  No NZFS data has been collected 
representing this task; however, considering stowage of tools upon fire appliances do vary 
between different types of appliances, and between different tools and equipment, 25 
seconds would appear to be a representative time appropriate for NZFS conditions in lieu of 
appropriate data.  This is also true for the removal of high-rise packs from appliances.  High-




considering similar stowage arrangement to that in Australia, there is likely to be little 
difference in practice between countries and the same data is recommend until sufficient 
NZFS data can be collected. 
Five data sets have been collected so far for the times taken to remove hydrant equipment, 
the hydrant standpipe, bar and key.  Figure 35 shows the distributions found using the 
Australian FBIM and NZFS data collected to date.  Considering the number of records 
collected so far, the distributions compare relatively well with the NZFS data represented by 
60% of current FBIM data for 125 records.  This data is provided within Table 20 with the 
recommended distributions using the existing FBIM data following. 
  
Figure 35 Australian and NZFS distributions found for the times taken to remove 




















Table 20 FBIM Table P including NZFS data for the collection of hydrant equipment 
and high-rise packs 
Tools/equipment Time (s) Sample 





P1 – hydrant equipment 29.8 9 20 46 5 
P2 – high-rise pack or similar 33 N/A N/A N/A 1 
Australian FBIM data 
P1 – hydrant equipment 32.5 18.1 7 90 125 
P2 – high-rise pack or similar 13.5 6.0 5 30 39 
 
The following distributions using @Risk to re-evaluate the Australian data suggests the 
following distributions for these tasks: 
P1 – loglogistic Γ = 5, β = 22.5, α = 2.7, min = 20, max = 46; 
P2 – lognormal µ = 13.3, σ = 6.3, shift 0.18, min = 5, max = 30. 
 
7.6.10. Fire-Fighter Horizontal Travel Speed 
 
FBIM Table Q provides the times associated with fire-fighters‘ horizontal travel speeds 
considering different levels of PPE and equipment.  As would be expected, the greater the 
level of equipment and PPE worn is reflected by decreasing travel speeds due to the 
increasing weight and encumbrance.  No NZFS data has been collected for fire fighters 
dressed in full hazardous incident suit with BA, so the FBIM data would need to be used until 
further data can be collected and assessed.  A total of 23 data samples have been collected 
so far for fire-fighter travel speeds with the various levels of PPE and BA.  As with the FBIM 
data, this has been collected without any smoke obscuration hindering movement or the fire 
fighters‘ way finding.  An appropriate safety factor would need to be considered if 
considering smoke-obscured conditions.   
For fire fighters dressed in PPE (turnout uniform), the data collected so far suggests a 
slightly faster rate of travel than that given within the FBIM.  This is possibly a function of the 
relatively small data set and limited range of conditions fire fighters have been subjected to.  




different weather and lighting conditions and other factors, the standard deviation would 
increase with more data sets collected.  The same is true for fire fighters carrying equipment 
and for those wearing BA.  However, it is not possible to determine this given the relatively 
small data set collected to date.  Therefore, until further data is collected and given that all of 
the NZFS data falls within the FBIM data ranges, it is considered appropriate to continue to 
use the existing FBIM data for these travel speeds. 
Table 21 FBIM Table Q including NZFS data for fire-fighter travel speeds 
Travel conditions Speed (m/s) Sample 





Q1 – dressed in turnout uniform 2.7 0.61 1.84 3.68 9 
Q2 – dressed in turnout uniform 
with equipment  
1.5 0.41 1.00 2.27 10 
Q3 – dressed in turnout uniform in 
BA with or without equipment 
0.54 0.22 0.18 0.75 4 
Australian FBIM data 
Q1 – dressed in turnout uniform 2.3 1.4 0.32 6.25 246 
Q2 – dressed in turnout uniform 
with equipment  
1.9 1.3 0.13 6.00 159 
Q3 – dressed in turnout uniform in 
BA with or without equipment 
1.4 0.6 0.28 3.33 111 
Q4 – dressed in full hazardous 
incident suit in BA 
0.8 0.5 0.13 2.5 48 
 
The following distributions using @Risk to re-evaluate the existing Australian FBIM data are 
suggested for these tasks: 
Q1 – loglogistic Γ = 0.12, β = 1.8, α = 2.7, min = 0.32, max = 6.25; 
Q2 – Weibull α = 1.4467, β = 2.0271, shift 0.10346, min = 0.13, max = 6; 
Q3 – logistic α = 1.3, β = 0.3, min = 0.28, max = 3.3; 





7.6.11. Fire-Fighter Vertical Travel Speeds 
 
As the travel speed inside a lift will be dependent upon the specific design of the lift 
proposed or present within the building, the ascent speed of the lift should be provided by 
the designer.  Strakosch (73) provides a number of lift ascent speeds within table 10.7 of the 
Vertical Transportation Handbook dependent on the class of building and the number of 
floors present.  To assist designers determining lift speeds where they are not known at the 
time of an analysis, this table has been reproduced in full with speeds converted into metric, 
which can be used if the actual lift ascent speeds cannot be determined.  
 
Table 22 Recommended lift ascent speeds (m/s) 
Number of 
floors 
Class of building 
Small Average Large or 
prestige 
Service 
Office buildings (including professional offices) 
Up to 5 floors 1.01 a 1.52-2 2.03 1.01 a 
5 to 15 floors 2.03 2.03 2.54 1.52 
15 to 20 floors 2.03 2.54 2.54 2.03 
20 to 55 floors 2.54 3.56 3.56 2.54 
25 to 35 floors - 5.08 5.08 2.54 
35 to 45 floors b - 5.08 to 6.10 6.10 3.56 
45 to 60 floors b - 6.10 to 7.11 7.11 to 8.13 4.06 
Over 60 floors b - - 9.14 4.06 
Stores 
Up to 5 floors 150 a 1.01 1.52 1.01 a 
5 to 10 floors 2.03 2.03 2.54 2.03 
10 to 15 floors 2.54 2.54 2.54 to 3.56 2.03 
Garages 
2 to 5 floors 1.01 a 1.01 a 1.01 a  
5 to 10 floors 1.01 1.52 2.03  
10 to 15 floors 1.52 2.03 2.54  
a 0.76 ms-1 hydraulic acceptable. 





The FBIM table R suggests a lift loading time of 30 seconds.  As well as fire fighters entering 
the lift this time needs to factor in the additional equipment required to support fire-fighting 
operations in high rise buildings including additional breathing apparatus sets and forcible 
entry tools, and also needs to include a time component for the fire fighters to familiarise 
themselves with the make and style of lift and to operate the lift using the appropriate keys.  
No specific data has been collected to establish a different time component or suggest a 
suitable distribution for this task.  However, given the variables discussed above, 30 seconds 
would appear to be a reasonable time to allow for the lift loading component to occur. 
 
7.6.12. Time for Hindrance Factor Caused By Occupants Evacuating 
 
The FBIM provides no recommendations for any hindrance factor that can be caused by 
occupants evacuating a building coincident with fire fighters trying to make access.  FBIM 
Table S refers designers to the evacuation model being used for the egress analysis and 
suggests that they determine an appropriate factor. 
Section 0 presents specific research conducted to determine fire-fighter vertical travel 
speeds within high-rise buildings and discusses information of importance when considering 
times associated with ascending stairs.  A brief discussion follows considering some of the 
issues associated with fire fighters trying to make entry to a building at the same time as 
occupants making egress. 
Past incidents have shown the difficulties associated with fire fighters undertaking their 
duties at the same time as occupants trying to escape from buildings (74)(75).  Typically, 
where insufficient protection is afforded to access stairs, fire fighters will need to set up their 
equipment and make access into the fire floor from the floor level below the location of the 
fire.  This will mean that once equipment including charged hoses has been laid within a stair 
it will not be passable safely by evacuating occupants.  Also, once entry to any fire 
compartment has been made it is likely that smoke leakage into the stair will make this 
untenable to occupants.  During many fires, the effects of occupants evacuating have 
caused significant delays to the commencement of fire fighting and, specifically, suppression 
operations as fire fighters have not been able to make entry and access to the affected floors 
until the occupants have completed evacuation of the building and stairs completed emptied 
(74).  In recognition of this particular issue, especially with fire fighting in high-rise buildings, 




(75) have included and recommended additional requirements for dedicated fire-fighting 
access stairs to be provided within buildings over certain heights.  
Apart from the issues identified above, relevant specifically to high-rise buildings, other 
buildings such as stadia and the like that contain large exits for mass evacuation should also 
take into account the effect of fire fighters making entry into the buildings concurrently to 
occupants evacuating.  In these situations, evacuation modelling is normally undertaken 
which should take into account reduced exit capacity that will result should dedicated access 
routes into the building for fire fighters not be provided.  In such circumstances, the FBIM 
can be used to quantify likely arrival and access times of responding fire fighters so that the 
evacuation strategies can take into account the effect of emergency response activities 
within such buildings.  A risk-based analysis can identify whether such egress studies would 
need to consider such hindrance factors for the entire evacuation time or only for a part of 
the evacuation time component.    
 
7.6.13. Fire-Fighter Stair Travel Speed 
 
The FBIM Table T provides six times associated with ascending and descending stairs for 
fire fighters including various pieces of equipment and associated rest breaks.  Times T1 
and T6 associated with ascending stairs with BA and equipment and rest breaks have been 
considered following a specific study undertaken with fire fighters in a high-rise building and 
comparison with the available international literature.  This data is discussed separately in 
the FBIM section 0.  This section considers the times associated with ascending stairs with 
the two types of hose used within the NZFS for internal fire-fighting hose, specifically high-
pressure deliveries and the combination of 70 and 45 mm low-pressure deliveries as would 
be deployed when using a 'high-rise pack'.  The times considered here assume that the 
hoses being carried or dragged are either dry or semi-charged but are connected to the 
appliance and being laid ready for immediate use.  Section 0 should be referred to for times 
associated with carrying hose as part of a high-rise pack as shown below in Figure 46 and 
41 or when water being supplied to a hose would be expected from an internal fire hydrant.   
Insufficient data has been collected to date to draw any conclusions either specific to NZFS 
conditions or with the existing FBIM data.  Considering that the data presented is on a 'per 
step' basis, and that there are only minor differences between the equipment carried, there 
is no reason to suggest any significant variance when considering the existing FBIM data.  




data presented within the FBIM Table T are recommended for continued use.  When using 
these values, the Australian 65 mm and 38 mm hoses should be considered the same as the 
NZFS 70 mm and 45 mm hoses, respectively.  The FBIM data is presented in Table 23 and 
has been assessed within @Risk for the appropriate distributions to be used within a 
probabilistic analysis. 
Table 23 FBIM Table T Fire-fighter stair travel speeds 
Travel conditions Time (s) Sample 




T1 – ascend stairs In BA with equipment 0.94 0.45 0.25 2.10 73 
T2 – ascend stairs with high pressure hose 0.48 0.28 0.09 1.21 33 
T3 – ascend stairs with 65 mm diameter hose 0.71 0.31 0.15 1.40 34 
T4 – ascend stairs with 38 mm diameter hose 0.77 0.27 0.40 1.40 33 
T5 – descend stairs in BA 0.97 0.45 0.20 2.55 68 
T6 – rest breaks (valid after 6 stair flights) 1.86 0.82 0.50 3.20 11 
 
The following distributions using @Risk to re-evaluate the existing Australian FBIM data are 
suggested for these tasks: 
T1 – lognormal µ = 1.2, σ = 0.48, shift −0.24, min = 0.25, max = 2.1; 
T2 – loglogistic Γ =  −0.098, β = 0.52, α = 3.6, min = 0.09, max = 1.21; 
T3 – normal µ = 0.71, σ = 0.32, min = 0.15, max = 1.4; 
T4 – loglogistic Γ = 0.26, β = 0.45, α = 3.26, min = 0.4, max = 1.4; 
T5 – lognormal µ = 1.28, σ = 0.45, shift −0.31, min = 0.2, max =2.55; 










Fire-fighting operations within buildings often require fire fighters to climb stairs. Stair 
climbing while dressed in structural fire-fighting clothing and when carrying the necessary 
fire-fighting equipment such as hoses and BA increases the physiological effects and stress 
on fire fighters, which in turn increases the travel time vertically up stairs and the time to 
undertake fire-fighting tasks once the desired location is reached (3; 4).   
Fire fighters use dedicated fire-fighting lifts in high-rise buildings if provided and when the 
height of the building dictates that climbing stairs will affect efficient fire fighting. However, if 
dedicated lifts are not available, because they have failed or the level of protection afforded 
to those lifts cannot be guaranteed, fire fighters may decide or be forced to use the stairs. 
Standard operational procedures also require that fire-fighting operations be based from the 
floor level below the location of the fire, so it is inevitable, even when lifts are used, that 
some degree of stair climbing in a multi-storey building will be required. 
 
7.6.14.2. Existing Available Stair-Climbing Data 
 
Section 7 of the FBIM manual (5) provides a single distribution for the stair travel speed in 
steps per second based on the number of steps for fire fighters wearing BA and carrying 
equipment.  Distributions are also provided for the times taken to ascend stairs with both 
low-pressure and high-pressure delivery hoses connected to a fire appliance from ground 
level.  These distributions are presented in Table 24. It is not known how many floors were 
climbed in each of the data sets collected and therefore what height limitations if any are 
applicable to the data.  A distribution is also available to factor in rest breaks when using the 
distribution for building over six stories so it could be taken that this distribution is applicable 





Table 24 FBIM distributions given for vertical fire-fighter travel  
Travel conditions Steps/s Sample 
size µ σ Min Max 
Ascend stairs in BA with equipment 0.94 0.45 0.25 2.10 73 
Ascend stairs with high pressure hose 0.48 0.28 0.09 1.21 33 
Ascend stairs with 65 mm hose 0.71 0.31 0.15 1.4 34 
Ascend stairs with 38 mm hose 0.77 0.27 0.4 1.4 33 
Descend stairs in BA 0.97 0.45 0.20 2.55 68 
Rest breaks (valid after 6 stair flights) 1.86 0.82 0.5 3.2 11 
 
Various international studies have been undertaken on fire fighters climbing high-rise 
buildings. A UK study (3) assessed fire fighters climbing a 28-storey building wearing 
structural fire-fighting clothing referred to as Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), Extended 
Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA)
6
 and carrying other equipment associated with high-
rise fire-fighting operations. In this study, the lead group of four fire fighters carried 
equipment while wearing EDBA and PPE, while the second group of nine fire fighters were 
responsible for laying hose to make water available at the top of the stair. Tests were also 
repeated with the same groups of fire fighters wearing only PPE. This particular study also 
assessed the physiological condition of the fire fighters measuring heart rate, body core and 
skin temperatures as well as subjective assessments of exertion and thermal stress. As the 
fire fighters climbed in groups, average times are presented for each group concluding a 
time of 14.6 ± 1.3 minutes for the lead group wearing EDBA and carrying equipment, with 
the hose-laying group taking 10.5 ± 0.5 minutes. The times taken for the fire fighters to 
repeat the exercise while not wearing EDBA or carrying any equipment were found to be 
approximately half of that with the EDBA and equipment. 
A study in Iceland (44) assessed four fire fighters wearing PPE, BA and carrying high-rise 
fire-fighting equipment within a 20-storey building. In these tests, fire fighters took between 
approximately six and eight minutes to reach the 20th floor. Average speeds of the linear 
distance travelled for the fire fighters‘ ascent were in the range of 0.37 m/s and 0.46 m/s for 
the total stair ascent slowing to 0.35 m/s and 0.45 m/s over the top five floors. 
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The Mississauga Fire and Emergency Services department in Canada recently conducted a 
series of 'time trials' to determine the response times of fire fighters to high-rise 
buildings(76)(77).  These trials compared fire-fighter response times in three separate 
residential high-rise buildings using stairs and lifts for access to the 5th, 10th, 15th and 20th 
floors. The crews carried typical high-rise fire fighting and medical equipment consisting of 
an apartment pack, medical bag, forcible entry tools, thermal imaging camera and 
defibrillator.  The total weight carried by the crews including that of the PPE and BA is given 
below in Table 25. 
Table 25 Typical PPE and equipment mass carried by Canadian fire crews 
Item Weight (kg)7 
PPE, BA and apartment pack                 41 
Forcible entry kit             26 
Medical bag (defibrillator) 35 
Medical bag (oxygen)           31 
Thermal imaging camera         25 
 
Travel speed for individual fire crews were not reported, however average times for crews 
responding have been produced against those taken to access the floors using lifts.  Table 
26 shows the average travel time component from the lifts on the ground floor using either 
stairs or the lift to the designated floor. The reports indicate that crews slowed as they 
travelled to the upper floors and also noted that some crews used rest breaks on various 
floors as fatigue set in. The rest breaks were found to be necessary to ensure that crews 
conserved their energy so that they could undertake fire-fighting tasks effectively once they 
reached the designated floor. The crews were also asked how 'effective' they would be when 
reaching the designated floor. Seventy-five percent of crews reported that they would be 
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Table 26 Comparison of vertical response times using lifts and stairs by Canadian fire 
crews 
Floors Average travel time from lift to 
designated floor using stairs (mins:secs) 
Average time to designated 
floor using lift (mins:secs) 
0 0:00 0:00 
5 1:53 0:47 
10 3:21 0:47 
15 6:05 0:50 
20 7:22 0:59 
 
Figure 36 Compares the UK, Icelandic and Canadian data sets from the three studies. 
 
Figure 36 UK, Icelandic and Canadian stair climb data 
A number of other studies are available that have factored in the speed of fire fighters 
climbing stairs.  Kuligowski (78) suggests 0.35 m/s based on modified fire fighters‘ travel 
speeds taken from published data from people movement studies. This case study also used 
the New York fire department‘s rule of thumb of 60 s for each flight of stairs climbed. This 
later figure presenting a very conservative value when compared with directly measured 
times. However, it is unclear what activities are factored into this 60 s value, which could 
include a range of fire-fighting tasks such as laying hose and preparing to enter the 




It is important to note that all of the data presented above considered unobstructed flow. 
Real fire and emergency incidents have shown that fire fighters have great difficulty making 
entry into buildings and climbing stairs while occupants are making their escape. For 
example, a fire at the 52-storey Boston Prudential centre in the United States in 1986 
penetrated one of the two egress stairs within the building preventing the use of this stair by 
either occupants or fire fighters. Due to the inability of the attending fire service to reach the 
fire floor and to undertake fire-fighting operations whilst occupants were descending down 
the single remaining stairs, operations were delayed for nearly an hour until all the 
occupants had escaped (74). 
Similarly, the official reports into the emergency response operations that took place during 
the World Trade Center disaster (75) estimated that stair climbing rates for the emergency 
responders varied between 1.4 minutes per floor for emergency responders not wearing 
protective clothing or carrying equipment and 2 minutes per floor for those that were wearing 
protective clothing and carrying equipment, with an associated error of ±0.5 minutes per 
floor. These times also include for the counter flow effect of occupants escaping down the 
stairs which significantly hindered the fire fighters‘ time to ascend the stairs. 
  
7.6.14.3. High-Rise Stair Climbing 
 
Tests were conducted in a 28-storey Auckland office building to ascertain the travel time 
over the height of the building. A total of 52 fire fighters dressed in structural fire-fighting 
clothing were assessed. The fire fighters that took part in these tests represented a large 
cross-section of fire fighters including New Zealand Fire Service, career and volunteer fire 
fighters as well as a number of fire fighters from the Auckland Airport Emergency Service. 
Fire fighters with a range of fitness and experience levels took part including those who 
regularly trained and have undertaken many stair climbing events to those with no previous 
experience of climbing high-rise buildings in PPE. This broad cross-section of fire fighters is 
considered to be representative of the fitness of any particular individual and team of fire 
fighters who could be expected to have to undertake fire-fighting activities within a high-rise 
building. 
Of the 52 climbers, all but six wore BA (not donned) with six climbers also carrying an 
additional mixture of typical high rise equipment including hoses, a branch and axe. The 
typical load associated with the clothing and equipment carried by the fire fighters ranged 




Table 27 Typical PPE and equipment mass carried by climbers 
Item Weight (kg) 
Structural fire-fighting clothing 8.5 
Breathing apparatus 11.5-14 
45 mm hose pack 10.6 
70 mm hose pack 16 
Branch 1.2 – 4.13 
Axe 2.8 – 5.7 
 
The start of the climb was undertaken external to the building at level 0 with a measured 
horizontal distance of 48 m and 28 steps to reach the base of the stair tower at level 1. The 
stairwell within the building between levels 3 and 26 was 2.4 m wide and consisted of a 
single flight of stairs between each floor level with no mid floor landing. The travel distance 
between each flight of stairs measured 6.3 m and consisted of 19 steps. A typical floor level 
is shown in Figure 37.  The stair treads and dimensions of the stairs from levels 1-3 and 26-
28 altered between each of the levels to accommodate the geometry of the building at those 
levels.   
 




Typically, each stair and tread riser dimensions measured: 
levels 0– 1     150 mm rise, 350 mm tread; 
levels 1 – 25   190 mm rise, 300 mm tread; 
levels 25 – 27 180 mm rise, 250 mm tread. 
Times were measured at each fifth floor landing with additional times taken at the entrance 
to the stair tower at level 1 and at the top of the stair at level 28.   Table 28 indicates the 
distance and number of steps between timing locations. 
 
Table 28 Distance and number of steps between timing locations 
Timing 
level 
Distance (m) Steps 
Section Cumulative Section Cumulative 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 40 40 28 28 
5 47 87 79 107 
10 47 134 95 202 
15 47 181 95 297 
20 47 228 95 392 
25 47 275 95 487 
28 47 321 59 546 
 
There was no specific direction given to the climbers in terms of how they were expected to 
undertake the climb, i.e. to replicate emergency conditions. It was made clear from the 
outset that this exercise was not intended to be a race and that it was not a competitive 
event. Official timing of the climbers for other purposes did not take place which could have 
further encouraged a competitive environment. A brief was given to the climbers before the 
climb expressing the purpose of this data-gathering exercise. Before the climb started the 
climbers were also advised that they may be asked questions regarding their physical 
condition when they reached level 28 and also if they could provide a subjective assessment 
of their ability to continue and undertake further tasks including compartment fire-fighting 
operations.  
Climbers formed 12 self-selected groups varying in size from 2 to 7 climbers although a 
number of individuals did not climb as part of any specific group. Each group was started 




building at level 1. Of the 12 groups that started together, 6 arrived at level 28 with all 
members finishing within 30 s of each other indicating that these groups climbed as a team 
as would be expected in a fire scenario.  
A number of competitive climbers monitored their individual times and undertook the climb at 
their fastest rate possible. These climbers times represented the quickest results and should 




Figure 38 presents the results for all of the 52 climbers to reach the 28th floor. The range of 
total times to complete the climb for all climbers was between 6.4 and 17.3 minutes, with 49 
climbers reaching the top in under 15 minutes and 44 of the climbers completing the climb 
within 11.4 minutes.  Considering the range of climbers and equipment carried, it is 
considered that the spread of data fits well with that available from overseas and within the 
expected ranges. The times for 49 of the fastest climbers fall within the ranges provided by 
the UK data with only three New Zealand climbers taking longer and three marginally faster 
than the UK times. 
 




The times presented by the UK, Icelandic and Canadian studies are overlaid on Figure 39.    
 
Figure 39 Overall times of 49 climbers compared with UK, Icelandic and Canadian 
data 
The range of times from each of the studies is presented in Table 29 and given for the 20th 
and 28th floors for comparison.  
Table 29 NZ Results compared with UK, Icelandic and Canadian data 
Data set Time to reach 20 floors 
(mins) 
Time to reach 28 floors 
(mins) 
NZ study 4.5–12. 8 6.4–17.3 
UK with BA 9.8 10.5–14.6 
UK without BA 4.9 5.3–7.3 
Icelandic 6–8 8–10* 
Canadian 7.22 10.5* 
*Extrapolated 
The speed of all the climbers based on the measured distance travelled within the stair is 
presented in Figure 40, which identifies the reduction in climbing speed up the first 15 flights 




can be seen, the speeds obtained within the climb ranged from approximately 0.8 m/s to 
1.6 m/s for the first 5 levels reducing to between 0.3 m/s and 0.8 m/s for the upper levels. 
 
Figure 40 Average speed between each five floors 
 
Figure 41 shows the step climbing rate and the initial low speed on a per step basis found 
over the first five levels. This reduced rate was found to be due to the stair arrangement 
which contained approximately half the number of steps per metre of the horizontal distance 






Figure 41 Step climbing rate between each five floors 
The @Risk software (55) was used to fit distributions to the climbing speeds found at each 
5th floor level.  @Risk automatically ranks the fitted distributions according to the 'goodness 
of the fit' of which normal distributions were commonly highly ranked using the Kolmogorov–
Smirinov fit statistic, which is appropriate for continuous data.  The mean (µ), standard 
deviation (σ), maximum and minimum values representing each of the truncated distributions 
are given in Table 30 including the Kolmogorov–Smirinov fitting statistics. Each of these 
distributions is graphically shown in Figure 42.  The shape of the distributions found are 
similar except at the 5th level which identifies a reduction in travel speed, considered to be 
caused by the queuing that occurred at the entry to the stairwell proper at level 1. 
Table 30 Travel speed per section (m/s) 
Level Speed (m/s) Kolmogorov–
Smirinov fit 
statistic 




Level 5 1.26 0.26 0.23 1.64 0.117 
Level 10 0.85 0.14 0.29 1.11 0.181 
Level 15 0.7 0.14 0.30 0.93 2.641 
Level 20 0.65 0.14 0.30 0.85 0.241 
Level 25 0.59 0.15 0.28 0.82 0.158 






Figure 42 Fitted normal distributions for travel speed (m/s) at each five level section  
 
Table 31 provides the values describing each of the normal distributions based on the step 
speed including the data from the FBIM manual (5).  These distributions are shown in Figure 
43 with the FBIM distribution shown identifying the far larger standard distribution of the data 
sets and a mean speed of µ = 0.94, slightly less than the means found within this data set. 
The larger standard deviation found with the FBIM data is possibly a function of the different 
configurations of stairs used, although information on the stair criteria used to collect the 
original FBIM sample data is not available. As the stair geometry was not a variable in this 
data set, this highlights a potential vulnerability in this data if applying it to a stair 
configuration that differs significantly from that used in this experiment. However, whilst 
some variables such as stair geometry may alter the climbing rates of individual fire fighters, 
the results found here when compared with those from similar research conducted overseas 





















Figure 43 Fitted normal distributions for climbing rate (steps/s) at each five level 
section  
Table 31 Climbing rate at each five level section (steps/s)  
Level Speed (steps/s) Kolmogorov–
Smirinov fit 
statistic 




Level 5 1.1 0.2 0.27 1.62 0.088 
Level 10 1.3 0.2 0.43 1.68 0.179 
Level 15 1.2 0.25 0.50 1.53 0.227 
Level 20 1.0 0.25 0.51 1.46 0.241 
Level 25 1.0 0.27 0.49 1.45 0.158 
Level 28 1.0 0.25 0.50 1.43 0.142 
FBIM 0.94 0.45 0.25 2.1 N/A 
 
The differences between the mean speeds found at each five level section are shown in 
Figure 44.  The average climber speed per five level section falls as can be expected as a 



















per step basis, the average speed per step is shown to increase between levels 5 and 10 
before it starts to decrease and level out in the later stages of the climb.   
 
 
Figure 44 Comparison of means found between the two different reporting methods of 
steps per second and metres per second using the fitted normal distributions for the 
mean travel speed at each five level section  
On a step-per-second basis, the returned average speed over the first five levels is skewed 
due to the fewer steps climbed to reach level five in this building relative to the distance 
travelled.  This is not reflected within the speed graph based on the distance travelled as this 
included time for the climbers to travel between the sections of steps.  On this basis, using 
distance rather than the number of steps is likely to be the best method where the number of 
steps required to be climbed is not in a typical stair configuration. 
The mean speeds found at each 5 level section are shown in Figure 45 with a best-fit 
negative exponential equation fitted to the data set using the least squares method.  This 
returned a sum of squares error of 0.00083342, such that: 




Where s is the mean inclined speed in m/s and L is the stair level. For levels 5 and below it 
is suggested that a mean speed of 1.26 m/s be used with a standard deviation of 0.26 m/s 
as given in Table 30.  The standard deviations varied little with the distributions found for 
each 5 level section from level 5 onwards so a standard deviation of 0.14 m/s for floors 10 to 
20 and 0.15 m/s for buildings above 25 floor levels should be used to derive the distribution 
of speeds for fire fighters climbing stairs. No upper limitation on the use of this equation is 
proposed given that the travel speed found approaches a constant speed of 0.6 m/s as the 
number of levels increase. Although an upper travel speed of 0.6 m/s has not been 
validated, it would appear to provide a reasonable approximation of likely travel speeds that 
would be found above this level, not including any recovery periods or rest breaks that 
should also be factored into this type of analysis. 
 
Figure 45 Mean speed using the fitted normal distributions at each 5 level section and 
suggested model  
It should be noted that a number of factors affecting the climber's potential rate of travel 
were witnessed during this exercise. Queuing at the lower levels and on entry to the stair 
was noted, especially for the climbers placed at the end of the starting line. Congestion also 
possibly influenced climber times within the stair, especially on the lower levels as some 
climbers would have waited for convenient sections in the stairs, such as the landings, 
before overtaking other climbers. The stair consisted of an unusual configuration at the lower 




buildings occupants descending the stair was encountered by the climbers. Such factors 
could affect the climber‘s rate of stair ascent and could be considered with respect to the 
level of conservatism required for any analysis using this data. 
 
7.6.14.5. Equipment Hindrance 
 
The times from climbers carrying specific pieces of equipment were isolated from the 
majority of the climbers wearing only PPE and BA. These times were compared to 
investigate if the times could be distinguished from those not carrying any additional 
equipment and thus whether any specific hindrance factor could be established from this 
data. Nine climbers with and without BA have been specifically investigated, including the 
times of two climbers who only wore their PPE, did not wear BA or carry any additional 
equipment. Seven climbers carried either a 45 mm or 70 mm hose in bandolier fashion as 
shown in Figure 46.    Although other equipment was carried by climbers, including an axe 
and a number of branches, this equipment was noted to be passed between climbers on 
their ascent, making isolation of specific individuals and the effect of this equipment on their 
time difficult to establish. This equipment is typical of that required to be carried by fire 
fighters as part of high-rise fire-fighting operations as shown in Figure 47; note that hoses 
can be carried either over the shoulder in a bandolier or coiled (Dutch rolled) in a back pack.  
 






Figure 47 Typical high rise equipment carried by two fire fighters (breathing 
apparatus not shown) 
Figure 48 shows the spread of this data compared with that of the UK data with and without 
BA for comparison. As can be seen, there is no distinct difference between the climbers 
carrying the hoses, irrelevant of the hose diameter or weight. However, there is a distinct 
difference between those climbers wearing BA and those only carrying the hose. This data 
compares well with the UK data indicating that the addition of BA makes a significant 
difference to the climbers‘ travel speed. As with the UK findings, the addition of BA in this 
study effectively doubled the time taken to climb the stairs. However, it is known that some 
of the fittest climbers including those who had trained for the climb were those that carried 
equipment and these times are reflected in these results. Further analysis would therefore 
be recommended before concluding that BA makes such a defined difference as indicated in 
this study.   
A number of the climbers carrying equipment were asked about the effect they perceived 
this had on their ability to climb the stairs. Many of the climbers remarked that carrying 
equipment made the climb more difficult and slowed them down due to the difficulty in 
holding onto the handrail, as climbers used this as a climbing aid for support. Some of the 
climbers also remarked that they needed to change the hands carrying the equipment as 
they were using one hand to hold onto the handrail and the other to either hold the 
equipment or steady the hoses, for example, that were carried over their shoulders.  
The conclusion and observations from this climb indicate that whilst the additional equipment 
would have provided a level of encumbrance, the weight and imbalance to the climbers 




speeds. In this study, the fitness level of the individual climbers was observed to be the 




Figure 48 UK and NZ data for climbers carrying equipment  
 
7.6.14.6. FBIM Data Comparison 
 
Figure 49 compares the NZ data collected with the predicted times using the distributions 
given within the FBIM for a 28-storey building with 546 steps.  The red curve depicts the NZ 
climb data versus the predicted distribution in green taken from the FBIM.  The FBIM also 
provides a distribution for rest breaks that should be factored into any prediction once more 
than six flights of stairs are required to be climbed, this distribution is shown in purple.  The 
results presented are based on a Monte-Carlo analysis using 100,000 iterations and the 





Figure 49 NZ fitted distributions of climber's times to climb 28 floors with predictions 
taken from the FBIM  








NZ climb 628 152 381 1095 
FBIM 690 336 260 2184 
FBIM with rest 
breaks 
1028 373 445 3239 
 
As can be seen, the returned mean FBIM predictions are within minutes of the NZ climb data 
and indicate a relatively good fit when the rest breaks are not factored into the prediction.  
This issue is further discussed in the following section. 
The difference in the data collected in this study and that given in the FBIM is considered 
likely to be a product of the sample size and height of the buildings the data was collected in.  



















included in that study are not known.  It is assumed that many of the FBIM data samples 
would have been drawn from relatively low-rise buildings in comparison to the 28-storey 
building in this study.  A greater standard deviation would be expected considering the 
different building geometries as a variable in the FBIM data sets. 
For the purposes of FBIM data, it was not expected that there would be any particular 
difference between the rates of fire fighters climbing stairs between countries.  Whilst 
variations in equipment encumbrance (weight and size) could be a variable this is 
considered negligible to the variances expected between the fitness of individual fire fighters 
and the building geometry that could be expected in any particular emergency or FBIM 
analysis.  Therefore, the data collected here should be applicable to any analysis of fire 
fighters climbing stairs and carrying equipment.  
 
7.6.14.7. Recovery Period 
 
At the finish of the climb a number of climbers were asked how exhausted they felt and how 
long they thought it would take before they would be able to undertake further tasks. 
Expected tasks would include entering a compartment on fire and starting fire-fighting 
operations. The range of subjective times suggested as recovery periods ranged from 0 to 
as long as 7 minutes. Whilst the responses were subjective it is clear that they reflected the 
climbing approach adopted by those questioned. Clearly, some climbers were extremely 
exhausted on reaching the 28th floor and would not be in a condition to take on further tasks 
until they had rested. Others, however, were considered to be in a relatively good condition 
and felt ready and confident in their ability to carry on working almost immediately.  
Tomasson et al. (44) report times of 2.45 and 4 minutes, respectively, for two fire fighters to 
recover from climbing 20 flights of stairs before they felt ready to undertake compartment 
fire-fighting tasks. The World Trade Center emergency response operations report (75) 
considered that fatigue in fire fighters affecting their capability to undertake rescue 
operations becomes a factor after 12 flights of stairs. This report also provides fire-fighter 
witness statements that detail that rest breaks were as frequent as every 3 to 4 floors in 
certain cases. 
Conclusions from the physiological studies performed on fire fighters climbing stairs in the 
UK (3) concluded that upon reaching the 28th floor the fire fighters would not be fit to commit 
to the fire compartment. This is concerning, as committing fire fighters to undertake further 




fighters significant stress and overexertion. In the United States, of the 100-plus fire fighters 
that die on a yearly basis in the line of duty, approximately 45% of these fatalities are due to 
stress and overexertion (79).  Therefore, fire fighters are recommended not to overexert 
themselves when undertaking activities prior to commencement of compartment fire-fighting 
activities. As the FBIM does not incorporate any rest breaks after undertaking specific tasks 
such as stair climbing and assumes that fire fighters will immediately commence the next 
task, any recovery periods need to be factored into the travel time or activity component. 
Therefore, the addition of the recovery periods noted at the finish of this climb need to be 
factored into the distributions when used for any analysis. 
The FBIM provides for rest breaks to be factored into any assessment requiring travel in 
excess of six flights of stairs.  As shown in Figure 49, the addition of rest breaks increases 
the prediction of the climbers‘ time significantly, with an increase in average time to reach 
the top level of 338 seconds for the FBIM data and 400 seconds for the NZ climb data. 
Given that only anecdotal times were suggested from fire fighters, for the purposes of 
providing a distribution that can be factored into the analyses a uniform distribution time of 
0–7 minutes is proposed.  This distribution is shown diagrammatically in Figure 50 below: 
 
Figure 50 Proposed 0-7 minute uniform distribution for inclusion of rest breaks 
Figure 51 below compares the NZ climb data inclusive of the proposed 0- to 7-minute 
uniform distribution for rest breaks.  As can be seen, the NZ times in red compare relatively 
well with the FBIM-predicted times using the FBIM value for rest breaks with only 190 
seconds between the mean values over the 28 floors.  For simplicity and for assessments 








Figure 51 NZ results and FBIM predictions inclusive of rest breaks 
Table 33 Calculated distributions (time in seconds) inclusive of rest breaks  
Level Time (seconds) 




This study 838 194 382 1512 
FBIM 1028 373 445 3239 
 
7.6.15. Direct Comparison with the Icelandic Data 
 
Figure 52 presents the results from a probabilistic assessment using the proposed model 
overlaid with the results from the study by Tómasson et al. (45).  A Monte-Carlo analysis 
using 100,000 iterations and the Latin Hypercube sampling method within @Risk (55) 



















distance up the stairs.  The Icelandic results provide slower average ascent speeds than 
found in this study but as can be seen, fall within the range predicted using the proposed 
model.  The Icelandic times fall at the 86th and 95–96th percentiles of that predicted for the 
fastest times recorded to reach the 20th floor inclusive of the recovery period.  Only four fire 
fighters‘ times were measured in the Icelandic study and Tómasson et al. also noted that 
their results were lower than results from previous tests. Of the 52 fire fighters measured in 
this study, five had slower average speeds than those in the Icelandic study, indicating the 
benefits of deriving distributions from larger data sets as presented here. 
 
Figure 52 Comparison between Icelandic times and current study to climb 20 floors  
 
7.6.15.1. Proposed FBIM Data 
 
A common factor identified by a number of the climbers that presented a difficulty when 
climbing was the hindrance of the equipment being carried. Other than the additional weight 
that the equipment presented, carrying equipment also restricted the use of climbers‘ hands 
to hold onto a hand rail which aides climbing, especially when fatigue sets in. A number of 
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on each side of the stair. However, equipment hindrance was not found to be the most 
significant factor affecting climbers‘ speed. Fitness levels of the individual fire fighters, 
climbing as a team and the individual‘s choice to climb the stair as fast as possible or to 
climb at a steady rate so that they were not totally exhausted when they reached the top 
appeared to be the main factors affecting climbers‘ speed.  
For any analysis requiring consideration of fire fighters climbing tall buildings, the following 
distributions are proposed. 
When the number of steps required to be climbed are known, the following values are 
recommended for each five flights of stairs (Table 34). 
Table 34 Speed (steps/s) at each five level section 
Level Speed (Steps/s) 




Levels 5–10 1.3 0.2 0.43 1.68 
Levels 10–15 1.2 0.25 0.50 1.53 
Level 20+ 1 0.25 0.5 1.4 
 
When the distance up the stairs is known, determine the mean travel speed from equation 1 
where L ≥ 5, or use the values presented in Table 35. 
Table 35 Speed (m/s) at each five level section 
Level Speed (m/s) 




Levels 0–5 1.26 0.26 0.23 1.64 
Levels 5–10 0.85 0.14 0.29 1.11 
Levels 10–15 0.7 0.14 0.30 0.93 
Levels 15–20 0.65 0.14 0.30 0.85 
Level 25+ 0.59 0.15 0.28 0.82 
 
To allow for rest breaks and recovery periods once fire fighters have reached the intended 
floor, a uniform distribution from 0 to X (where X is 60 seconds added for every four flights of 
stairs) is recommended, otherwise 60 seconds should be added for every four flights of 




7.6.16. Time to Position Appliance at Entrance 
 
Table U within the FBIM provides a single value for the time associated with positioning an 
appliance at the entrance to the building at 2 m/s.  There is no statistical data supporting this 
value so it is assumed that this value is recommended recognising that a nominal value is 
required to support the time taken for the appliance operators to establish the most suitable 
parking location with respect to the incident as it unfolds and depending on any 
predetermined tactics and immediate water supply or delivery needs.  There is no reason to 
suggest that this nominal value needs revising or is not appropriate for NZFS aerial 
appliances considering that a nominal value is appropriate to take into account this specific 
task. 
 
7.6.17. Time to Lay, Connect and Charge Hose 
 
FBIM Table V considers the times associated with hose operations and the times taken to 
establish connected hoses between hydrants and appliances, appliances to branches, the 
appliance to sprinkler/hydrant inlet connections (referred to as booster connection in 
Australia) and the time taken to charge those hoses to a working pressure once the 
connection has been established. 
Whilst data has been collected for all of these different hose operations, sufficient data of 
statistical relevance has been collected for comparison for only two of the hose operations.  
For task V1.1, the FBIM presents data collected from only three records for 90 mm hose.  It 
can also be seen that the standard deviation for these three records is large, with significant 
difference between each data set found.  Four data points have been collected using 90 mm 
feeder hose which are given below in Table 36.  Whilst only four data sets have been 
established, these times are not only more closely matched but the mean speeds returned 
per section of hose are only slightly slower than those given within the FBIM data for the 
smaller diameter 65 mm hose, as would be expected.  Therefore, the times found here are 
considered to be more appropriate than those currently presented within the FBIM data sets 
for 90 mm hoses supplying water from a hydrant to an appliance, data set V1.1. 
The other data set with enough data to form a comparison is that considering tee times 
taken to remove 70 mm delivery hose and connect to a branch, FBIM data set V 2.1.  
Considering the 25 m length of 70 mm diameter delivery hose 11, data samples have been 




FBIM data for 30 m long, 65 mm diameter hose.  Considering the number of data samples 
collected compared with the 82 data sets given within the FBIM, the distribution returned is 
as expected with a lower standard deviation and reduced average time per section of hose.  
Given that the largest variable between the relevant hoses is the length, it would be 
expected that the average time to lay and connect a 25 m length of hose would be on 
average faster than laying a 30 m length.  Whilst the diameters are slightly different, this 
would be expected to be negligible as the results suggest.  However, the number of data 
sets collected so far is not considered large enough to recommend a distribution for FBIM 
analysis purposes as it is unlikely to represent sufficient variables that could be expected on 
a fire ground.  The distribution is represented by only 43% of the FBIM data suggesting that 
a larger standard deviation would be found if enough samples were collected under more 
variable conditions.   
Given the above, the FBIM distributions for hose are recommended to be used for NZFS 
purposes except for data set V1.1 for which the distribution found within this data set is 
recommended for use within an FBIM analysis. 
 
 
Figure 53 Australian and NZFS distributions found for the times taken to remove 



















Table 36 FBIM Table V with NZFS data for hose operations 
Hose connection conditions (all 




Time (s) Sample 





V1.1 – remove, connect & charge 
hose from hydrant to appliance 
90 84.8 11.5 67 99 4 
V2.1 – remove & connect hose from 
appliance to branch 
70 23.26 5.88 12.67 33 11 
Australian FBIM data 
V1 – remove, connect & charge 
hose from hydrant to appliance 
90 144.7 90.2 50 266 3 
65 60.4 30.2 14 154.4 156 
V2 – remove & connect hose from 
appliance to branch 
65 39.4 17.4 6 80 82 
38 33.3 15.4 2 70.7 36 
V3 – remove & connect hose from 
appliance to booster connections 
65 45.3 17.1 17.5 80 39 
V4 – charge delivery hose from 
appliance 
65 20.3 13.2 2.5 80 119 
38 18.4 10.2 6 45 37 
V5 – connect hose to boosted 
hydrant and charge 
65 59.6 37.9 15 163 52 
38 40.9 17.8 14 90 28 
 
The following distributions using @Risk to re-evaluate the Australian data suggests the 
following distributions for these tasks: 
V1.1 – normal µ = 84.8, σ = 11.5, min = 67, max = 99; 
V1.2 – lognorm µ = 89, σ = 31, shift −28.5, min = 14, max = 154;  
V2.1 – Weibull α = 2.25, β = 41.7, shift 2.5, min = 6, max = 80; 
V2.2 – normal µ = 33.3, σ = 15.6, min = 2, max = 70.7; 
V3    – lognorm µ = 50.8, σ = 18, shift -5.5, min = 17.5, max = 80; 
V4.1 – gamma α = 2.3, β = 8.1, shift 1.5, min = 2.5, max = 80; 
V4.2 – loglogistic Γ = 2.97, β = 12.8, α = 2.6, min = 6, max = 45; 
V5.1 – loglogistic Γ = 10.7, β = 36.8, α = 1.97, min = 15, max = 163; 




7.6.18. Time to Search for External Water Source 
 
FBIM Table W provides for an additional time component to be factored into the FBIM 
assessment when the location of the water source is not immediately adjacent to the building 
and fire service main attendance and parking location.  This time should be included on top 
of the time taken to travel between the hydrant and appliance.  
Table 37 FBIM Table W Time to search for external water source 
External search for street main hydrant Time (s) 
Where street hydrant is < 30 m from appliance set up additional 30 s 
Where street hydrant is > 30 m < 60 m from appliance set up additional 90 s 
Where street hydrant is > 60 m from appliance set up additional 180 s 
 
The times associated with searching for external fire-fighting facilities that are not 
immediately apparent or located adjacent to fire appliance access locations has been 
witnessed to be highly dependent on the fire fighters‘ local knowledge of the facility and 
surrounding facilities.  Fire fighters undertake familiarisation visits to buildings located close 
to their fire station as part of general operational emergency planning arrangements.   Local 
knowledge of risks and preplanning activities provide significant learning opportunities, 
information dissemination between crews and increases the efficiency of operational tasks 
such as establishing water supplies in the event of emergencies.  However, such local 
knowledge of buildings cannot readily be relied upon as it is heavily dependent on 
individual's knowledge and the assumption that the fire fighters with such knowledge will be 
the first on the scene.  Even when the first appliance arrives at an emergency from the 
closest located fire station, there is a possibility that the first arriving fire fighters may have 
no knowledge of the building or local fire-fighting infrastructure.   
The importance of local knowledge has been demonstrated in the two independent fire 
ground field experiments reported in Section 8.5, where two different crews replicated the 
same incident within the same building.  In these two exercises, the time taken to locate 
external street hydrants was shown to be dependent on the fire fighters‘ level of knowledge 
of the site.  The first exercise identified the issues encountered by fire-fighting crews trying to 
establish water supplies from a fire hydrant to an appliance without prior knowledge of the 
location of the hydrant.  In this exercise, it took a fire fighter approximately 50 seconds to 
locate the street hydrant located 57 m from the fire appliance including travel time with a 




to the hydrant to connect it to the appliance.  During the repeated exercise where the fire 
fighter had prior knowledge of the location of the hydrant, the fire fighter was able to take a 
standpipe, feeder hose and necessary tools directly to the hydrant in one go to enable full 
connection and the establishment of water to the appliance within a total of 67 seconds.  
Due to the repeated trips to the hydrant in the first exercise, it took nearly two minutes more 
to supply the fire appliance with water than in the second exercise.   
The additional times given in the FBIM to take into account the extended distances between 
external hydrants and the fire appliance access and final parking locations appear to be 
appropriate from the exercises witnessed. 
 
7.6.19. Time to Obtain Static Water 
 
FBIM Table X provides the various times associated with the tasks required for fire fighters 
to establish water to an appliance, either from an open water source or tanked supply.  
These times include positioning of the appliance and the making up of and securing of hard 
suction hose.  The time taken to position a fire appliance when obtaining water from a 
tanked or static source will depend upon the ease at which an appliance can make access to 
the source and identification of the location of the supply.  For tanked supplies, clear and 
obvious signage should be provided identifying the location of any tank with appropriate 
access and hard standing in close proximity to the tank outlets.  For open water sources, 
appliance access and positioning is critical due to the relatively short length of hard suction 
hose carried on an appliance.  As only a maximum of 10 m of hard suction hose is carried on 
an NZFS fire appliance, access to the tank outlets or water source will need to be well within 
10 m from the position of the fire appliance inlets (typically on the off side of the appliance) 
minus the height of the source.  The NZFS Fire-fighting Water Supplies Code of Practice, 
PAS NZS 4509 (80) provides details regarding fire-fighting water supplies and relevant 
access requirements to water supplies such as open and static water sources to ensure that 
they meet fire-fighters operational requirements.  As addressed above, local knowledge can 
be crucial to minimise times associated with locating such facilities.  However, as this cannot 
be guaranteed, appropriate signage should be provided to help locate such supplies. 
To date, three separate exercises have been conducted to determine the times taken to 
establish water supply to an appliance from an open water source.  No suitable tanked 
supplies were found to undertake the FBIM exercises.  Whilst suction hose can vary slightly 




length, with only 2.5 m lengths used as standard within the NZFS compared with 3 m lengths 
used as standard within Australia.  Whilst statistically the number of records for this study is 
not significant, the returned average values for each task compares relatively well, except for 
the time taken to connect the suction hose to the appliance.  Table 38 shows the data 
contained within the FBIM manual with the average values from the three NZFS data sets 
given in brackets.   
Table 38 FBIM Table X times to obtain static water (with NZFS data in brackets)  
Activity Time (s) Sample 




X1 – position appliance (m/s) 1.1 
(0.8) 
0.5 0.16 2.42 84 
X2 – remove suction hose and connect 




7.5 3 37.5 85 
X3 – prime suction hose from tank (s) 23.5 
(N/A) 
15.3 7 70 39 




54.4 23 265 49 
X5 – lower suction hose to open water 
and prime (s) 
60.7 
(64) 
37.9 10 180 48 
 
The following distributions have been derived using @Risk to re-evaluate the Australian data 
for these tasks: 
X1 – lognormal µ = 3.2, σ = 0.5, shift −2.1, min = 0.16, max = 2.4; 
X2 – normal µ = 18.6, σ = 7.6, min = 3, max = 37.5; 
X3 – loglogistic Γ = 6, β = 12, α = 1.6, min = 7, max = 70; 
X4 – beta general α1 = 1.1, α2 = 3.1, min = 23, max = 265; 






7.6.20. Times for Search and Rescue 
 
Where fire fighters are required to undertake search and rescue activities within buildings, 
the time associated with these tasks will be heavily dependent on the level of visibility 
present and the size and complexity of the compartment.  There are two types of search 
procedures undertaken at an incident identified as the primary and secondary search. 
Search and rescue activities will be undertaken in accordance with NZFS standard 
operational procedures, which requires all rescue activities to involve a primary search. This 
requires rescuers, working in teams of two or more, to search the perimeter of the room first, 
followed by a sweep of the centre of the floor.  These methods are employed to ensure that 
all areas of the room are searched considering that visibility levels can be expected to be 
zero and that fire fighters will be reliant on what they can touch and feel as they move 
through a room in which the layout and sometimes size may not be known.  When 
conducting a primary search in a fire situation, fire fighters will take a hose line with them to 
provide protection to themselves and any casualties as well as providing a means of 
identifying and protecting their escape route and allowing them to conduct an attack on the 
fire if required.  A typical search and rescue pattern is shown below as given in the NZFS 
training manual (81). 
 
 
Figure 54 NZFS methodology for the correct method for searching a room 
The secondary search occurs once the situation is under control and the fire has been 
contained, and is undertaken to confirm the presence of casualties and to account for all 
occupants.  When estimating the time taken to undertake a primary or secondary search, the 




unrealistic expectations are not factored in to any design.  As well as being limited by the 
duration of BA, the physiological and psychological demands on fire fighters, especially 
under thermal stress, needs to be recognised.  UK research has shown that the depth of a 
compartment that can be safely negotiated from a place of relative safety such as a stair 
may be as little as 32 m.  Also, research into the operational capabilities of fire fighters 
wearing PPE and BA in other conditions such as tunnels has identified that the safe depth of 
penetration is between 100 and 300 m depending on the tasks expected of fire fighters, 
even when under no thermal stress from a fire (82 p. 485). 
There are two main types of BA set used within the NZFS, the Sabre Centurion and Dräger 
PA 94 Plus set using either steel, hoop-wrapped fibre-reinforced plastic or fully composite 
cylinders.  Generally, BA sets have a standard duration of approximately 30 minutes.  
However, the actual duration is completely dependent upon the consumption of the wearer 
and their work rate.  Durations of as little as 10 minutes could be expected if fire fighters are 
working at their maximum rate as would be expected during search and rescue or 
compartment fire-fighting activities. 
No data to date has been recorded to establish the times associated with search and rescue 
activities.  The simulation of a search and rescue of real persons was a major part of two 
exercises conducted as part of this research as discussed in section 8.5.  However, due to 
the theatrical smoke released during these exercises and the reduced visibility conditions 
that resulted, it was impossible to record the travel times within the searched compartments 
and any quantifiable data relating to travel times within different visibility conditions.  Whilst 
the times taken to remove the occupants from the buildings were recorded and an attempt to 
follow the fire fighters while undertaking the searches was made, the distances travelled and 
times associated with searching specific parts of the building were difficult to establish.   
For the purposes of establishing appropriate FBIM data, it is necessary to investigate the 
times associated with fire-fighter travel under different visibility conditions.  To undertake this 
successfully the use of theatrical or pyrotechnic smoke is considered undesirable as it does 
not produce measurable or uniform conditions within compartments representative of those 
found during real fires or that are easy to quantify for the purposes of this research.  On this 
basis, it is recommend that for future research fire fighters are provided with BA masks that 
replicate known levels of smoke visibility as are currently available for training purposes.  
This way it would be possible to quantify the relationship between visibility and the speed at 
which fire fighters undertake search and rescues operations within smoke-affected buildings. 
FBIM Table Y provides two values for the time taken to conduct a perimeter search and for 




times for NZFS fire fighters, the FBIM data is required to be used.  The associated speeds at 
which fire fighters can search a room or remove a person during rescue operations are 
unlikely to be any different between different brigades considering the variables that would 
affect this type of task.  The main variables are likely to be the nature of the search required 
given the conditions faced by the fire fighters as well as the condition of the area requiring 
search and other variables such as the experience of the individual fire fighters and their 
relative fitness given the operating environment.   
 
Table 39 FBIM Table Y times for search and rescue  
Activity Time (s) Sample 




Y1 – secondary search (m2/s) 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.3 28 
Y2 – remove/rescue person (m/s) 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.13 27 
 
The following distributions using @Risk to re-evaluate the Australian data are suggested for 
these tasks: 
Y1 – normal µ = 0.16, σ = 0.05, min = 0.07, max = 0.3; 
Y2 – lognormal µ = 0.05, σ = 0.03, shift −0.007, min = 0.01, max = 0.13. 
 
7.7. Time to Set up Aerial Equipment 
 
Australian and New Zealand Fire Services use a variety of aerial appliances to perform 
various fire suppression and rescue activities.  The use of aerial appliances during any 
incident will be dependent on the specific type of appliance available as not all aerial 
appliances can perform the same tasks.  As specialist appliances, aerial appliances are 
generally only available in the major urban cities or are located due to specific risks. 
Consultation with the relevant fire brigades should be made to determine the appliance type 
and availability.  The type of operations which aerial appliances typically undertake includes:  
 elevated water supply; 
 water tower and water relay;  




 cyclic victim removal (e.g. using a basket); 
 crane (fire/rescue-related incidents); 
 equipment elevation; 
 observation tower. 
 
There are four generic types of aerial appliances typically used by fire services as given 
within the AFAC Aerial Code of Practice (83).  
 Telescopic Turntable Ladder (TTL) apparatus is defined by a number of 
incorporated telescopic ladder sections.  
 Telescopic Boom (TB) apparatus is defined by having a number of incorporated 
telescopic booms (FBIM uses teleboom). 
 Articulated Boom (AB) apparatus is defined by having one or more joints which 
provide boom articulation, without telescopic capability.  
 Articulated Telescopic (AT) apparatus is defined by having a combination of 
telescopic and articulating booms.  
 
The NZFS operates a range of different aerial appliances across its fleet and has recently 
begun standardising the type and availability of its aerial appliances.  Timing exercises using 
three different aerial appliances have been undertaken to establish the times, manpower and 
issues associated with setting up and operating aerial appliances during emergency 
incidents.  This includes exercises undertaken on flat ground away from buildings and in 
close proximity to buildings on an incline.   
The following aerial appliances were used for these purposes. 
 Bronto Skylift F32 RLH. Type 5 articulated telescopic ladder/platform which is now 
being standardised across the NZFS fleet.   
 Aerialscope. Type 6, 23 m articulated boom with platform. 
 Thibault Type 6, 30 m telescopic turntable ladder. 
 
Table 40 provides the data for aerial appliances given within the FBIM manual which is 
shown diagrammatically assuming a normal distribution in Figure 55.  As can be seen, the 
distributions vary widely with set up times as low as 35 seconds increasing to 607 seconds 
for the turntable ladder.  It is not known what specific appliances were used to collect this 




far from using NZFS aerial appliances it is apparent that significant differences may apply to 
different makes of aerial appliances irrespective of their type.   
Table 40 FBIM Table Z times to set up aerial equipment  
Aerial appliance set-up Appliance 
type 
Time (s) Sample 




Z1 – position aerial appliance 
(m/s) 
 0.54 0.32    
Z2.1 – set up appliance in 
preparation for use (s):   
Teleboom 56.6 17.6 40 105 20 
Z2.2 TT ladder 292.0 222.1 35 607 6 
Z2.3 Platform 145.9 59.4 35 210 33 
Z3 – conduct safety 
procedures (s) 
 62.9 33.7    
Z4.1 – elevate and manoeuvre 
appliance 180° (m/s): 
Teleboom 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.19 22 
Z4.2 TT ladder 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.35 7 
Z4.3 Platform 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.22 34 







Figure 55 Distributions given within the FBIM for Australian aerial appliances  
7.7.1. NZFS Aerial Appliance Data 
 
Due to the significant resources required to undertake specific data-gathering exercises 
using aerial appliances, only a limited number of exercises have been undertaken to date to 
collect specific FBIM data.  The following section discusses the issues surrounding the data 
collected so far for each of the aerial appliances investigated. 
 
7.7.1.1. Bronto Skylift F32 RLH 
 
Figure 56 below shows the Type 5 Bronto, a two-manned appliance requiring a Type 3 or 4 
pumping appliance to supply it with a pressurised water supply.  For a two-man crew to park 
the appliance and conduct the set-up procedures so that the platform could be raised safely 
was measured at approximately 284 seconds.  The speed at which the Bronto was recorded 
to raise the platform and train the platform was recorded at 0.2 m/s to its highest elevation 
and to rotate the platform 360 degrees.  It was observed that the elevation and rotation 


















of rotating and elevating simultaneously.  However, these speeds account for maximum 
elevation speeds and do not take into account the times associated with precision location of 
the basket in close proximity to any particular object such as a building window.   
The Bronto is also provided with an extension cord which can be used at the turntable 
providing for remote control of water monitor operations from the ground level.  Such remote 
control ability is not available with the following less modern appliances. 
 
Figure 56 Bronto Skylift following initial set up procedures ready for crew and 
equipment to be placed in basket 
 
7.7.1.2. Aerialscope Type 6 23 m Articulated Boom with Platform 
 
The Aerialscope Type 6 appliance is a four-manned appliance with dedicated pump and has 
been in service for over 25 years.  The additional manpower associated with this appliance 
increases the number of operators available to set it up.  However, due to its age and 
configuration this appliance is significantly more operator-intensive to set up than the Bronto.  
Whilst it has its own dedicated pump it also has some advantages operationally as it can be 
supplied with water direct from an external water source.  However, this requires further man 
power to set up dedicated water supplies to this appliance rather than relying on it being 
supplied from another pumping appliance and taking advantage of that crew to set up the 




up procedures so that the platform could be raised safely with two crew in the basket took 
approximately 420 seconds.  The speed at which the Aerialscope was recorded to raise the 
platform and train the platform was recorded at 0.1 m/s to its highest elevation and to rotate 
the platform.  Again, it was observed that the elevation and rotation speed did not appear to 
vary noticeably over its full range and that it could rotate and elevate simultaneously.   
 
Figure 57 Aerialscope used as a water tower with two crew in the basket operating 
two independent jets 
 
7.7.1.3. Thibault 30 m Telescopic Turntable Ladder 
 
Three exercises were conducted with the Turntable Ladder:  one on level ground extending 
and rotating the ladder to its maximum elevation as with the other aerial appliances, and two 
exercises were timed from specific training exercises conducted at real buildings with difficult 
access issues.  The first training exercise was conducted at the rear of a high-rise building 
on grade and the second exercise was located tightly in-between two high-rise buildings with 
various services such as drains located in the narrow access way.  The purpose of these 
exercises was to raise the ladder each time to roughly its maximum elevation and reach a 
specific window of the building from which rescue could be conducted.  The exercises 
highlighted the additional difficulties associated with parking an aerial appliance on a 




appliance and stabilisers were not positioned on weak points on the road surface.  Whilst 
this appliance can carry four crew, these exercises were established using only two fire 
fighters.  For two fire fighters to park the appliance and conduct the set-up procedures so 
that the ladder could be raised safely took 160 seconds on flat open ground, and 340 and 
287 seconds, respectively, for the two mock exercises.  These times indicate the associated 
difficulties and times associated with establishing the aerial appliances on uneven and 
difficult terrain.  It was particularly noted that when obstacles such as drains were present, 
additional times were introduced as these obstacles took operators additional time to identify 
and place the stabilisers in locations away from these weak points in the road surface.  Such 
problems were not present with the other data collected on stable level ground.  The speed 
at which the ladder was recorded to raise to the specified location also varied significantly at 
0.14 and 0.16 m/s for the two mock exercises to a far greater speed of 0.5 m/s to its highest 
elevation and full rotation of the platform.  Again, the elevation and rotation speed did not 
appear to vary noticeably over its full range and it could rotate and elevate simultaneously.  
However, when the ladder was required to be located at a specific location and in close 
proximity to a building, the speed of elevation decreased significantly resulting in an increase 
in time taken to reach the specific target‘.  This was observed due to the operator needing 
increased accuracy with the elevation of the ladder and to ensure that the approach speeds 
to the building were slow enough so that the ladder would not over-run and hit the building.  
Figure 58 below shows the ladder being extended with an operator located at the end of the 
ladder as would occur for a rescue operation.   
 




Table 41 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table Z  
Appliance type Set up(s) Elevate and 
manoeuvre appliance 
180° (m/s) 
Bronto articulated telescopic 
ladder/platform 
284 0.2 
Aerialscope articulated boom with 
platform 
420 0.1 
Thibault telescopic turntable ladder 160 340 287 0.5 0.14 0.16 
 
Depending on the nature of use, (i.e. use of water tower vs rescue) the aerial appliance will 
require different levels of accuracy of elevation.  Therefore, when using the Thibault 
telescopic turntable ladder or similar, the faster speeds can be used when a water tower on 
flat, open terrain is required and the longer and slower times are recommended  as upper 
and lower bounds for more complicated and steeper terrain and when accurate placements 
of the ladder are required.   
The positioning of an aerial appliance is crucial to ensuring that it can be used safely and to 
ensure that it can be used as intended, i.e. that the appliance can reach the intended target.  
The positioning of aerial appliances will typically take longer than could be expected for a 
normal fire appliance as once they are parked and set up has begun it will take a significant 
amount of time to move the appliance again.  The values given in Table 42 have been 
measured from the various aerial appliances manoeuvring within a site into the final position 
required before set up.  Table 42 also contains the times measured to charge the various 
aerials at full elevation.  As the time taken to charge the monitors will be dependent on the 
type of aerial, operator skill, pump and water reticulation configuration as well as the degree 
of extension, it has not been possible so far to break these times down per metre of 
elevation used.  Given that this is such a small fraction of the overall aerial time component 
and given that a significant proportion of the charging time is dedicated to the operator 
configuring the pump and filling the pipe work before increasing the pressure, it is 
considered that there is little benefit in gaining greater accuracy of this particular aspect of 
the operation.  As can be seen from the Australian data in table 40, the times associated 
with charging the monitors varies significantly, whereas the times found here, albeit with less 





Table 42 Proposed New Zealand data additions to FBIM Table Z  
Aerial appliance set–up Time (s) Sample 




Position aerial appliance (m/s) 1.41 0.27 1.00 1.75 5 
Charge monitor (s) 18.6 3.07 14 22 5 
 
The FBIM model provides an additional time component for the preparation times associated 
with any ancillary safety procedures required to go through when operating aerial 
appliances.  The Health & Safety in Employment (HSE) Regulations applies to fire fighters 
when working at heights requiring aerial operators to wear harnesses as part of the fall 
protection requirements.  The times associated with donning this equipment and establishing 
other appliance safety protocols is incorporated into the NZFS values established above and 
have not been accounted for separately.    
Based on the observation from these experiments and from discussing these issues with 
aerial operators, variations in the times associated with aerial appliance set up have been 
found to be attributable to the following issues:  
 terrain, especially gradient and quality of the surface; 
 times associated with determining the most suitable location; 
 operator experience; 
 purpose of use, i.e. use of water tower vs rescue will require different levels of 
accuracy of elevation; 
 type and particular make of the aerial appliance. 
 
7.7.2. Rescue Using Aerial Appliances 
 
It is difficult to establish the times taken to rescue trapped persons from buildings using 
aerial appliances as there are so many variables outside of the control of the fire services.  
An exercise has been undertaken to try and quantify the time associated with rescuing 
victims from a building and the perceived difficulties using an aerial appliance.  This exercise 
was conducted with eight volunteers using the Thibault TTL appliance from a six-storey fire 
service training tower under ideal conditions.  The escape height of the tower measured from 




descend the ladder was approximately 7.5 minutes, taking on average 1 minute per person.  
It was specifically noted that the last remaining volunteer had reservations about descending 
the ladder and required additional assistance from a fire fighter to guide that particular 
individual down the ladder.  This hesitation increased the time taken for this occupant to 
descent the ladder and identified the additional time delays that could occur for occupants 
with vertigo and who may be hesitant to descend a ladder from such a height.  Recognising 
that the exercise was undertaken under ideal conditions and with volunteers, the calculated 
time may not accurately reflect ladder descent times under emergency conditions but does 
provide an insight into the difficulties associated with ladder rescue and provides an 
indicative time value should such a rescue method require inclusion into any assessment. 
Figure 59 shows the second from last person being guided down by a fire fighter while the 
other people were confident in descending the ladder on their own without any support.   
 




7.8. Effective Length of Fire-fighting Hose for Design Purposes 
 
Calculation of hose run distances inside and outside of buildings will be required for FBIM 
purposes and if undertaking designs in accordance with the Acceptable Solution (6) for 
establishing internal fire hydrant requirements, for example.  For planning and design 
purposes, designers typically measure hose run distances off plans assuming a straight line 
with no loss in hose length due to kinks, obstacles or other issues.  For FBIM purposes, the 
effectiveness or efficiency of hose-laying operations should be recognised as set up times 
are established on the number of lengths of hose used given the distance between targets 
such as an appliance and hydrant, requiring the number of lengths of hose that would likely 
be used at an incident to be determined.  This section provides data collected from real 
incidents to establish an upper limit of hose-laying effectiveness so that the number of 
sections of hose likely to be used during an incident can be estimated.  
The FBIM provides times associated with hose operations per section of hose used.  As only 
full lengths will ever be used, the distances over which hose will be run and thus number of 
hoses used to cover any distance needs to incorporate movement around obstacles and 
inefficiencies associated with laying out the last 45 mm branch man's length and the natural 
lie of the hose once pressurised.   
To understand the optimum efficiency of hose-laying operations for planning purposes, 
measurements were taken during two large fire incidents to ascertain the effective length of 
hose-laying operations in service.  The sixth and fifth Alarm fires at the Southdown freezing 
works complex in Auckland in 2008 and 2010 were protracted incidents requiring significant 
water resources.  During the 8-day and 2-day incidents, water was relayed to the site in 
some cases from distances exceeding 1 km using 90 mm lay flat delivery hose and with 
pumping appliances providing water relays to maintain water supply pressures over these 





Figure 60 Feeder hose supplying water from a remote source 
 
 
Figure 61 Fire pumping appliance used as a relay to maintain pressure in feeder hose 





During attendance at these two incidents, seven different hose sets of hose runs were 
measured and logged including those hoses laid over long and medium distances.  Four of 
the data sets were taken from hoses laid using a specialist hose-laying vehicle and fire-
fighters over a flat and relatively straight asphalt road.  Also, a number of relatively short 
feeder deliveries were measured from the standpipe to pumping appliances within the site.  
The number of hose lengths used and the distance between the standpipes used to access 
water from the in-ground hydrants and the final pumping appliance inlets were measured as 
would be done from site plans used for design purposes, in a straight line from point A to 
point B including any obstacles.  The results from the seven data sets are provided below in 
Table 43 and provide a very good agreement from all the data sets for an effective hose 
length per section of hose to be 87%.  Given that the majority of the hose was laid on flat 
straight ground with few obstacles affecting the hose laying indicates that even in relatively 
ideal circumstances the full length of hose is unlikely to be utilised.   
Table 43 Effective lengths of feeder hose used during fire incidents  
Data set Number of 
hose (30 m 
lengths) 






1 36 1080 953 88 
2 43 1290 1132 88 
3 29 870 730 84 
4 28 840 730 87 
5 12 360 310 86 
6 7 210 181 86 
7 9* 265* 223 84 
Total 164 4915 4259 87 (µ= 86) 
*1 length of 70 mm diameter 25 m length of hose used 
 
The hose run lengths considered above were for long and medium length distances and are 
considered to be at the upper limit of hose laying effectiveness.  For shorter distances where 
fewer lengths of hose would be used, the effectiveness can drop significantly.  Figure 62 
below shows the problems that can occur with laying hose in cramped and restricted spaces 
over short distances.  Where the distances between water supplies, fire appliances and fires 
are short, full length of hose will still have to be run out and once placed in specific locations 




hose lengths being left and new ones being run out, should operational tactics change 
during the course of the incident. 
 
 
Figure 62 Congested hose laying occurring within restricted space 
For the purposes of the FBIM and operational planning, only an upper limit of fire hose laying 
capability is required for assessment purposes where times to lay hose are given per length 
of hose.  The information presented above suggests that an upper limit of 87% be used for 
laying hose lengths giving a maximum effective reach of a 90 mm, 30 m length and a 75 
mm, 25 m length hose of 26 m and 22 m, respectively.   
For example, where a direct distance of 70 m was measured between an appliance access 
position and the building fire hydrant inlets or any point of interest, four lengths of 75 mm, 25 
m length hose would be required to reach the inlets from the appliance, not three as could 






7.9. Other Methods of Data Collection 
 
Other methods of data collection including using fire fighters to record fire ground activity 
times and using fire appliance-mounted cameras internally and externally were considered 
but dismissed for varying reasons.  Also, fire incidents recorded on amateur and professional 
videos were viewed to try and capture times of the activities shown.  At the time of 
conducting this research, a television documentary following the NZFS at emergency 
incidents was being made.  Footage for the documentary has been commissioned from a 
number of independent sources to provide live fire incident footage.  A significant amount of 
this footage was viewed in an attempt to source real fire ground activity data.  Also, the 
internet provides a significant resource of video footage from real incidents.  However, from 
the videos studied to date, little in the way of good data could be sourced as footage typically 
did not show complete activity times, making this method of data collection unsuccessful.  
Due to the resources required to undertake this method of data collection and the trivial 
amount of data that was able to be gained from this footage, this method of data collection 










This chapter aims to provide validation of the data collected within this project and to provide 
verification by identification of any inherent differences between the methodologies 
presented in the FBIM and current NZFS procedures.  A number of different methods have 
been used to compare the results obtained within this research with the times and 
procedures found at real incidents.  The methods presented within this chapter include: 
 comparison of the statistical data sets with actual attendance at specific buildings of 
interest; 
 attendance at numerous large-scale and protracted fire emergencies; 
 observations made from being present and on shift at fire stations; 
 undertaking fire ground field experiments. 
 
8.2. Validation of Proposed FBIM Response Time Data 
 
To validate that the proposed distributions given in Chapter 7 provide realistic response 
times compared with those found at real incidents, the proposed distributions were included 
in a partial FBIM analysis using a probabilistic Monte Carlo analysis following the FBIM 
method set out within the manual (5) and compared with the actual response times to 
incidents at a specific building.   For this particular example, a building was sourced that had 
been responded to on multiple occasions to provide a representative comparison.  The 
chosen building had received 72 appliance responses from emergency incident calls over an 
eight-year period ranging from 111 emergency calls to notification from the installed 
automatic and directly linked detection systems within the building.  As the nature of every 
incident was not under scrutiny, this analysis only included the response times recorded 
within the NZFS incident database, from the time NZFS was notified of an incident to the 
time of arrival of the first appliance.   
A number of assumptions were made such as the closest located fire appliance would arrive 
first, and that it was located at its home fire station at the time of receipt of the call.  The 




Google™Maps (70) as 1.8 km.  The following distributions were used along with the 
methods set down in charts 2, 3 and 4 from the FBIM manual: 
Chart 2, times for dispatch; lognormal µ = 26.8, σ = 14.6, shift −0.85; 
Chart 3, time to assimilate; loglogistic Γ = −308.3, β = 384.7, α = 25.5; 
Chart 4, design speed; normal µ = 41.8, σ = 22.2 min = 12, max = 100. 
The software package @Risk was used to find the calculated response time using Monte 
Carlo analysis and Latin Hypercube sampling. A total of 100,000 iterations were run, 
sufficient to ensure convergence.  Figure 63 shows the comparison of the FBIM calculated 
distribution and the fitted distribution found from the 72 response times to the subject 
building. 
 
Figure 63 FBIM and real incident response time verification (seconds)  
Table 44 compares the calculated response times and associated values for the fitted 
distributions that describe both the actual and calculated response times to the subject 
building.  As can be seen from both the graph and values presented in the table, the 
calculated times compare well.  When comparing the maximum expected response time to 
this subject building, the calculated times only deviate by 18 seconds 95% of the time.  This 




Given the available sample size, the responses found compared with actual incident data 
indicate that the FBIM method and the fitted distributions presented can predict the expected 
response times to buildings accurately. The difference between the lower response times 
found using the FBIM methodology indicate the times that could be expected on the very 
rare occasions that small values for fire-fighter response times, for example, could occur.     
Table 44 FBIM and real incident response time verification (seconds)  








µ σ Sample 
size/iterations 
FBIM analysis 61 783.8 168 481 278 96 100,000 
Fitted distribution 134 1016 217 463 318 77 100,000 
 
The results from the actual incident data include data from the first arriving appliance which 
was not always from the closest located station as assumed when using the FBIM 
methodology.  Where sufficient resources are available, such as in the main cities as was 
the case for this specific building, the results from this analysis indicate that it is not 
necessary to discount a response from the closest located fire station as the travel speed 
distribution takes into account the associated slower response times of appliances under 
certain travel conditions.  In these circumstances, when the slowest appliance speeds occur, 
appliances from further away from the building travelled faster and arrived prior to the 
appliance from the closest station. 
Figure 64 shows a regression sensitivity analysis for the calculated response times to the 
subject building.  As to be expected, the result was most sensitive to the distance travelled 





Figure 64 Sensitivity analysis for calculated response time 
As the travel distance accounts for the largest response time factor, where there are 
significant distances from the subject building to the second and third closest located fire 
stations, it would not always be appropriate to assume that the closest station would arrive 
first. 
 
8.3. Attendance during Large Emergency Incidents  
 
To provide a level of verification and validation of data collected within this project and to 
identify any inherent differences between the methodologies present within the FBIM and 
current NZFS procedures, attendance at real incidents was recognised to be fundamental to 
this research.  Numerous large scale and protracted fire emergencies were attended 
throughout the period of this research in an attempt to collect data and indentify any 
procedural differences to that assumed within the FBIM.  Notification and attendance at 
these incidents was undertaken via pager notification under non-emergency response 
conditions.  Attendance at numerous incidents during this research identified the significant 
difficulties with trying to collect and establish real incident data.  The immediate problem 
associated with attendance at real incidents and data collection is that the tasks of 
immediate interest typically involve the first arriving appliances and tasks undertaken by the 
first arriving fire fighters.  Relying on notification by pager and arriving even under the most 




occur well after the first appliances had arrived and many of the tasks undertaken by fire 
fighters under emergency conditions had been completed.  Attendance also indentified the 
significant challenge and difficulties of trying to collect data given that access to the scene 
can be difficult, access into the buildings of interest is typically impossible until after the 
incident has finished.  Viewing and recording incidents from outside the building and without 
being able to follow fire fighters closely removes the ability to collect specific fire-fighter data.  
Also, the collection of data associated with equipment and appliance operations is not 
possible as most tasks and those required under emergency conditions were typically 
completed by the time of arrival.    
Whilst attendance at these incidents proved to be of little benefit with respect to the 
collection of FBIM data, it has been found to be beneficial in providing experience and 
gaining knowledge of NZFS operations and procedures during large-scale fires.  Observing 
fires and NZFS operational procedures first hand has been found to be of great benefit when 
comparing the FBIM and the tactics adopted by the NZFS.   
For the purpose of collecting and providing a level of validation to the FBIM, it has been 
concluded from these incidents that attendance at fires needs to occur during the earliest 
stages of an incident and with the first arriving appliance. 
 




Experience from attendance at real fire and emergency incidents suggested that the 
perspective gained by observing incidents first hand would need to include observations 
from arriving at the scene at the earliest possible stage.  Time was spent at a range of fire 
stations with the intention of attending emergencies and gaining data first hand.    
Observations were undertaken during a night shift at six different fire stations in Auckland 
and Wellington consisting of 10 shifts totalling 120 hours of effort.  During these shifts, 14 
emergency incidents were attended, providing data samples for verification of the FBIM 
data.  Of these incidents attended, only three were fires and data other than response times 
to the incident location was not able to be recorded.  As a result, validation of the times 





8.4.2. Appliance Response Speeds 
 
Attendance and observations at fire stations has allowed the recording of the times taken for 
fire fighters to respond to emergency calls and to ascertain the actual average speed 
travelled by a fire appliance to an emergency incident.  A number of different data collection 
methods were considered and trialled.  The use of a digital Dictaphone recording the 
incidents was found to be most successful as this allowed for the recording to be started as 
soon as the fire station was notified that attendance at an incident was required until the 
appliance returned back to the station.  This allowed the times taken from the recordings to 
be compared with those times taken from the ICAD records.  For the purposes of gaining an 
understanding of the travel speeds, the routes could be plotted on a mapping system and 
compared with the times actually taken under 'lights and sirens' to travel that distance.  The 
information specific to each incident attended including a description of the road and traffic 
conditions is provided in Appendix E.  The average travel speeds found are shown in Figure 
65 and indicate the average speeds travelled as a function of the distance travelled.  Two 
distances are provided for comparison, the actual distance travelled along the route taken 
and the distance from the appliance starting location (the fire station) in a direct and straight 
line to the incident location. 
 
Figure 65 Average speeds found when travelling to actual emergency incidents  
As can be seen, the actual average travel speeds found varied significantly.  There was also 




incidents, 13 occurred within relatively short distances, less than 3.1 km from the stations 
visited, which is to be expected given that these were fire stations and responses within the 
Auckland and Wellington CBDs.  One motor vehicle incident occurred 12.6 km from the 
station, which required the specialist rescue equipment on this particular appliance.  The 
data was scrutinised to test any correlations between the two CBDs and by isolating the 
attendance at the motor vehicle incident .  The closest relationship found was that using a 
power relationship with the r2 correlation of 0.84 when using the following curve: 
   [2] 
where y is the time in seconds and x is the distance travelled in km.  These findings and this 
relationship conflicts with the previous studies discussed here that found that for short 
distances, travel time increased with the square root of the distance and that for long travel 
distances, the travel time increased linearly (63).  However, given the relatively small data 
set and that no such correlation was found with the larger data set discussed in Section 
7.5.3, this correlation is not recommend for practical use. 
 
Figure 66 Power trend line relationships for the average speeds found when travelling 





8.4.2.1. Distance Verification 
 
To validate the distance measurements provided using the TransCAD Facility Location 
software tool (68), the distances travelled to the incidents were verified using Google™Maps 
(70) and compared.  Table 45 shows the difference between the two methods of 
establishing fire appliance travel distances to each incident attended, rounded up to the 
nearest 0.1 of a kilometre.  As can be seen from Table 45, where differences existed 
between nine of the 14 data sets, six of these were within 0.1 of a kilometre with only a 
single data set being 0.3 of a kilometre different to that predicted by either method.  








1 12.6 12.6 0 
2 2.4 2.4 0 
3 2.7 2.7 0 
4 1.5 1.6 6.2 
5 0.4 0.5 20 
6 0.3 0.3 0 
7 1.7 1.8 5.6 
8 3.0 3.1 3.2 
9 1.5 1.7 11.8 
10 0.9 1 10 
11 2.4 2.7 11.1 
12 1.5 1.7 11.8 
13 2.1 2.1 0 
14 1.3 1.4 7.1 
 
Figure 67 shows the strong relationship and accuracy of the TransCAD distance predictions 











Attendance at incidents and observing the tasks directly has provided the following 
verification and validation of the FBIM. 
Verification: 
  that the procedures used by the attending crews is that assumed within the 
FBIM; 
 that the times recorded by the (ICAD) system and reported within the Fire 




 that the times recorded by ICAD/FIRS are accurate; 
 that response times at real incidents are commensurate with those found 
within the statistical collection, including: 
o times for alarms/fire verification and any notification delays; 
o times for fire-fighter response; 




8.5. Fire Ground Field Experiments 
 
A number of full-scale exercises were conducted to attempt data collection that could be 
validated against an FBIM analysis for the buildings used under different scenarios.  Two 
full-scale exercises (Exercise A and B) were undertaken during the period of this research to 
provide a degree of validation against the FBIM and the current computer model.  Both 
exercises made use of a large industrial facility which included a two-storey office block 
attached to a warehouse and production factory.  Figure 68 shows the basic layout of the 
site taken from the NZFS operational plan for the facility.  As the facility was scheduled for 
demolition, it provided a unique opportunity to undertake a large scale event and training 
exercise within a recently operating facility which could also be used to collect data to 
validate the FBIM. 
 







Exercises A and B were undertaken on different days utilising different crews including 
volunteers for Exercise A and career fire fighters for Exercise B.  The objective for both 
exercises was to simulate an uncontrolled fire occurring within the second floor offices with 
two occupants located at the upper level requiring rescue.  For both exercises, the crews 
were provided with a safety brief and were informed about the basic nature of the event and 
asked to undertake the exercises simulating emergency conditions, in line with NZFS 
Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).  None of the crews had specific previous 
experience undertaking operational exercises at the site, although there was some level of 
familiarity with the site and facility with some of the crews that were local to the area.  To 
replicate realistic arrival conditions, the responding appliance and crews were initially located 
remote from the site and were notified of an incident through the NZFS dispatch system.  
This prompted the first two dispatched appliances to travel a short distance on public roads 
at normal speed to the location of the site.  On arrival at the building the crews travelled to 
the main front entrance and rear of the building in accordance with SOPs and were met at 
the front of the building by a safety officer who gave the first arriving officer specific details of 
the incident.  This information included a statement that two persons were unaccounted for 
and believed to be located on the upper office level.  The safety officer also prompted the 
first arriving crew in Exercise A to make entry through a side door, not the main entrance, 
which provided a slight variation between the two exercises.   
Due to the size of the site and predetermined tactical plan, appliances were sent to both 
entrances, termed here as entry control points, at the front and rear of the building to 
establish operations.  On arrival and on notification of missing persons reported, the first 
arriving crews, in line with standard operational procedures, were prompted to call for 
additional resources using the correct communication protocols.  Further appliances were 
then turned out remote from the site at various intervals to simulate them arriving from 
various locations, as would occur in practice.  At Exercise A, six appliances were utilised 
consisting of four Type 3 appliances with full crews and fire police units for traffic 
management.  Exercise B utilised five Type 3 appliances, a Type 6 aerial appliance, 
breathing apparatus appliances, command unit with full crews and other support staff.   
 
8.5.1. Recording of Information 
 
During the two exercises, specific methods of recording the times associated with each 
specific task were used using numerous personnel.  Due to the size of the complex, size of 




by the various crews, collecting the data became a difficult task and became limited by the 
resources made available to collect the data.   
Various methods were used to collect the data including the use of a video camera, stills 
photography, a Dictaphone and stopwatches.  In total, five people took part in data collection 
in the first exercise and three in the second.  Initially, data was intended to be recorded by 
following the crews from both the front main entrance and rear of the building to identify the 
differences in the tasks expected to occur between the different entrance configurations.  At 
the front of the building was an office and at the rear a processing facility; different way 
finding and travel characteristics were to be expected from the crews.  Located at the rear of 
the building were the sprinkler pump, valve house and inlet connections as well as repeater 
FAP.  Crews arriving at the rear of the building were required to establish water and prepare 
to boost the sprinkler system should it be required, then make entry to the building to begin 
simulation of search or suppression activities.     
For safety reasons and to ensure that the data collection and observers did not interfere with 
the operational activities, it became difficult to establish the times taken for all the activities 
that occurred and for individuals to record all of the activities that occurred with crews 
moving inside, outside and around the building.  During both exercises, smoke machines 
using theatrical smoke were used to simulate fire conditions within the upper floor.  Whilst 
this was considered necessary to require the fire fighters to undertake search and rescue 
operations in accordance with SOPs and to simulate difficult operating conditions, the use of 
the smoke machines made the recording of fire-fighter activities on the upper floor extremely 
difficult.   
For the purposes of collecting and collating data from this type of exercise, the most reliable 
method of collecting and analysing the information was found to be from the video 
recordings.  Collating the data collected from the other methods became particularly difficult 
depending on the quality of the information recorded and the level of information recorded by 
each individual, especially when trying to identify what task was undertaken, by whom, and 
to establish the timeline of events.  The use of video recordings proved invaluable in 
establishing the timeline of events and what tasks were actually undertaken and in what 




Figure 69 shows the main building outline with the approximate parking locations of fire 




both Exercises A and B.  As dictated by the pre-operational plan for the building and 
standard tactics in both exercises, the first arriving appliances from which the hoses were 
run into the building were parked in approximately the same locations as indicated.  
Appendix H contains the raw results of both exercises in tabulated and Gant chart form, 
showing the sequence of task completion as they occurred and as could be established from 
the various data collection methods used.   
 
Figure 69 Building layout shown with feeder and delivery hose runs and entry control 
points (ECP) as used in Exercises A and B 
First arriving appliance at front 




For the purposes of validation against the FBIM computer program and its methodology, an 
analysis was undertaken using the FBIM computer program and the existing Australian data, 
the parameters of the building, and based upon the time taken for the first two fire fighters to 
reach the head of the stairs, to make entry into the offices at the second level.  The analysis 
has not been carried through to completion due to the difficulties associated with 
establishing task times on the upper floor offices due to it being smoked logged in both 
exercises.  Because the method, direction and travel distances the fire fighters used to 
undertake the search and rescue activities could not be established, validation from this 
point onwards was not possible. 
There were two major differences between exercises A and B in the way in which the 
exercises were conducted.  To mitigate the potential for water damage to the building, 
charged hoses were not used for Exercise A.  This would have resulted in operational 
efficiencies due to reduced hose weight of and increased manoeuvrability compared with the 
use of charged hoses.  In Exercise B, the hoses were charged with water but not to full 
operating pressure.  The increased difficulty associated with manoeuvring charged hoses 
due to their increased weight and stiffness was obvious from the exercises, but was not able 
to be specially assessed within this analysis.  However, in Exercise A fire fighters were 
directed to use the side entrance rather than the main front entrance where the FAP was 
located.  This difference added an additional 30 m from the appliance to the entrance and an 
additional 30 m of extra internal travel compared with that experienced by the crews in 
Exercise B.   Therefore, if a direct comparison of the exercise times is made, the advantage 
that the fire fighters in exercise A had by using empty hoses was minimised by the additional 
travel distance they had to cover compared with the fire fighters in Exercise B.  Table 46 






Table 46 Photo log of Exercises A and B taken from video footage showing key tasks 
with approximate times for comparison 
 Exercise A Exercise B 
1A. Arrival 0 seconds 
 
 





2A. Don BA 290 seconds 
 
 










3A. Enter compartment at head of stairs 821 
seconds 
 




4A. Victim recovered at head of stairs 1259 
seconds 
 





5A. Victim reaches building exit/entry point 
1359 seconds 
 







An FBIM analysis was undertaken using the FBIM computer software based on the building 
and site layout dimensions as would be expected to be undertaken within a performance-
based design. Table 47 shows a summary of the main input data and assumptions used 
within the analysis.  The analysis followed the tasks expected to be undertaken by the first 
arriving crew and the times taken to establish water supplies to the appliance and lay, 
connect and charge internal delivery lines so that a delivery would be established at the 
head of the stairs, so that entry could be made into the compartment containing the fire.   
 
Table 47 Summary of input data and assumptions used within FBIM analysis  
FBIM chart Activity/task 
 
Value 
1-4 Not used  
5 Premises occupied 
     Fire warden present 
     FAP to be interrogated 





6 Flush hydrant 
Remove  -                     Hydrant equipment 




7 Additional resources required 
Distances for Officer in Charge (OIC) to walk to 
set up area 
Yes 
50 m  
9 Side hung doors to be negotiated 3 
10 Travel with 65 mm  -     Horizontal travel  
 hose                             Vertical travel   
20 m 
20 steps 
11 Water supply set up -    Hydrant to appliance 
                                      Hose appliance to branch 
                                      Charge delivery hose 
57 m  
90 m  
90 m 
12-16 Not used  
 
Table 48 shows a summary of the results of the two exercises for times taken to establish 
water at the head of the stairs of the office compared with results for the same parameters 
using the FBIM computer program and Australian data with a 95th percentile confidence 




Table 48 Comparison of Exercise A and B results with those of the FBIM analysis  
 Time taken for fire fighters to 
establish water at head of stair 
(secs) 
Comparison with 95th 
confidence level of FBIM 
prediction (secs) 
Exercise A 821 −72 (−8%) 
Exercise B 825 −68 (−7.6%) 
FBIM prediction  893 N/A 
 
Table 49 provides a summary of the individual component values that were able to be 
isolated for direct comparison against the existing FBIM data.  The table presents the value 
taken from the exercise and converted into the unit provided in the FBIM data tables for ease 
of reference.  Due to the difficulties experienced in recording the data during the exercises 
and because a number of individual tasks were not completed as single tasks during the 
exercise (i.e. some tasks were not fully completed before others were started), only 21 
individual component times were able to be isolated from the data collected.   As can be 
seen, all but thee of the results fell within the given FBIM distributions.  The travel speeds 
associated with 'Q - Firefighter horizontal travel speed' can be explained considering that 
these values included the times taken to search for the fire hydrants and also to familiarise 
themselves with the building.  As explained previously, the unfamiliarity with the site required 
the fire fighters to search for the fire hydrant and to familiarise themselves with the building 
layout.  Additional times are incorporated within the FBIM to account for these additional 
delays which have not been removed from the component times presented here.   
A significant difference in the individual times taken for the fire fighters to 'dismount 
appliance and don BA' occurred between the exercises.  This was due to the BA being 
locker-mounted in Exercise A and seat-mounted in Exercise B.  The times associated with 
the locker-mounted BA exceeded the FBIM distributions significantly, indicating an anomaly 
between the data sets.  This can be explained as the fire fighters in Exercise A prepared and 
donned their BA sets in a manner appropriate for a long protracted incident; they set up a BA 
station, including placing a tarpaulin on the ground and placing their BA sets on that rather 
than wearing them directly from the appliance as would be expected for immediate entry to a 
building. 
The remaining component times generally fall below the mean times reported within the 
FBIM indicating that the remaining components of the exercises would have taken longer 




found to be at the 72nd and 98th percentile values when compared with the FBIM computer 
program results. 
 
Table 49 Individual component results from Exercise A and B compared with those 
from the FBIM data 
FBIM activity data table reference 
Existing FBIM data Exercise A and B data 
Mean (µ) 95% Value Percentile 
Q1 – dressed in turnout uniform 2.3 4.6 
2 41.5 
2.85 65.3 
Q2 – dressed in turnout uniform with 
equipment 
1.9 4 1.2 29.5 
Q3 – dressed in turnout uniform in BA with 






P1 – hydrant equipment 32.5 62.3 24 32 





V1.1 – remove, connect & charge hose from 




V4.1 – charge delivery hose from appliance 20.3  10.3 23 
T1 – ascend stairs in BA with equipment 0.9 1.6 
0.43 12 
0.95 55 
T3 – ascend stairs with 65 mm diameter 
hose 
0.7 1.2 0.9 75 
T5 – descend stairs in BA 1 1.8 0.49 15.4 









8.5.3. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
At the outset of this research, the intention was to try and undertake a number of different 
fire ground field experiments at real buildings in an attempt to validate the FBIM against 
simulated real incidents.  Unfortunately, most of the planned exercises had to be cancelled 
for a number of reasons and only two large-scale exercises were able to be undertaken with 
data collected.  The two field experiments undertaken were completed at the same building 
using the same scenario simulating the search and rescue of two occupants on an upper 
level of a relatively complex building.  Significant NZFS resources were employed to 
simulate real conditions in real time following NZFS SOPs as closely as could be expected.  
Whilst the results of the experiments were not completed under the same level of urgency as 
could be expected during a real emergency, the results have indicated a good agreement 
with an FBIM analysis of the building using a 95% confidence limit.   
Due to the problems encountered with the data collection and other difficulties found when 
collecting data in and around a building undergoing such an exercise, and with the added 
problems of smoke logging, the data collected and results collated were not as 
comprehensive as originally envisaged.  Future fire ground field experiments need to 
consider the implications of simulating smoke conditions with respect to the recording of fire-
fighter activity times in smoke. 
The exercises conducted identified a number of issues associated with the collection of data 
associated with such exercises and found that the use of video footage was the best way of 
capturing and analysing the data after the event. 
As only two exercises were undertaken and only some of the results compared, further 
analysis and comparison of real incident training with FBIM analysis should be undertaken 
using NZFS data presented within this project to provide more comprehensive validation of 
the FBIM.   
 
8.6. Application of FBIM within the Rural Environment 
 
One limitation of the research undertaken and the findings of this report is that associated 
with the use of the FBIM in a rural environment.  As with Australia, the vast majority of New 
Zealand consists of rural areas.  However, the FBIM is typically used within urban areas and 




than could be expected within a rural setting.  Most of the Australian brigades are typically 
only applying the FBIM within an urban setting and although this issue was discussed, only 
urban FBIM examples were reviewed.  The CFA is one brigade that has many remote and 
isolated buildings and has regular issues associated with fire service intervention, 
considering the long response times from volunteer stations associated with the rural 
environment.   
Wright (84) provided an example of a hypothetical building design proposed within a rural 
environment.  The example was used to highlight the deficiencies that could occur when a 
building design was based on the prescriptive requirements of the BCA but which is not 
provided with the level of service assumed to be provided within the BCA.  Wright concluded 
that 'meeting the prescriptive requirements for this building may not meet the true objectives 
of the BCA'.  This situation is also true for any design in which the level of service or facilities 
available to the responding brigades is not in adherence to the assumptions on which the 
prescriptive codes were established as is the case in many parts of rural New Zealand. 
The FBIM was developed to be applicable to the rural environment and contains both data 
and options covering all types of station response, including permanent, volunteer and 
composite stations.  However, application in a rural environment is perceived to be more 
difficult and less well tried and tested.  Although data exists, there are more unknowns in a 
rural situation and no guarantee of a fire-fighting response at all, as should otherwise be 
expected in an urban environment.  These findings emphasise the importance of 





CHAPTER 9. A Risk-Based Probabilistic Analysis for Predicting Fire 
Brigade Intervention 
 
The following chapter considers a risk-based FBIM analysis for a proposed building design 
taking into account the needs and effect of fire fighters responding to the building.  The 
analysis has been undertaken based on the use of the data collected and proposed within 
this project.  When an FBIM analysis is considered and used in performance-based designs, 
engineers and designers typically only consider an analysis which derives a single time 
value to reflect fire brigade operations.  This is normally based upon an agreed margin of 
safety that is applied to the FBIM data, typically using the 95th percentile approach.  
However, there are no explicit margins of safety recommended to be used within the FBIM 
or published by any Australian brigades.  These are normally agreed to during an FEB 
meeting in consultation with the relevant brigade.  The FBIM chapter 4.3 discusses the 
issues surrounding the choice of incorporating either margins of safety into any analysis or 
using the percentile approach, and considers the issues that need to be addressed on a 
'step-by-step' basis.  The following analysis is given to provide an example of the results that 
can be derived using a probabilistic risk-based approach using the Monte-Carlo technique.  
The advantages of undertaking an FBIM analysis in this manner are shown and considered 
for each stage of the 'run strategy' so that the impact and expected fire brigade action can be 
addressed with respect to its effect upon the expected evacuation condition at that time or 
with respect to the proposed building‘s fire safety precautions. 
   
9.1. Introduction 
 
The analysis considers a 67-storey 232 m ‗ultra‘ high-rise building consisting of a mixed 
commercial office and apartment development similar to one that was proposed to be 
constructed in Auckland, New Zealand in 2007.   Whilst a building of this type and height has 
not been developed yet, it represents a building that would be 55 m taller than the closest 
similar building located in Auckland or anywhere else in New Zealand, excluding the Sky 
Tower.  As this building far exceeds the height of any building in which the NZFS has 
experience operating in, the following analysis provides an initial assessment into the likely 
fire brigade intervention times that could be expected, should a fire occur within the upper 
levels of a building of this height.  This building type has been specifically chosen to consider 
the data collected within this project and specifically that relevant to high-rise buildings, fire-




This analysis does not consider the detailed design of the proposed building and considers 
only the impact of fire brigade intervention based on a number of building design 
assumptions.  The intention is to identify areas that could warrant specific consideration and 
detailed attention to understand any positive or negative effects of fire brigade intervention 
on the means of egress and needs of the responding fire fighters. 
The analysis will consider three specific areas of fire brigade intervention and will assess the 
impact of individual fire safety precautions and their relevance to each of the three main fire 
brigade intervention or 'run strategies'. 
 Kerbside arrival 
o this includes the time for the fire brigade units to respond to a call and arrive 
at the fire scene, represented by FBIM Charts 1–4. 
 Fire brigade arrival and set-up 
o the time at which the fire brigade will arrive at the fire scene, represented by 
FBIM Charts 1–11. 
 Search and rescue 
o fire brigade arrival time including the time taken for search and rescue 
operations to be conducted, represented by FBIM Charts 1–12. 
 
Although a building of this height and type does not currently exist in New Zealand, taller 
buildings currently exist in Australia, such as the 88-storey Eureka tower.  It is therefore 
considered quite likely that buildings with similar dimensions could become a reality in the 
future of New Zealand.  The results of this type of analysis could be used to indicate 
potential areas for further investigation that may need to be considered by both the building 
designers and NZFS with respect to possible deployment decisions, if this type and height of 
building were to be constructed. 
The Acceptable Solution C/AS1 (6) is not mandatory and thus only provides for one route to 
obtain building code compliance.  C/AS1 states in the introduction that: 
‗The methods given are particularly appropriate for simple, low-rise buildings.' 
Irrespective of this statement, C/AS1 does provide a design solution for a building of this 
height.  Table 4.1 within C/AS1 provides for the fire safety precautions for buildings that 
exceed 58 m.  There is no upper limit provided in C/AS1 which is considered to be outside of 




escape height of 245 m, C/AS1 table 4.1/5 would require the following fire safety 
precautions. 
 Type 7e Automatic fire sprinkler system with smoke detectors and manual call points 
where the e requires a Type 5 alarm system.  
 Type 5 Automatic fire alarm system with modified smoke/heat detection and manual 
call points. 
 Type 13 Pressurisation of safe paths. 
 Type 15 Fire Service lift control. 
 Type 16 Visibility in escape routes. 
 Type 18 Fire hydrant system. 
 Type 20 Fire systems centre. 
 F60 Fire rating requirement. 
Given that these fire safety precautions would also be required for a building with a 58 m 
escape height, it is unclear whether a building containing these fire safety precautions would 
also be appropriate for a building four times this height.  As discussed in Chapter 5, some 
international building codes provide for additional and dedicated fire brigade facilities, such 
as additional staircases once buildings reach certain heights; for example, the UK Approved 
Document B (36) suggests that phased evacuation should be used for buildings in excess of 
30 m and also that a stair should be discounted for any egress analysis as this will be used 
by the fire service.  Following the World Trade Center disaster, NIST (75) also 
recommended that an additional staircase be provided for buildings that exceed 100 m in 
height dedicated to providing access for the emergency services into the building's upper 
levels.  Therefore, this assessment will consider the issues associated with fire brigade 
intervention that can be readily identified using the FBIM analysis using a risk-based 
approach utilising Monte-Carlo analysis. 
 
9.2. The Building 
 
The building under consideration is a 67-storey, 232 m ‗ultra‘ high-rise building consisting of 
a mixed commercial office and apartment development. The following assumptions will be 
considered within this analysis. 
 No internal site travel is necessary on arrival at the building. 
 The premises are assumed to be occupied as the fire occurs during the day and 




 For simplicity, no hindrance factor has been included for occupants making egress 
against the flow of fire fighters entering the building or climbing stairs. 
 No time for any security procedures will be included as a fire warden will be assumed 
to be present.  The time to communicate with the warden will be taken as 30 
seconds. 
 It is assumed that a compliant fire alarm, sprinkler and fire hydrant system is installed 
within the building. 
 Fire fighters will take the lifts and climb to the 66th floor, connect hoses to the fire 
hydrant system and make entry to the top floor level at the head of the stairs in 
accordance with NZFS SOPs.  
 A travel distance of 6 m per level per flight of stairs is assumed. 
 The fire hydrant system is permanently charged and no additional time component 
associated with charging the system is included. 
 
9.3. Analysis  
 
The analysis will consider the expected NZFS response to a high rise building incident in line 
with NZFS Operational Instructions and high-rise procedures, an example of this on which 
these scenarios are based is given in Appendix J.  The results presented are based on a 
Monte-Carlo analysis using 10,000 iterations and the Latin Hypercube sampling method. 
The analysis will consider both sprinkler and smoke detectors as a means for detecting the 
fire and alerting the NZFS.  Table 50 shows a breakdown of each activity considered within 
the analysis and identifies the FBIM charts and tables used including the distributions used 
in @Risk for each individual activity.  Where data collected as part of this research has been 
used, this is identified by the relevant FBIM Table letter and appended ‗NZ‘ e.g. A - NZ.  





Table 50 Individual high-rise FBIM analysis  
 




1 Time taken for initial brigade notification sprinkler detection scenario 
Sprinkler activation   RiskUniform (295,332) 
Time to depressurise system and activate alarm A - NZ RiskUniform (60, 360) 
Time taken for initial brigade notification smoke detection scenario 
Smoke detection   RiskUniform (33, 35) 
Time delay for alarm verification 30 s B - NZ 
 2 Time taken to dispatch resources 
Time to relay dispatch information by NZFS CAD 




Time taken for fire fighters to respond to dispatch call 
Time to dress, assimilate information and leave station – 




Time taken for resources to reach fire scene (kerb side) 
Appliance 1 – Auckland CBD – 1 km F - NZ 
RiskNormal (35.7,11.5, 
RiskTruncate (12,100)) 
Appliance 2 – Auckland CBD – 2 km F - NZ 
RiskNormal (35.7,11.5, 
RiskTruncate (12,100)) 




Time taken for initial determination of fire location 
Time to communicate with warden – 30 s   H 
 Time for information gathering from a fire alarm panel 
complying with NZS 4512 – 30 s   L - NZ 
 6 
Time taken to don safety equipment and gather necessary tools 
Time to dismount fire appliance and don BA M - NZ 
RiskNormal (74, 5, 
RiskTruncate (56,850)) 
Time to remove high-rise pack or similar P 
RiskNormal (13.46, 
5.96, RiskTruncate (5, 
30)) 
7 
Time taken to assess fire 




Time taken to travel to set-up area 









Time taken for fire-fighter travel to level 66 
Side hung door – 10 s J 
 
Horizontal travel time from appliance to front lift lobby of 




Fire-fighter vertical travel speeds 
using lifts       fireman‘s lift – 231 m  at 9.14 m/s R - NZ 
 
                       loading time  30 s R 
 




                       rest breaks – 16.5 T - NZ RiskUniform (0, 60) 
Ascend stairs with 65 mm diameter hose – 24 steps T   




Time taken to set up water for initial fire-fighter protection  
Time taken to setup water for initial fire-fighter protection 




Time taken to set up water supply requirements   
Connect hose to hydrant outlet and charge to fire floor – 
2 lengths V 
RiskNormal (59.6, 37.9, 
RiskTruncate (15, 163)) 
Time to search for external water source – 1 length – 
30s  W 
 Connect hose from street hydrant  to appliance – 1 
length V 
RiskNormal (45.3, 17.1, 
RiskTruncate (17.5, 80)) 
Connect hose from appliance to hydrant inlet and 
charge – 1 length V 
RiskNormal (75.4, 23.8, 
RiskTruncate (38, 99)) 
12 
Time taken for search and rescue 
Time to search area (secondary search) 1000 m
2
 Y 
RiskNormal (0.6, 0.1, 
RiskTruncate (0.1, 0.3)) 
 
9.3.1. Fire Brigade Arrival and Set-Up 
 
The term ‗kerbside arrival‘ is taken from the time of ignition of the fire until the time the first 
appliance arrives at the building, and is considered within FBIM charts 1-4.  The analysis first 
requires information relating to the detection of a fire.  Assuming that both smoke detection 
and sprinklers are likely to be provided in some form of combination, the analysis considers 
the times for both sprinklers and smoke detectors to detect a fire and provide an alert.   The 
parameters for the sprinklers and smoke detectors are given below in Table 51 and are 
based on the criteria given in the proposed DBH performance framework for fire safety that, 
if adopted, would provide a compulsory methodology for performance-based fire engineering 





Table 51 Detector criteria used within FBIM analysis 
Detector criteria 
Commercial sprinklers Smoke detectors 
RTI = 95 
C = 0.4 
Tact = 68 
oC 
Radial distance = 2.8 m 
Depth below ceiling = 20 mm 
Optical density at alarm (1/m) = 0.097 
Detector sensitivity (% per ft) = 6.6 
Characteristic length (m) = 15 
Radial distance  = 7 m 
Distance below ceiling = 0.025 mm 
 
The sprinkler and smoke detector parameters have been used within the BRANZFIRE zone 
model version 2009.1 (85) to determine a predicted range of response times given an 
assumed 3.5 m room height and a medium t2 fire growth rate.  As the layout of the building is 
unknown, a fire could occur within a small enclosed area or large open room providing for a 
range of potential detection times.  Two detector scenarios have been included, considering 
a small (5 m x 5 m) room and a larger (20 m x 20 m) area with no ventilation effects to 
represent a range of possible detector response times.  Using a range of detection times 
also allows for the potential effect of different fire growth rates that would also have a 
significant bearing on the possible detection times.  The detector activation times were 
calculated to be between 295 and 332 seconds, respectively, for the commercial sprinkler 
and 33 and 35 seconds, respectively, for smoke detector activation using the NIST ceiling jet 
algorithm.  As these activation times were considered representative for this type of building, 
they have been used in the analysis, proposed as uniform distributions with these values as 
the considered minimum and maximum activation times. 
For consideration of NZFS response and arrival times, the building has been assumed to be 
located within central Auckland, New Zealand.  The distance to the closest permanently 
manned career fire station using the shortest trafficable route has been assumed to be 1 km. 
Figure 70 below shows the predicted kerbside arrival time considering 10,000 iterations 






Figure 70 Predicted kerbside arrival distributions considering sprinkler and smoke 
detector system activation and notification 
Table 53 provides a summary of the expected kerbside arrival times. As would be expected, 
arrival of the closest responding fire appliance is likely to be far quicker when responding to 
detection from a smoke detector than from sprinkler activation.   
Table 52 Predicted kerbside arrival times (seconds)  
Detection type Mean Minimum Maximum 5th percentile 95th percentile 
Sprinkler  737 463 1134 578 899 
Smoke detector 277 104 521 207 373 
 
The difference in calculated arrival times is clearly evident with the maximum predicted 
arrival time for smoke detector activation considering 10,000 iterations occurring less than a 
minute after the minimum expected arrival time for sprinkler activation.  Figure 71 shows the 
regression sensitivity analysis for the calculation inputs graphically displayed using tornado 
graphs.  The graphs rank the inputs in accordance with their impact on the output.  As can 
be seen for the sprinkler scenario, the input 'time taken to depressurise system and activate 



















examination of this input value suggests that investigating and increasing the confidence in 
this input could make a significant difference to the predicted NZFS kerbside arrival time.   
 
  
Figure 71 Regression sensitivity analysis for the kerbside arrival considering 
notification by sprinklers (top) and smoke detectors (bottom). 
 
9.4. Fire Brigade Arrival and Set-Up 
 
The time components for the fire brigade arrival and set-up are considered through FBIM 
Charts 5–11.  Two assessment options are considered for this analysis including a response 
from fire fighters using lifts and the stairs assuming the data proposed in this project.     
This analysis assumes that two fire fighters will remove hydrant riser packs from the 
appliance and, with the officer in charge of the appliance, make their way to the floor below 
the determined location of the fire to set up and start fire-fighting operations.  Meanwhile and 
concurrently, the pumping appliance operator/driver will set up water supplies and will, on 
request, charge the hydrant system and sprinkler system if required.   For this part of the 
analysis, it is assumed that a street hydrant is located within 30 m of the parked appliance 
and a single length of feeder and supply hose is used to supply water to the appliance and 




outside the building is shown in Figure 72.  The maximum predicted time to set up the water 
requirements is less than the minimum time predicted to reach the fire floor using any 
method at 208 seconds and 182 seconds for a 95 percentile confidence limit.  This time 
component can be discounted from further consideration as it occurs concurrently and would 
be completed in time to ensure water was available when required by the fire fighters at the 
fire floor. 
 
Figure 72 Predicted distribution of the times taken to set  up water supply 
requirements outside the building, shown with a cumulative overlay. 
 
The calculated times taken to reach the fire floor with charged hoses using both lifts and the 
stairs are shown in Figure 73 with the times given in Table 53. 
Table 53 Predicted internal response times using lifts or stairs (seconds)  
Response type Mean Minimum Maximum 5th percentile 95th percentile 
Stairs 1076 382 1849 611 1535 




















As would be expected, the fire-fighter response times to the fire floor are significantly quicker 
when comparing a response using the lifts compared with fire fighters using stairs.   
 
Figure 73 Internal response time distributions using lifts or stairs (seconds) shown 
with a cumulative overlay 
Regression sensitivity analysis for the expected response time to the fire floor dependent 
upon the use of lifts or stairs is shown in Figure 74.  When using lifts to reach the 65th floor, 
the time taken to connect the hose to the hydrant outlet and make entry to the 66th floor 
level has the largest overall impact on the arrival time, whereas the rest break parameter has 
the largest impact followed again by the time taken to connect the hose to the hydrant outlet 



















Figure 74 Regression sensitivity analysis for the internal response using lifts or 
stairs  
 
9.4.1. Total Predicted Time to Start Fire-Fighting Suppression Operations 
 
The two scenarios addressed above have not yet considered the total time taken given the 
four possible options that can now occur.  The following results present the overall times for 
the four options assuming either detection by a sprinkler or smoke detection system and with 
fire fighters responding using a lift or the stairs.  Figure 75 shows the predicted distributions 
with the times presented in Table 54.  The analysis indicates a wide variation of predicted 
times dependent on the method of detection and alert and whether stair or the lifts would be 
used to reach the fire floor.  The minimum predicted time before suppression operations 
could be expected to occur could be as little as 455 seconds with the largest time calculated 






Figure 75 Overall response time distributions using lifts or stairs and given 
notification by sprinkler or smoke detector activation (seconds) 
As can be seen, the times taken for fire fighters to respond to this type of building and to 
start suppression operations can be considerable.  Considering only a 5% confidence value 
returns a prediction of as long as 10 minutes for the fastest intervention scenario.  Where fire 
fighters could be expected to use lifts in a smoke detector scenario, times as long as 14 
minutes are returned when a 95 percentile confidence limit is applied. 
 
Table 54 Predicted total response times to start suppression operations (seconds)  
Response type 
 




Sprinkler activation and lifts 1142 797 1551 946 1342 
Sprinkler activation and stairs 1813 917 2701 1309 2314 
Smoke detector activation and 
lifts 
682 437 995 556 826 
Smoke detector activation and 
stairs 



















9.5. Search and Rescue 
 
The times associated with search and rescue operations will vary significantly upon the size 
of each floor and its complexity as well as whether conditions on the fire floor would be 
tenable for fire fighters.  Search and rescue operations are more complicated within high-rise 
buildings as fire fighters will attempt to search and at least make an examination of the floors 
above the fire, should the fire require fire suppression operations to occur.  The purpose of 
this type of search is to ensure that no occupants remain above the level of the fire and to 
make an assessment of any fire spread occurring throughout the upper levels.  The times 
taken for such operations in high-rise buildings requires that significant support operations 
and resources be put in place to replenish air supplies, move equipment and to rotate fire 
fighters, etc. These operations may occur concurrently with fire suppression operations on 
the upper levels and will be heavily dependent on the layout of stairs and the ability to 
establish control points inside the building.  An example of NZFS high-rise procedures is 
given in Appendix J to highlight the responsibilities of each arriving crew and the tasks 
expected of them at a high-rise building incident.   
Significant resources would be required to be factored into an FBIM analysis if a full search 
and rescue analysis was desired so this assessment has not included analysis of this 
particular component.  However, assuming that the building contained a floor area of 
1000 m2 and using existing Australian FBIM data, the FBIM predicts that an average time of 
55 minutes could be expected for fire fighters to undertake a secondary search, assuming 
the use guidelines and standard search techniques in smoke-logged conditions.  This is a 
significant time component for consideration of people remaining within the building during a 
fire event and consideration of this length of time on the specification of the building‘s 




The predicted times taken for fire fighters to respond to a fire within a 67-storey building are 
long and are heavily dependent upon the method of fire detection, notification and whether 
fire fighters choose, or would have any choice as to, whether they made access to the fire 
floors using lifts or stairs.  For a 95th percentile confidence limit, the maximum predicted 
times taken were between 14 and 40 minutes, dependent on the method of detection and 
internal response method.  For a best-case scenario assuming a fifth percentile confidence 




of occupants escaping at the same time as fire fighters were entering the building.  No 
specific egress analysis has been undertaken, however it has been shown that fire fighters 
would be arriving at the building and would be ready to start making entry into the building 
and potentially impacting with occupants trying to make egress after as little as three 
minutes for the fastest predicted arrival time with a fifth percentile confidence limit.  However, 
this time could take as long as 15 minutes for the longest scenario, given a 95th percentile 
confidence limit.  What is apparent, however, is that it is very likely given the height of the 
building that fire fighters would be arriving at the building whilst occupants are trying to 
evacuate.  Consideration of the likely effects on both the occupants trying to evacuate and 
responding fire fighters trying to make access to the fire floors should be considered.  
The fire-fighter response times to the building given the different scenarios have also been 
shown to form a less significant part of the overall intervention time, contrary to conventional 
thinking.  Considering average values, the time taken for the fire service to arrive at the 
building ranges from 20%, to approximately 67% of the time component.  When only the fire-
fighter response time is considered, that being once the NZFS are notified of a fire, this 
percentage reduces further with the resulting times ranging between 11% and 19% of the 
overall time taken before fire fighters could be expected to be in a position to start 
suppression operations.  If the overall fire brigade intervention time to complete operations 
were considered, it is likely that the response time of the NZFS would be found to be 
insignificant compared with the other tasks required to take place. 
 
9.6.1. Regression Analysis 
 
Regression sensitivity analysis can be used to identify the inputs that have the most 
significant impact to the output and allow for a better understanding of the inputs that are 
driving the results.  The length of the bars represents the degree of correlation with the 
output variable.  They can identify areas that should be investigated further if refinement, 
increased confidence or scenario adaption's need to be considered if the scenarios identify 
results that are not acceptable.  
 
Figure 76 shows the regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering sprinkler 
activation and lifts.  This identifies that the time taken to depressurise and activate the 
sprinkler system has the largest impact on the result.  It also identifies that further 
investigation of the times taken for fire fighters to connect hoses to the hydrant and make 




Options such as the provision of appropriate floor lobbies and additional protection to the 
staircase and hydrant outlets could allow fire fighters to make access directly from the 
hydrant on the fire floor, reducing this time component, for example. 
 
Figure 76 Regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering sprinkler 
activation and lifts 
 
Figure 77 shows the regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering sprinkler 
activation and use of stairs.  This analysis of the inputs to this scenario identifies that the rest 
breaks taken during the stair-climbing component has the largest impact on the result.  
Research undertaken as part of this project has identified the significant problems 
associated with the difficulties of fire fighters climbing high rise buildings and the need to 
factor in appropriate times for rest breaks.  It is also possible that a building of this height is 
beyond the physical capability for fire fighters to respond using stairs and  mount 
suppression operations within a heated fire compartment safely.  This regression analysis 
identifies that the second and third most important inputs are again the sprinkler activation 
time and the times taken for fire fighters to connect hoses to the hydrant and make access to 






Figure 77 Regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering sprinkler 
activation and use of stairs  
 
Figure 78 shows the regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering smoke 
detector activation and the use of lifts.  The analysis of the inputs to this scenario identify 
that those having the largest impact on the results are those that are outside of the control of 
the designer and mainly concern fire-fighting tasks.  This indicates that there is probably little 
potential for further refinement of this scenario except to identify the need to ensure that the 
assumptions are appropriately considered within the design.  Placing reliance on fire fighters 
using the lifts and that detection and notification is given by smoke detection may require 
additional specification to ensure increased reliability or to undertake a potential failure 
modes analysis of these to assess the likelihood of these facilities not being available during 







Figure 78 Regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering smoke 
detector activation and lifts 
 
Again, the regression sensitivity analysis for the smoke detector activation scenario identified 
that the main inputs relate to fire-fighting tasks.  As expected, considering the use of stairs, 
the distribution associated with rest breaks is the most significant input affecting the scenario 






Figure 79 Regression sensitivity analysis for the scenario considering smoke 
detector and stairs 
 
The full scenario simulation output reports from @Risk for these results are provided within 
Appendix K for review.   
 
9.7. Discussion  
 
The results generally identify that there could be relatively long intervention times associated 
with fire-fighting operations in a high-rise building such as the one considered here.  
Consideration of the results of this FBIM analysis should be used to identify their impact on 
the proposed building design from a holistic perspective.  When considering the performance 
requirements of the NZBC and how these are demonstrated, the FBIM results could be used 
in conjunction with other recognised fire engineering methodologies, such as fire growth and 
evacuation modelling, to demonstrate that the building can meet all of the code's 
performance requirements.  The results can also be used to identify other factors that may 
be of importance such as the level of property damage that could be expected due to smoke 
or water damage from the activation of sprinklers when considering the delayed fire-fighter 




As identified here, fire station location and the travel time to a high-rise building is almost 
insignificant considering the overall intervention time.  This is contrary to the general 
perception of many emergency services agencies and the public. 
When considering the prescriptive and performance requirements of the Building Code that 
would be of most relevance to this type of high-rise building, the following main points could 
be worthy of further consideration. 
 Detection and notification to the fire service should be as early as possible and be 
from smoke detection systems located throughout the building.  As C/AS1 only 
requires the full building alarm and fire brigade to be notified by sprinkler activation, 
consideration should be given to the provision of notification of the brigade by 
activation of the smoke detection system.  Specific design solutions would need to be 
considered to mitigate the increased potential and impact of unwanted alarms if 
smoke detection was to be used to notify the NZFS. 
 
 Although fire service lift control would be expected within this height of building, there 
are few specific requirements prescribing how many lifts are made available, their 
configuration and the level of protection afforded to them.  Further consideration 
should be given to the number of dedicated fire-fighting lifts to be provided and their 
reliability if they are assumed to be used within an analysis. 
 
 Structural fire ratings may need to be specifically considered given that there are 
scenarios that predict that fire fighters could be in the building for a substantial length 
of time.  As C/AS1 only requires a fire rating of 60 minutes, this could be shown to be 
too low for a building of this height, even for a sprinkled fire scenario. 
 
 The evacuation strategy to be adopted needs to consider the impact of fire fighters 
attempting to make entry to the building at the same time as occupants making 
egress. 
 
 It is necessary to further investigate the logistics and time associated with the fire 
fighters closing off an exit stair for fire-fighter equipment staging during an 
emergency evacuation.  The provision of appropriate facilities to control occupants 
within the exit stairs who are descending from floors located above the fire floor 
needs to be considered.  The effect of occupants needing to immediately leave their 




associated with transferring back into other floors or into the nearest available stair 
need to be considered.  
 
 Information is critical during a fire emergency and data from equipment such as 
remote field devices and television or security cameras in strategic positions 
including lobbies and staircases could be invaluable to allow real time assessment of 
the fire and evacuation. 
 
 The lifts needs to be protected against smoke and water ingress, otherwise they may 
not be available, forcing fire fighters to use the stairs. 
 
 Both lift and stairway shaft pressurisation should be considered. 
 
 If lifts are to be used for staged occupant evacuation these need to be considered 
separately to dedicated fire-fighting lifts and be located in separate shafts from those 
located in the evacuation zone of fire origin to mitigate the potential for water 
damage. 
 
 Emergency and redundant back-up power supplies for the lifts needs careful 
specification and consideration should be given to it being powered from an external 
emergency power source. 
 
 Consideration for the provision of dedicated refuge floors for both occupants to rest 
and to allow the fire service to stage operations and to provide forward control points 
in locations outside of stairs should be considered for buildings of this height. 
 
 Examination and potential modification of fire-fighter procedures may need to be 
considered in line with the specific fire safety precautions and geometry, stair and lift 







Use of a risk-based FBIM analysis provides for a clear and transparent method of factoring 
in the expected fire-fighter intervention within a building design.  This allows for identification 
of the expected times associated with the most important factors that can affect both the 
evacuation of the building occupants and the fire fighters reaching the location of the fire, 
and the times associated with tasks that may need to be undertaken during a fire incident.  A 
sensitivity analysis of fire brigade intervention can then be undertaken with results 
scrutinised considering the building‘s proposed fire safety features with identification of the 
most important inputs.  The results can then be easily depicted and scrutinised as a 
probability function allowing identification and potentially improvement of fire brigade 
intervention through different design choices and fire service operational techniques.  For 
building design purposes it is necessary to identify the most important input variables that 
have the greatest affect upon the design of any egress systems and fire brigade intervention 
facilities and ensure that those with the greatest effect upon the output are assessed in more 
detail.  This allows for further refinement or complete substitution for different or additional 
facilities.  
The outcome of this type of an analysis may require the consideration of additional or 
alternative fire safety features and similarly additional or alternative operational procedures 
to be adopted.  These can then be tailored specifically to the building, producing an 
improvement to both occupant and fire-fighter life safety as well as decreasing property 






CHAPTER 10. Future Fire Brigade Intervention Data Requirements 
 
FBIM data collection is not complete and further data as well as further analysis to identify 
any additional differences between the NZFS and Australian practices should be 
undertaken.  There were no significant differences found between fire appliances, equipment 
or procedures used within the Australian brigades and those in use by the NZFS that would 
have an appreciable effect upon the outcome of an FBIM analysis using the current data.  
However, some aspects of the data collected so far have been limited with respect to actual 
fire-fighter activity data and this part of the research should be continued. 
Differences between some volunteer and career fire-fighter practices and equipment such as 
the use of seat-mounted BA and locker-mounted BA have been identified, which should be 
considered within an analysis.  Differences between the use of flaked and rolled hose and 
differences between hose diameter, lengths of hose and coupling types have also been 
identified between the Australian and NZFS equipment.  However, some of these differences 
have been found to have or are suggested to have little or minor effect on the outcome of an 
FBIM analysis. 
This project introduces many opportunities for further study including the following. 
 Times associated with the operation and activation of automatic detection and 
suppression systems that comply with the New Zealand standard have not been 
collected as part of the project.  A uniform distribution has been recommended based 
on advice provided by recognised sprinkler experts.  However, specific research into 
the time between activation of any sensing element and notification of the NZFS 
should be undertaken to investigate what delays, if any, may be present and what 
relationship these delays have with respect to the design of the systems.  Such 
research would also be useful for understanding its effect upon occupant notification 
and the potential effect it may have upon evacuation analysis. 
 
 The least well understood area for the application of the FBIM is the rural 
environment.  The long response times associated with rural and some volunteer 
responses can result in fire brigade responses that are significantly longer than would 
be expected within a typical urban scenario.  The issues of fire-fighter life safety and 
the performance requirements of building codes in these environments should be 
specifically investigated to identify if the performance requirements or expectations 






 Education about the FBIM should be provided and be available to those within the 
building industry involved with building designs that do not follow prescriptive 
requirements. 
 
 Other uses of the FBIM should be investigated to identify its relevance for use in: 
o post-incident analysis and fire investigation; 
o fire-fighter training including deployment decision training and its use within 
computer simulation models such as VectorCommand. 
 
 Further fire ground field experiments at real buildings should be undertaken to 
validate the FBIM further and to identify further refinement of the model.   
 
 Further data analysis for appliance travel speeds within the larger cities based on 
larger data sets could be undertaken to identify if any trends similar to those found in 
previous studies exist and whether any can be described for rural areas.  Further 
scrutiny of the data separated into evening and daytime responses could be 




CHAPTER 11. Conclusions 
 
The following conclusions have been made from the research conducted as part of this 
project. 
 Analysis of building consent applications submitted to the NZFSC for review has 
identified a common trend for fire-fighting facilities and the needs of responding fire 
fighters to be ignored within fire designs utilising alternative or performance-based 
methods.  Specifically, the following findings can be summarised. 
 
o Within all responses provided by the NZFSC, recommendations regarding 
fire-fighting facilities were made in 47% of responses.  Reponses containing 
advice on fire hydrants and attendance points including FAP locations were 
made in 21% and 25% of responses, respectively.  In 16% of all submissions 
reviewed, no information at all regarding fire-fighting facilities was provided, 
but was considered necessary by the NZFS to demonstrate compliance with 
the NZBC. In 67% of the responses provided by the NZFS advice was given 
stating that the submissions contained insufficient information to demonstrate 
compliance with the NZBC and recommended that further information be 
supplied. 
 
o For new buildings containing alternative fire-engineered solutions, the findings 
indicate that the NZFS made recommendations regarding fire-fighting 
facilities in 63% of responses, and for fire hydrants and attendance points, 
including FAP locations, in 31% and 37% of responses, respectively.  In 23% 
of all submissions for new buildings, no information at all regarding fire-
fighting facilities was provided.  In 66% of the memorandums produced by the 
NZFS, advice was given stating that the documentation submitted for review 
contained insufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the NZBC. 
 
 Fire-fighting intervention requirements of the NZBC and current NZ legislation have 
been identified as being potentially deficient when compared with other available fire-
fighting intervention methodologies and performance-based building codes available 
internationally. 
 The collection and analysis of the data required to support an FBIM analysis is 




and within a probabilistic risk assessment methodology.  Where insufficient data 
specific to the NZFS has not been able to be collected, existing Australian FBIM data 
has been validated against NZFS procedures and equipment or discussed with 
regards to its relevance, and is recommended for use until further data is collected. 
 
 Verification and validation of the FBIM with fire ground field experiments has been 
undertaken and shown to compare well with the existing FBIM computer program 
using existing FBIM data.   
 
 Validation of specific FBIM data against emergency incidents that have been 
attended during this research has also established confidence in the use of the data 
collected and the FBIM methodology. 
 
 An FBIM analysis for a high-rise building is presented utilising the data collected 
within this project using a risk-based probabilistic approach and Monte-Carlo analysis 
methods.  This analysis has identified the advantages of using the FBIM and 
probabilistic analysis over the traditional percentile approach, to identify areas that 
warrant further scrutiny to improve the fire engineering design and tailor the building‘s 
fire safety features specifically to the building. 
 
 The data presented as part of this research is recommend to be presented within the 
next revision of the FBIM manual so that it can be made available as part of the FBIM 
proper. 
 
The FBIM has been in use in both Australia and New Zealand for over a decade and since 
November 2008 has been referenced within the New Zealand compliance document C/AS1.  
The FBIM is also accepted by the NZFS as a suitable methodology to demonstrate the 
performance requirements of the NZBC that relate to fire brigade operations.  This research 
presents a first attempt at the collection of FBIM data specific to the NZFS and presents 
validation and verification of this data and the FBIM methodology against real emergency 
incidents and the NZFS operating tactics.   Whilst this research cannot comprehensively 
conclude that the FBIM is entirely validated against all conditions within the New Zealand fire 
environment, the FBIM has been shown to be appropriate for use and should be able to be 




The IFEG references the use of the FBIM to quantify fire service activities to allow a design 
to incorporate fire brigade intervention and is endorsed by both the DBH and IPENZ.  With 
sufficient data to represent NZFS operations and procedures the FBIM should be an 






CHAPTER 12. References 
 
1. Alexandrovski, A. Fire Brigade Intervention Model, is it used properly? School of 
Engineering, University of Western Sydney. November 2006. A research paper presented 
to the School of Engineering University of Western Sydney in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree Master in Fire Safety Engineering. 
2. Marsden, J. Building barriers. Fire Risk Managment Journal. pp. 51-54. June 2009. 
3. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. Physiological Assessment of Firefighting, Search 
and Rescue in the Built Environment. London: 2007. 
4. British Standards Institution. PD 7974-5 Application of fire safety engineering principles 
to the design of buildings. London: 2003. 
5. Australasian Fire Authorities Council. Fire Brigade Intervention Model. Melbourne: 
2004. Vol. 2.2. 
6. Department of Building and Housing. Acceptable Solution, Approved Documents for 
New Zealand Building Code Fire Safety Clauses C1, C2, C3, C4, Incorporating 
Amendments up to and including Amendment 7. November. Wellington: 2008. 
7. Brown, N. Is rescue from a burning building about to become a thing of the past? Fire 
Australia. Victoria: Winter 2008. pp. 20-21. 
8. Young, S A. AFAC FBIM Computer Program User Manual. Melbourne: Australasian Fire 
and Emergencies Services Authorities Council, 2004. Vols. 1,3. 
9. Post-War Building Studies No. 29. Fire Grading of Buildings Part II. Fire Fighting 
Equipment. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952. 
10. Standards Association of New Zealand. NZS1900: Chapter 5: Model Building Bylaw, 
Fire Resisting Construction and Means of Egress (including up to Amendment 2). 
Wellington: 1988.  
11. Department of Building and Housing. About the Building Code. Department of 
Building and Housing. [Online] http://www.dbh.govt.nz/bcr-about-the-building-code 
[Cited: 05 01 2010]. 
12. Building Industry Authority. Protection of fire fighters in the alteration of a school 




13. Post-War Building Studies No. 20. Fire Grading of Buildings Part I. General principles 
and Structural Precautions. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952. Sections 109-
112. 
14. Australian Building Codes Board. International Fire Engineering Guidelines. Canberra: 
2005. 
15. Department of Building and Housing. Alternative solutions. Department of Building 
and Housing. [Online] http://www.building.dbh.govt.nz/blc-alternative-solutions [Cited: 30 
01 2010]. 
16. Department of Building and Housing. BC Update: No.17 - Release of the International 
Fire Engineering Guidelines. Department of Building and Housing. [Online] 
http://www.dbh.govt.nz/bcupdate-article-17 [Cited: 03 04 2010]. 
17. Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand. Hot Topics. Fire Engineering 
Advisory Taskforce. Report and Recommendations. Wellington: Institution of 
Professional Engineers New Zealand, 2007. 
18. Building Industry Authority. Determination 2001/5: Protection of fire fighters in the 
alteration of a school building. Wellington: 2001. 
19. Department of Building and Housing. Determination 2009/100: Refusal of an 
amendment to the fire engineering design forming part of a building consent for a multi-
storey office building. Wellington: 2009. 
20. Merry, A and Spearpoint, M. The Building Act of 2004 and the New Zealand Fire 
Service. Society of Fire Protection Engineers, SFPE International Conference on 
Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods. April 16-18. pp. 47-58. 
Auckland. 2008. 
21. Department of Building and Housing. Framework for Demonstrating Fire Safety. 
Wellington: 2009. 
22. Hughes-Brown, B. Alternative Building Solutions and Real Building Fires. University of 
Western Sydney, 2008. Built Environment Research Project. 
23. Department of Building and Housing. 2005/109: Single means of escape from a high-
rise apartment building. Wellington: 2005. 
24. Warrington Fire Research. Technical Audit of the New Zealand Fire Service Design 




25. British Standards Institution. BS 9999: Code of practice for fire safety in the design, 
management and use of buildings. London: British Standards Institution, 2008. 
26. Richards, P and Chuo, T. Case Study 01. Society of Fire Protection Engineers, SFPE 
International Conference on Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety Design 
Methods. April 16-18. Auckland. 2008. 
27. Cashin, B. Deconstructing the Building Code. Wellington: Brookers Ltd, 2005. 
28. New Zealand Fire Service. Inquiry into the Explosion and Fire at Icepak Coolstores, 
Tamahere, on 5 April 2008 . Wellington: New Zealand Fire Service Commission, 2008 . 
Incident Number F128045. 
29. Fire safety engineering – Part 1: Application of fire performance concepts to design 
objectives. International Standards Organisation, 1999. ISO/TR 13387-1. 
30. Fire-safety engineering – Technical information on methods for evaluating behaviour and 
movement of people. Switzerland: International Standards Organisation. ISO/TR 16738. 
31. International Code Council. Performance Code for Building and Facilities. Country 
Club Hills, Illinois: International Code Council. 2009. 
32. International Code Council. International Fire Code. Country Club Hills, Illinois: 
International Code Council. 2009. 
33. Australian Building Codes Board. Building Code of Australia. Canberra: 2009. 
34. Australian Building Codes Board. The Guide to the Building Code of Australia. 
Canberra: Australian Building Codes Board, 2009. 
35. Meacham, B. A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Approach to Building regulation. 
Society of Fire Protection Engineers, SFPE International Conference on Performance-
Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods. April 16-18. pp. 3-14. Auckland. 2008. 
36. Department for Communities and Local Government. Approved Document B (Fire 
safety) - Buildings other than dwellinghouses. London: 2006. Vol. 2. 
37. Communities and Local Government. Fire safety law and guidance documents for 
business. Communities and Local Government website. [Online] 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/firesafety/firesafetylaw/ [Cited: 31 03 2010]. 
38. British Standards Institution. BS 7974 Application of fire safety engineering principles 




39. National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety 
Code. Quincy: 2009. 
40. National Research Council Canada . Fire Risk Assessment for Residential and Office 
Buildings - FiRECAM . National Research Council Canada. [Online] 04 04 2010. 
http://www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/eng/projects/irc/residential-protection.html [Cited: 05 04 2010]. 
41. Benichou, N, Kashef, A and Hadjisophocleous, G. Fire Department Response Model 
(FDRM) and Fire Department Effectiveness Model (FDEM) Theory Report. Fire Risk 
Management Program Institute for Research in Construction. National Research Council 
Canada, 2002. Internal Report No. 842. 
42. Yung, D T, Hadjisophocleous, G V and Yager, B L. Case study: The use of FiRECAM 
to identify cost-effective fire safety design options for a large 40-storey office building. 
Pacific Rim Conference and 2nd International Conference on Performance Based Codes 
and Fire Safety Design Methods. pp. 441-452. NRCC-42040. Maui. 1998. 
43. Tillander, K. Utilisation of statistics to assess fire risks in buildings. VTT Technical 
Research Centre. Helsinki: 2004. 
44. Tómasson, B, et al. The Influence of Fire Department Intervention for the Fire Safety of 
High-rise Buildings. Society of Fire Protection Engineers, SFPE International Conference 
on Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods. April 16-18. pp. 205-
216. Auckland. 2008. 
45. Tomasson, B, et al. [ed.] B Karlsson. A Probabilistic Risk Analysis Methodology for 
High-Rise Buildings Taking into Account Fire Department Intervention Time. International 
Association for Fire Safety Science. Fire Safety Science – Proceedings of the Ninth 
International Symposium. pp. 957-968. Karlsruhe: 2009. doi:10.3801/IAFSS.FSS.9-957. 
46. Guidelines. South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service. [Online] Government of South 
Australia, 21 08 2009. 
http://www.samfs.sa.gov.au/site/community_safety/commercial/guidelines.jsp [Cited: 03 
04 2010]. 
47. New South Wales Fire Brigade. Guidelines for built environment. New South Wales 
Fire Brigades. [Online] New South Wales Government, 02 03 2010. 
http://www.nswfb.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=28 [Cited: 03 04 2010]. 
48. Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board. Fire Safety Guidelines. 





[Cited: 03 04 2010]. 
49. Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board. Performance Based Designs Fire 
Brigade Requirements, 5. Victoria: 2004. Advisory No. B 6000/14. 
50. Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board. Guideline No: GL-17 Fire Brigade 
Intervention Model (FBIM). Victoria: 2005. 
51. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. Policy on Fire Engineered Alternative Solutions. 
Queensland Government. Queensland. 2006. 
52. Marchant, R, Kurban, N and Wise, S. Development and Application of the Fire Brigade 
Intervention Model. 1st International Conference on Fire Service Deployment Analysis. 
Indianapolis, Indiana. 1999. 
53. VectorCommand Ltd. Tactical Command Trainer. [Online] 2010. 
http://www.emergencycommandsystem.com/products/tactical-command-trainer/ [Cited: 
03 04 2010]. 
54. British Standards Institution. BS 6391 Specification for non-percolating layflat delivery 
hoses and hose assemblies for fire fighting purposes. London: 2009. 
55. Palisade Corporation. @Risk The Decision Tools Suite version 5.5.0, Industrial Edition.      
Newfield, NY: Palisade Corporation, 2009. 
56. O'Brien, T. Private communication. 2010. 
57. Houston, B. Private communication. 2010. 
58. Mak, C. Private communication. 2010. 
59. Fire Detection and Alarm Systems in Buildings. Wellington: Standards New Zealand, 
2003. NZS 4512. 
60. New Zealand Fire Service. Station Management System Incident Data. Wellington: 
2008 – 2009. 
61. Commission on Fire Accreditation International, Inc. Creating and Evaluating 
Standards of Response Coverage for Fire Departments. Chantilly, VA: Public Entity Risk 




62. Office of the Fire Marshal Ontario. Fire Station Location. Office of the Fire Marshal 
Ontario. [Online] Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2009, 14 12 2009. 
http://www.ofm.gov.on.ca/english/FireProtection/munguide/04-87-13.asp. PFSG 04-87-
13 [Cited: 16 12 2009]. 
63. Kolesar, P and Walker, W. Measuring the Travel Characteristics of New York City‘s Fire 
Companies. New York: New York City RAND Institute, 1979. R-1449-NYC. 
64. National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization and 
Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations Emergency Medical Operations, and Special 
Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. Quincy: 2010. 
65. Averill, J D, et al. NIST Technical Note 1661Report on Residential Fireground Field 
Experiments U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. National Institute of Standards and Technology. U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2010. 
66. The Fire Cover Review 2000. Communities and Local Government. [Online] 2000. 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/fire/firecover/ [Cited: 16 12 
2009]. 
67. Greenstreet Berman Ltd. Review of Fire and Rescue Service response times. London: 
Communities and Local Government Publications, 2009. Fire Research Series 1/2009. 
68. Caliper Corporation . TransCAD Overview. TransCAD transportation planning software. 
[Online] 2009. http://www.caliper.com/tcovu.htm [Cited: 16 12 2009]. 
69. Yung, D. Principles of Fire Risk Assessment in Buildings. Chichester: Wiley, 2008. 
70. Google. GoogleMaps. [Online]. http://maps.google.co.nz/maps?ct=reset [Cited: 17 12 
2009]. 
71. Jones, W and Bukowski, R. Critical information for first responders, whenever and 
wherever it is needed. Edinburgh: Interscience Communications Ltd, International 
Interflam Conference, 9th Proceedings. Vol. 2. September 17-19. 2001. 
72. Massingberd-Mundy, P. FireGrid – An integrated emergency response system. 
Duisburg: 14th International Conference on Automatic Fire Detection. September 8-10. 
2009. 
73. Strakosch, G R. The Vertical Transportation Handbook. Third ed. New York: John Wiley 




74. Klem, J T. Preliminary Investigation Report Prudential Building Fire, Boston MA, January 
2, 1986. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 1986. 
75. Lawson, J and Vettori, R. Reports of the Federal Building and Fire Investigation of the 
World Trade Center Disaster NIST NCSTAR 1-8: The Emergency Response Operations. 
Building and Fire Research Laboratory. Washington: National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2005. NIST NCSTAR 1-8. 
76. Mississauga Fire And Emergency Services. Vertical response time trials August 5, 6, 
7. Ontario: 2009. 
77. Office of the Fire Marshal Ontario. Assessing vertical response times. 
October/November 2009, Ontario: 2009, The Ontario Fire Service Messenger, p. 23. 
PM40005428/R1001817. 
78. Kuligowski, E D and Bukowski, R W. Design of Occupant Egress Systems for Tall 
Buildings. 2004. CIB World Building Congress. Toronto: May 2-7 pp. 1-10. 
79. Federal Emergency Management Agency. U.S. Fire Administration Firefighter 
Fatalities in the United States in 2008. [Online]. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
September 2009. http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/ff_fat08.pdf. 
[Cited: 05 04 2010]. 
80. New Zealand Fire Service. Firefighting Water Supplies Code of Practice. SNZ PAS 
4509:2008. Wellington: Standards New Zealand, Publicly Available Specification, 2008. 
81. Professional Development Unit. Recruit Course Student Note: Breathing Apparatus. 
New Zealand Fire Service, 2005. 
82. Beard, A and Carvel, R. Handbook of tunnel fire safety. Thomas Telford, London: 2005. 
83. Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council. Code Of Practice 
Aerial Appliance - Safe Use and Minimum Maintenance. Melbourne: 2003. 
84. Wright, M. Prescriptive versus Alternative Solutions. Fire Australia 2009 
Conference and Exhibition, October 28 -29, Hobart: 2009. 
85. Wade, C A. BRANZFIRE Technical Reference Guide. BRANZ Study Report No 92. 
Judgeford: Building Research Association of New Zealand, 2004 (revised). 















This Gazette notice dated 24 March 2005 requires the following type of building consent 
applications to be sent to the NZFSC: 
1. An application for a building consent that relates to building work to be carried out in 
respect of any type of building or part of a building described in section 21A of the 
Fire Service Act 1975 regardless of whether the building or part of the building is 
sprinkler protected. 
 
2. For the purpose of clause 1 an application for a building consent for building work 
means an application— 
 
a) where compliance with clauses C1-4, D1, F6 or F8 of the Building Code will be 
established other than by compliance with the provisions of an applicable 
compliance document; or 
b) that involves a modification or waiver of clauses C1-4, D1, F6 or F8 of the 
Building Code, under section 67 of the Building Act 2004; or 
c) that involves an alteration, change in use or subdivision and affects the fire safety 
systems, including any building work on a specified system relating to fire safety, 
except where the effect on the fire safety system is minor. 
 
3. Clause 1 does not apply to an application for a building consent for building work to 
be carried out in respect of:  
 
a) single household units; 
b) buildings in which every fire-cell is a household unit separated vertically from the 
other fire-cells and each fire-cell has independent and direct egress to a safe 
place outside the building; 
c) an internal fit-out, unless the fit-out relates to a change of use under clause 2(c); 




















South Australian legislation 
The South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005 
Division 2—Functions and powers 
26—Functions and powers 
(1) MFS has the following functions: 
(a)  to provide services with a view to preventing the outbreak of fires, or 
reducing the impact of fires, in any fire district; 
(b) to provide efficient and responsive services in any fire district for the 
purpose of fighting fires, dealing with other emergencies or 
undertaking any rescue; 
(c)  to protect life, property and environmental assets from fire or other 
emergencies in any fire district; 
(d) to develop and maintain plans to cope with the effects of fires or 
emergencies in any fire district; 
(e)  to provide services or support to assist with recovery in the event of a 
fire or other emergency in a fire district; 
(f)  to perform any other function assigned to MFS by or under this or any 
other Act. 
 
The South Australia Development Regulations 2008 
28—Special provisions—referrals 
(3) If a relevant authority, in assessing an application for building rules consent, 
considers 
that— 
(a)  a proposed alternative solution within the meaning of the Building 
Code requires assessment against a performance requirement of 
the Building Code which provides for fire fighting operations of a 
fire authority; or 
(b)  the proposed development is at variance with a performance 
requirement of the Building Code which provides for fire fighting 




(c)  special problems for fire fighting could arise due to hazardous 
conditions of a kind described in Section E of the Building Code, 
then the relevant authority must refer the application to the relevant 
fire authority for comment and report unless the fire authority 
indicates to the relevant authority that a referral is not required. 
 
(4) If a report is not received from the fire authority on a referral under subregulation 
(3) within 20 business days, the relevant authority may presume that the fire 
authority does not desire to make a report. 
 
(5) The relevant authority must have regard to any report received from a fire 
authority under this regulation. 
 
(6) A relevant authority must provide to the Building Rules Assessment Commission 
a copy of any report received from a fire authority under subregulation (3) that 
relates to an application that is referred to the Building Rules Assessment 
Commission under the Act. 
 
83—Certificates of occupancy 
(4) If— 
(a)  a building is— 
(i) to be equipped with a booster assembly for use by a fire 
authority; or 
(ii) to have installed a fire alarm that transmits a signal to a 
fire station or to a monitoring service approved by the 
relevant authority; and 
(b)  facilities for fire detection, fire fighting or the control of smoke must 
be installed in the building pursuant to an approval under the Act, 
the council must not grant a certificate of occupancy unless or until 
it has sought a report from the fire authority as to whether those 
facilities have been installed and operate satisfactorily. 
 
(5) If a report is not received from the fire authority within 15 business days, the 
council may presume that the fire authority does not desire to make a report. 
 
(6) The council must have regard to any report received from a fire authority under 




New South Wales Legislation 
Fire Services Act 1989 
Part 2 – Provision of fire services etc 
6 Duty to deal with fires and hazardous material incidents  
(1) It is the duty of the Commissioner to take all practicable measures for preventing 
and extinguishing fires and protecting and saving life and property in case of fire in 
any fire district. 
(2) It is the duty of the Commissioner to take all practicable measures:  
(a) for protecting and saving life and property endangered by hazardous 
material incidents, and 
(b) for confining or ending such an incident, and 
(c) for rendering the site of such an incident safe. 
 
7 General authority to protect persons and property  
(1) The Commissioner is authorised to take measures anywhere in the State for 
protecting persons from injury or death and property from damage, whether or not 
fire or a hazardous material incident is involved. 
(2) In the case of fire, it does not matter whether or not the persons are, or the 
property is, within a fire district. 
Part 3 – Fighting and preventing fires and dealing with hazardous material incidents 
Division 1 – Powers at fires and hazardous material incidents 
11 Brigades to proceed with speed to suspected fires or hazardous material incidents  
(1) When there is an alarm of fire, a fire service must, despite anything to the 
contrary in any Act, proceed with all speed to the fire and try by all possible means to 
extinguish it and save any lives and property that are in danger. 
 (2) When there is a report of a hazardous material incident, a fire service must, 




(a) proceed with all speed to the site of the incident, and 
(b) try by all possible means to render the site of the incident safe and 
save any lives and property that are in danger. 
 
The Environmental Planning and Assessment (EP&A) Regulation 2000 
144 Referral of certain plans and specifications to New South Wales fire services  
(cf clause 79F of EP&A; Regulation 1994) 
(1) This clause applies to:  
(a) a class 9a building that is proposed to have a total floor area of 2,000 
square metres or more, or 
(b) a building (other than a class 9a building) that is proposed to have:  
(i) a fire compartment with a total floor area of more than 2,000 square 
metres, or 
(ii) a total floor area of more than 6,000 square metres, 
where:  
(c) the building is the subject of an application for erection, rebuilding, 
alteration, enlargement or extension, and 
(d) the plans and specifications for the erection, rebuilding, alteration, 
enlargement or extension provide for an alternative solution to meet the 
performance requirements contained in any one or more of the Category 2 
fire safety provisions. 
(2) As soon as practicable after receiving an application for a construction certificate 
for a building to which this clause applies, the certifying authority must forward to the 
Fire Commissioner:  
(a) a copy of the application, and 
(b) a copy of the plans and specifications for the building, and 
(c) details of the performance requirements that the alternative solution is 




(d) details of the assessment methods to be used to establish compliance 
with those performance requirements, which may be delivered by hand, 
forwarded by post or transmitted electronically, but may not be sent by 
facsimile transmission. 
(3) The Fire Commissioner must furnish the certifying authority with an initial fire 
safety report for the building. 
(4) An initial fire safety report may recommend conditions to be imposed on the 
erection, rebuilding, alteration, enlargement or extension of the building to which the 
report relates. 
(5) The certifying authority must not issue a construction certificate for a building to 
which this clause applies unless:  
(a) it has received an initial fire safety report for the building and has taken the 
report into consideration, or 
(b) at least 23 days have elapsed since the plans and specifications were 
forwarded to the Fire Commissioner but no such report has been received by 
the certifying authority. 
(6) If the certifying authority does not adopt any recommendation in an initial fire 
safety report:  
(a) because the report had not been received when the construction 
certificate was issued, or 
(b) because the certifying authority does not agree with the recommendation, 
the certifying authority must cause written notice to be given to the Fire 
Commissioner of the fact that it has not adopted the recommendation and of 
the reasons why it has not adopted the recommendation. 
(7) If the certifying authority adopts any condition recommended by an initial fire 
safety report:  
(a) it must ensure that the terms of the recommended condition have been 
included in the plans and specifications for the building work, in the case of a 
condition whose terms are capable of being so included, or 
(b) it must attach to the construction certificate a condition in the same terms 




terms are not capable of being so included. 
(8) Compliance with the requirement that the terms of a recommended condition be 
included in the plans and specifications for building work is sufficiently complied with:  
(a) if the plans and specifications are redrawn so as to accord with those 
terms, or 
(b) if those terms are included by way of an annotation (whether by way of 
insertion, deletion or alteration) marked on the relevant part of those plans 
and specifications. 
(9) In this clause:"initial fire safety report" means a written report specifying 
whether or not the Fire Commissioner is satisfied, on the basis of the documents 
referred to in subclause (2):  
(a) that the alternative solution will meet such of the performance 
requirements as it is intended to meet, and 
(b) that the fire hydrants in the proposed fire hydrant system will be 
accessible for use by New South Wales fire services, and 
(c) that the couplings in the system will be compatible with those of the fire 
appliances and equipment used by New South Wales fire services. 
 
144A Compliance certificate required for certain fire safety aspects of building work  
(1) A certifying authority must not issue a construction certificate for building work 
that involves an alternative solution under the Building Code of Australia in respect of 
a fire safety requirement unless the certifying authority has obtained or been 
provided with a compliance certificate referred to in section 109C (1) (a) (v) of the Act 
that:  
(a) was issued by a person holding Category C10 accreditation under the 
Building Professionals Act 2005, and 
(b) certifies that the alternative solution complies with the relevant 
performance requirements of the Building Code of Australia. 




(a) a class 9a building, as defined in the Building Code of Australia, that is 
proposed to have a total floor area of 2,000 square metres, and 
(b) any building (other than a class 9a building) that is proposed to have:  
(i) a fire compartment, as defined in the Building Code of Australia, 
with a total floor area of 2,000 square metres, or 
(ii) a total floor area of more than 6,000 square metres, that involves 
an alternative solution under the Building Code of Australia in respect 
of the requirements set out in EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, DP4 and DP5 in 
Volume 1 of that Code. 
(3) From 1 March 2010, this clause applies to all building work that involves an 
alternative solution under the Building Code of Australia in respect of a fire safety 
requirement. 
 
152 Reports of Fire Commissioner: section 109H  
(cf clause 79M of EP&A; Regulation 1994) 
(1) This clause applies to a building to which clause 144 applies. 
(2) Unless it has already refused such an application, a certifying authority must 
request the Fire Commissioner to furnish it with a final fire safety report for a building 
as soon as practicable after receiving an application for an occupation certificate for 
the building. 
(3) If it refuses the application after making such a request but before receiving a final 
fire safety report, the certifying authority must cause notice of the refusal to be given 
to the Fire Commissioner. 
(4) Unless it has received a notice referred to in subclause (3), the Fire 
Commissioner must furnish the certifying authority with a final fire safety report for 
the building within 7 days after receiving a request for the report. 
(5) The certifying authority must not issue an occupation certificate for the building 
unless it has taken into consideration any final fire safety report for the building that 
has been furnished to it within the 7-day period. 




specifying whether or not the Fire Commissioner is satisfied:  
(a) that the building complies with the Category 2 fire safety provisions, and 
(b) that the fire hydrants in the fire hydrant system will be accessible for use 
by New South Wales fire services, and 
(c) that the couplings in the fire hydrant system will be compatible with those 







The Metropolitan fire services Act 1958 
SECT 32B. Action on alarm of fire 
(1) For the purposes of this section, the Chief Officer is responsible for the control 
and direction of all members of units in the metropolitan district. 
(2) On an alarm of fire being received by a unit, those members of the unit  specified 
by the Chief Officer must, with the appliances and equipment specified by the Chief 
Officer, proceed with all practical speed to the scene of the alarm of fire. 
(3) At the scene of an alarm of fire the senior member of the operational staff- 
   (a)  shall endeavour by all practical means to have any fire suppressed and 
any person or property in jeopardy saved; 
 
   (b)  shall have the control and direction of any unit present and of all 
        persons assisting any unit or units at the scene; 
 
   (c)  may, for the purposes of dealing with any alarm of fire, cause- 
(i)  any land building structure vessel or vehicle to be entered upon or 
into (if necessary by force), taken possession of, shored up, pulled 
down, otherwise destroyed or removed; 
(ii) any vehicle or equipment to be taken through upon or into any land 
building structure vessel or vehicle; 
(iii) water to be shut off from any main pipe or other source of supply 
in order to obtain a greater pressure or supply of water; and 
(iv) any road waterway railway or tramway to be closed to traffic or 
any main pipeline conduit or conductor of gas electricity oil or any 





(d)  may order to withdraw any persons who interfere by their presence or 
otherwise with the operation of the unit or units, and cause to be removed any 
persons who fail or refuse to comply with any such order  to withdraw; and 
(e)  may take such other measures as appear necessary for the protection of  
life and property. 
 
Country Fire Authority Act 1958 
 20 General duty of Authority 
The duty of taking superintending and enforcing all necessary steps for the 
prevention and suppression of fires and for the protection of life and property 
in case of fire and the general control of all stations and of all brigades and of 
all groups of brigades shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, so far as 
relates to the country area of Victoria be vested in the Authority. 
 
Victorian Building Regulations 2006 
PART 3—BUILDING PERMITS 
309 Requirements for permits involving fire safety matters 
(1) The report and consent of the chief officer must be obtained to an application for 
a building permit which involves any of the following fire safety matters if those 
matters do not meet the deemed to  
satisfy provisions of the BCA—  
(a) fire hydrants;  
(b) fire hose reels; 
(c) fire control centres or fire control rooms; 
(d) fire precautions during construction; 
(e) fire mains; 




(g) booster assemblies; 
(h) emergency vehicle access; 
(i) fire indicator panels; 
(j) proscenium curtain drencher systems; 
(k) Fire Services controls in passenger lift cars. 
(2) In a report under subregulation (1), the chief officer may consent to a variation of 
the requirements of the BCA if the chief officer is satisfied that a satisfactory degree 
of fire safety is achieved. 
(3) When a building permit is issued which involves the installation of fire sprinklers 
and the installation does not meet the deemed-to-satisfy provisions of the BCA the 
relevant building surveyor must forward details of the installation to the chief officer. 
PART 10—OCCUPANCY PERMITS AND CERTIFICATES OF FINAL INSPECTION 
1003 Reporting authorities for occupancy permit 
(1) The report and consent of the chief officer must be obtained in respect of an 
application for an occupancy permit— 
(a) if he or she was a reporting authority in respect of the application for the 
building permit which required the issue of the occupancy permit; or 
(b) in relation to the transmission signal of alarms required, under these 
Regulations or any previous corresponding regulations, to be connected to a 
fire station or other approved monitoring service. 
 
1015 Building surveyor to notify chief officer of issue of certificates of final inspection 
(1) If a certificate of final inspection is issued for building work in respect of which 
there is a requirement under these Regulations or any previous corresponding 
regulations that the transmission signal of an alarm be connected to a fire station or 
other approved monitoring service, the relevant building surveyor must notify the 
chief officer within 10 days after the issue of the certificate that— 




(b) the required connection has been made. 
(2) If a certificate of final inspection is issued for building work for which an 
occupancy permit is not required and the chief officer was a reporting authority in 
respect of the application for the relevant building permit, the relevant building 
surveyor must notify the chief officer within 







Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 
8B Functions of service 
The functions of the service are— 
 (a) to protect persons, property and the environment from fire and hazardous 
materials emergencies; and 
(b) to protect persons trapped in a vehicle or building or otherwise endangered, to the 
extent that the service‘s personnel and equipment can reasonably be deployed or 
used for the purpose; and 
(c) to provide an advisory service, and undertake other measures, to promote— 
(i) fire prevention and fire control; and 
(ii) safety and other procedures if a fire or hazardous materials emergency 
happens; and 
(d) to cooperate with any entity that provides an emergency service; and 
(e) to perform other functions given to the service under this Act or another Act; and 
(f) to perform functions incidental to its other functions; and 






Integrated Planning Regulation 1998  





























Summary of incident attendance 



















Auckland night 0 
   
 ~ 
Auckland night 1 
   
 PFA - FA 
Auckland night 0 
   
 ~ 
Auckland night 2 
12.6 84.6 14.9 
67.5 MVA 
- 4 persons 
trapped 
2.4 56.7 4.2 47.0 PFA - FA 
Auckland night 0 
   
 ~ 
Auckland night 0 
   
 ~ 
Wellington night 3 2.7 71.3 3.8 29.7 PFA - FA 
1.5 50.0 3.0 31.0 PFA - FA 
0.4 66.7 0.6 20.0 PFA - FA 
Auckland night 4 





1.7 70.0 2.4 42.9 PFA - FA 
3.0 67.5 4.4 44.8 house fire 
1.5 1.7 88.2 21.0 PFA - FA 
Auckland night 3 
0.9 69.6 1.3 
40.0 Rubbish bin 
fire 
2.4 67.6 3.5 
45.2 MVA 
- 1 deceased 
1.5 69.5 2.2 41.6 bin fire 
Wellington night 2 
2.1 82.1 2.6 
29.6 PFA - FA 
cooking 
























































































































1 0:00:00 0:00:21 0:01:34 0:03:49 0:05:57 0:08:35 0:12:22 0:14:04 
2 0:00:00 0:00:15 0:01:04 0:02:33 0:03:58 - 0:08:09 0:09:16 
3 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:12 0:02:22 0:03:31 0:05:04 0:06:17 0:07:13 
4 0:00:00 0:00:23 0:01:23 0:02:22 0:03:51 0:05:18 0:06:38 0:07:38 
5 0:00:00 0:00:23 0:01:29 0:03:09 0:05:27 - 0:09:51 0:11:23 
6 0:00:00 0:00:16 0:01:14 0:02:20 0:04:09 0:05:36 0:09:25 0:10:43 
7 0:00:00 0:00:27 0:01:24 0:02:36 0:04:03 0:05:39 0:07:12 0:08:25 
8 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:23 0:02:40 0:03:57 0:05:33 0:06:52 0:08:00 
9 0:00:00 0:00:20 0:06:21 0:07:48 0:09:59 0:12:47 0:16:26 0:18:15 
10 0:00:00 0:00:32 0:01:23 0:02:45 0:04:15 0:05:33 0:07:19 0:08:28 
11 0:00:00 0:00:13 0:00:53 0:02:14 0:03:29 0:04:35 0:05:53 0:06:43 
12 0:00:00 0:00:14 0:01:00 0:02:21 0:03:43 0:05:06 0:06:35 0:07:44 
13 0:00:00 0:00:16 0:01:14 0:02:09 0:03:54 0:05:15 0:09:25 0:10:41 
14 0:00:00 0:00:20 0:01:20 0:02:46 0:04:02 0:05:50 0:07:42 0:09:03 
15 0:00:00 0:00:22 0:01:24 - 0:04:54 0:06:58 0:09:23 0:10:48 
16 0:00:00 0:00:23 0:01:24 0:02:36 0:03:49 - 0:06:12 0:07:03 
17 0:00:00 0:00:21 0:01:51 - 0:06:40 0:10:04 0:13:07 0:15:10 
18 0:00:00 0:00:16 0:01:16 0:03:00 0:04:41 0:08:39 0:11:34 0:12:49 
19 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:14 0:02:20 0:04:15 0:05:43 0:09:34 0:10:55 
20 0:00:00 0:00:22 0:01:05 0:02:15 0:03:38 0:05:03 0:06:32 0:07:32 
21 0:00:00 0:00:12 0:01:10 0:02:13 0:03:43 0:05:12 0:06:43 - 
22 0:00:00 0:00:23 0:01:20 0:02:22 0:03:37 0:04:57 0:06:06 0:07:12 
23 0:00:00 0:00:39 0:01:31 0:02:46 0:04:10 0:05:39 0:07:25 0:08:29 
24 0:00:00 0:00:12 0:01:06 0:02:13 0:03:43 0:05:22 0:06:36 0:07:54 
25 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:08 0:02:17 0:03:47 0:05:26 0:06:40 0:07:56 
26 0:00:00 0:00:14 0:01:04 0:02:17 0:03:40 0:05:26 0:06:31 0:07:54 
27 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:18 0:02:34 0:04:03 0:05:26 0:06:55 0:08:08 
28 0:00:00 0:00:19 0:01:16 0:02:39 0:03:40 0:04:56 0:06:01 0:07:14 
29 0:00:00 0:00:39 0:01:28 0:02:46 0:03:58 0:05:39 0:07:19 0:08:23 
30 0:00:00 0:00:14 0:00:43 0:02:00 0:03:14 0:04:30 0:05:47 0:06:43 
31 0:00:00 0:00:26 0:01:24 0:02:45 - 0:06:36 0:08:16 0:09:38 




33 0:00:00 0:00:34 0:01:21 0:02:32 0:04:00 0:05:03 0:07:20 0:08:40 
34 0:00:00 0:00:25 0:01:33 0:02:45 0:04:02 0:05:33 0:07:08 0:08:01 
35 0:00:00 0:00:30 0:01:42 0:02:45 0:04:10 0:05:33 0:07:26 0:08:31 
36 0:00:00 0:00:20 0:01:28 0:02:45 0:04:02 0:05:33 0:07:08 0:08:22 
37 0:00:00 0:00:19 0:01:16 0:02:45 0:03:59 0:05:49 0:07:30 0:08:58 
38 0:00:00 0:00:23 0:01:18 0:02:22 0:04:21 0:05:32 0:07:04 0:08:08 
39 0:00:00 0:00:34 0:01:17 0:02:32 0:03:56 0:05:03 0:06:32 0:07:39 
40 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:10 0:02:47 0:06:49 0:11:18 0:15:31 0:17:08 
41 0:00:00 0:00:27 0:01:09 0:02:20 0:03:19 0:04:28 0:05:38 0:06:35 
42 0:00:00 0:00:12 0:01:04 0:02:20 0:04:03 0:05:43 0:09:25 0:10:51 
43 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:20 0:02:47 0:06:51 0:11:14 0:15:31 0:17:13 
44 0:00:00 0:00:18 0:01:20 0:03:23 0:06:56 0:11:20 0:15:31 0:17:10 
45 0:00:00 0:00:25 0:01:54 0:03:38 0:06:04 0:08:40 0:13:05 0:13:59 
46 0:00:00 0:00:21 0:01:43 0:03:47 0:05:46 0:08:27 0:12:08 0:13:51 
47 0:00:00 0:00:26 0:01:31 0:02:50 0:04:57 0:06:24 0:08:28 0:09:41 
48 0:00:00 0:00:23 0:01:08 0:02:33 0:03:48 0:04:59 0:06:22 0:07:23 
49 0:00:00 0:00:43 0:01:35 0:02:44 - - 0:06:03 0:06:50 
50 0:00:00 0:00:26 0:01:18 0:02:27 0:03:26 0:04:32 0:05:40 0:06:45 
51 0:00:00 0:00:26 0:01:38 0:02:58 0:03:44 0:04:43 0:05:36 0:06:21 
52 0:00:00 0:00:16 0:01:16 0:02:34 0:04:03 0:05:26 0:06:47 0:08:05 
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Table 57 Exercise A results  
Activity Minutes Seconds 
Mobilised 0.00 0 
First appliance in attendance 0.00 0 
Fire fighters dismount 0.33 20 
Breathing apparatus removed from appliance 1.10 66 
Breathing apparatus removed placed on ground ready to don 1.37 82 
Fire fighters begin search for hydrant 1.47 88 
Removal of feeder hose and starting of "standpipe shipped to 
hydrant" 1.50 90 
Reach hydrant 2.30 138 
Fire fighter 1 leave hydrant 2.83 170 
Fire fighter 1 return to truck 3.30 198 
Fire fighter 2 with feeder hose connected leave hydrant 4.40 264 
Breathing apparatus procedure starts fire fighter 1 4.73 284 
Breathing apparatus procedure starts fire fighter 2 4.82 289 
3rd/4th appliances arrive 5.00 300 
Breathing apparatus procedure, donned not started fire fighter 1 5.35 321 
Fire fighter 1 removes high rise pack from truck and carries to 
building entry point 5.37 322 
Breathing apparatus procedure donned not started fire fighter 2 5.88 353 
3rd appliance arrives and parks up 5.57 334 
Breathing apparatus procedure donned not started fire fighter 3 7.08 425 
Breathing apparatus procedure donned not started fire fighter 4 7.18 431 
Breathing apparatus procedure donned not started fire fighter 5 7.20 432 
Breathing apparatus entry control board established 
  Breathing apparatus procedure started fire fighter 1 8.73 524 
Breathing apparatus procedure started fire fighter 2 8.73 524 
Breathing apparatus procedure complete fire fighter 1 10.12 607 
Breathing apparatus procedure complete fire fighter 2 10.23 614 
Door entry practises 10.23 614 
Entrance to building made 10.68 641 
Fire fighter  3 and 4 enter building 12.37 742 
Fire fighter 1,2,3,4 enter ground floor stair 12.90 774 
Fire fighter  3,4 at head of stair  13.68 821 
Searching management room 16.40 984 
Casualty found 20.15 1209 
Casualty at head of stairs 20.98 1259 
Casualty at foot of stairs 21.67 1300 
Breathing apparatus procedure started fire fighter 5 21.82 1309 
Breathing apparatus procedure started fire fighter 6 21.82 1309 




Casualty dragged to entrance 22.65 1359 
Fire fighters leave entrance 22.90 1374 
Breathing apparatus procedure complete fire fighter 5 22.88 1373 
Breathing apparatus procedure complete fire fighter 6 24.18 1451 
Fire fighter 5,6 take in extra hose from entrance 24.65 1479 
Fire fighter 1,2 leave entrance 25.20 1512 
Fire fighter 5,6 take in extra hose from entrance arrive at foot stair 25.35 1521 
Fire fighter 5,6  enter head of stair 25.72 1543 
2 fire fighters enter rear warehouse and follow guideline 29.07 1744 
2 fire fighters reach foot of 2nd stair 30.18 1811 
2 fire fighters reach head of 2nd stair 30.53 1832 
Fire fighters reach outside of management conference room 31.58 1895 
2nd casualty reaches head of stair 33.23 1994 
2nd casualty reaches foot of stair with 4 fire fighter 's 34.13 2048 
2nd casualty reaches exit of warehouse with 4 fire fighter 's 34.92 2095 


































Table 58 Exercise B results  
Activity Minutes Seconds 
1st appliance in attendance 
  Pump  operator collects hydrant tools 0.14 14 
Fire fighter 1 removes 75 mm delivery hose 0.18 18 
Pump  operator starts to run out feeder hose to hydrant 0.38 38 
Fire fighter 1 reaches office entrance with flaked hose 0.36 36 
75 mm lp delivery hose by front door, 3x75 mm flaked lengths 1.18 78 
Pump  operator  reaches hydrant - 90 mm flaked feeder hose 
dragged across grass 57 m approx. 1.45 105 
Pump  operator  flushes hydrant 2.15 135 
Reading fire alarm panel 2.43 163 
Water supply - hydrant turned on and connected to appliance  3.03 183 
Feeder hose charged - appliance has water supply 3.36 216 
Delivery hose extended by 1 length, now 3x75 mm and 1x45 mm 4.20 260 
Fire fighter 1 and 2 start donning breathing apparatus 4.28 268 
1st breathing apparatus crew - donned and started - 'on air' 5.22 322 
Start charging deliveries 6.54 414 
Delivery charged - 3x75 mm and 1x45 mm hose 7.35 455 
2nd appliance  and aerial appliance  in attendance 7.42 462 
Fire fighter 1 and 2 in breathing apparatus enter building with 
charged jet 7.56 476 
2nd low pressure delivery at the door 13.01 781 
Fire fighter 1 and 2 reach top of stairs and door entrance 13.45 825 
2nd breathing apparatus crew enter building to advance 1st hose 
line 15.29 929 
3rd and 4th appliance  in attendance (3rd alarm) - breathing 
apparatus tender and control unit arrive and set up 20.41 1241 
1st victim/ dummy recovered at had of stairs  
 
1720 
Auckland appliance  in attendance 28.50 1730 
Dummy fire fighter rescued from 1st floor level down stairs, time 
taken at ground floor, dragged to building entry point 30.04 1804 
Exercise end 
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Table 59 FBIM computer program results for Exercise B using Australian data and 
95th percentile confidence limits 
Australasian Fire Authorities Council - Fire Brigade Intervention Model 
Version 1.03 Beta ©2010 AFAC 
Run Log for crew# 1  






Time for alarm verification 1       
An automatic direct 
 uninterrupted connection to the fire 
brigade is provided 
Time to receive call - via automatic call 2       
Time to dispatch 2       
Dressing & assimilation included in brigade 
response speeds 3       
Brigade policy response time 4       
Time to don BA 6 0 145 145 
longest concurrent safety procedure to 
complete 6 145   145 
high rise pack or similar 6 145 23 168 
longest concurrent tool obtaining procedure 
to complete 6 168 62 230 
Delay time for forced entry  5 230   230 
Delay time for door entry  5 230 10 240 
Brigade planning not documented - Time to 
resolve way-finding 5 240 30 270 
Specific activity travel in Chart 9 not 
employed  reverting to default 
Delay time for opening doors through 1 
door(s) of type Side hung door 9 270 10 280 
Time for horizontal travel  9 280 117 397 
Time for vertical travel up stairs  9 397 66 462 
Time for information gathering from FIP 5 462 30 492 
Time for OIC to travel around perimeter 7 492   492 
Based on initial assessment of fire OIC calls 
for additional resources 7 492   492 
Delay for security procedures to travel on site  8 492   492 
Road travel required on the site - 0 m @ 8 
km/h 8 492   492 
Delay for internal security procedures to 
travel on site  8 492   492 
Specific activity travel in Chart 9 not 
employed  reverting to default 
Delay time for opening doors through 1 
door(s) of type Side hung door 9 492 10 502 
Time for horizontal travel  9 502 117 619 




Adjustment for delays due to evacuation 
hindrance factor  8 685   685 
Attack hose from appliance to branch 11 685 68 752 
Time to travel horizontally with initial setup 
protection  10 752 117 869 
Time to travel up stairs with initial setup 
protection  10 869 24 893 
Commencing perimeter search of fire 
compartment 12 893   893 
Perimeter search completed 12 893 1 894 
Area search completed before arrived on 
scene 12 894   894 
Total time to make entry to upper floor   0 894   
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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@RISK Output Report for Sprinkler activation and stairs 
Performed By: NZFS User
Date: Wednesday, 28 July 2010 9:31:08 p.m.
Workbook Name FBIM High rise scenario.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 9






Minimum 917.3417 5% 1309.1035
Maximum 2700.5923 10% 1389.1644
Mean 1812.7532 15% 1457.1299
Std Dev 314.1825 20% 1509.5473
Variance 98710.6517 25% 1563.7507
Skewness 0.007032945 30% 1615.6161
Kurtosis 2.154512268 35% 1662.5696
Median 1811.1492 40% 1713.2751
Mode 1807.3417 45% 1763.5771
Left X 1309.1035 50% 1811.1492
Left P 5% 55% 1859.3794
Right X 2314.2673 60% 1911.1973
Right P 95% 65% 1959.4933
Diff X 1005.1638 70% 2013.0833
Diff P 90% 75% 2063.1793
#Errors 0 80% 2115.1317
Filter Min Off 85% 2170.2093
Filter Max Off 90% 2230.4247
#Filtered 0 95% 2314.2673
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 rest breks 0.909 0.917
2 Time to depressurise system and activate alarm0.275 0.268
3 connect hose to hydrant outlet and charge to f ire f loor:0.195 0.180
4 Firefighter stair travel speed0.156 0.152
5 Auckland appliance 1-0. 17 -0.114
6 Time to dress and leave station - CBD0.088 0.064
7 Horizontal travel time from appliance to entrance lobby-0.051 -0.063
8 Time to relay dispatch information by NZFS CAD systems0.047 0.016
9 Sprinkler activation0.035 0.017
10 ascend stairs w ith 65 mm diameter hose0.020 0.027
11 Time to remove high rise pack or similar0.016 0.020
12 Time to dismount f ire appliance and don BA0.014 0.035













@RISK Output Report for Sprinkler activation and lifts 
Performed By: NZFS User
Date: Wednesday, 28 July 2010 9:33:35 p.m.
Workbook Name FBIM High rise scenario.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 9






Minimum 796.6830 5% 946.1833
Maximum 1550.6886 10% 983.3138
Mean 1141.6187 15% 1011.0583
Std Dev 120.4170 20% 1033.9429
Variance 14500.25255 25% 1053.3798
Skewness 0.116366607 30% 1072.3154
Kurtosis 2.623780144 35% 1089.9337
Median 1138.9161 40% 1107.6388
Mode 1178.2102 45% 1122.7035
Left X 946.1833 50% 1138.9161
Left P 5% 55% 1156.8496
Right X 1341.8754 60% 1173.6683
Right P 95% 65% 1190.4709
Diff X 395.6920 70% 1207.7543
Diff P 90% 75% 1225.9028
#Errors 0 80% 1246.5162
Filter Min Off 85% 1269.9491
Filter Max Off 90% 1298.2647
#Filtered 0 95% 1341.8754
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 Time to depressurise system and activate alarm0.716 0.735
2 connect hose to hydrant outlet and charge to f ire f loor:0.508 0.497
3 Auckland appliance 1-0.306 -0.272
4 Time to dress and leave station - CBD0.230 0.209
5 Horizontal travel time from appliance to entrance lobby-0.133 -0.139
6 Time to relay dispatch information by NZFS CAD systems0.122 0.102
7 Sprinkler activation0.090 0.067
8 ascend stairs w ith 65 mm diameter hose0.0 3 0.054
9 Time to remove high rise pack or similar0.042 0.035
10 Time to dismount f ire appliance and don BA0.036 0.044













@RISK Output Report for Smoke detector activation and lifts 
Performed By: NZFS User
Date: Wednesday, 28 July 2010 9:35:14 p.m.
Workbook Name FBIM High rise scenario.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 9






Minimum 436.6715 5% 556.1802
Maximum 995.3719 10% 579.5643
Mean 682.1187 15% 597.7174
Std Dev 82.0932 20% 611.3545
Variance 6739.295231 25% 623.4207
Skewness 0.361647667 30% 633.8218
Kurtosis 2.950060728 35% 644.5302
Median 676.0330 40% 654.8508
Mode 662.2466 45% 665.2964
Left X 556.1802 50% 676.0330
Left P 5% 55% 686.8305
Right X 826.2678 60% 698.4005
Right P 95% 65% 710.3426
Diff X 270.0876 70% 722.6249
Diff P 90% 75% 734.9016
#Errors 0 80% 750.7699
Filter Min Off 85% 768.5844
Filter Max Off 90% 792.2406
#Filtered 0 95% 826.2678
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 connect hose to hydrant outlet and charge to f ire f loor:0.745 0.750
2 Auckland appliance 1-0.449 -0.410
3 Time to dress and leave station - CBD0.337 0.314
4 Horizontal travel time from appliance to entrance lobby-0.194 -0.173
5 Time to relay dispatch information by NZFS CAD systems0.180 0.151
6 ascend stairs w ith 65 mm diameter hose0.078 0.090
7 Time to remove high rise pack or similar0.061 0.042
8 Time to dismount f ire appliance and don BA0.053 0.074
9 Smoke detector activation0.008 0.007
10 Time delay for alarm verif ication0.000 0












@RISK Output Report for Smoke detector activation and lifts 
Performed By: NZFS User
Date: Wednesday, 28 July 2010 9:35:17 p.m.
Workbook Name FBIM High rise scenario.xlsx
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations 10000
Number of Inputs 19
Number of Outputs 9






Minimum 436.6715 5% 556.1802
Maximum 995.3719 10% 579.5643
Mean 682.1187 15% 597.7174
Std Dev 82.0932 20% 611.3545
Variance 6739.295231 25% 623.4207
Skewness 0.361647667 30% 633.8218
Kurtosis 2.950060728 35% 644.5302
Median 676.0330 40% 654.8508
Mode 662.2466 45% 665.2964
Left X 556.1802 50% 676.0330
Left P 5% 55% 686.8305
Right X 826.2678 60% 698.4005
Right P 95% 65% 710.3426
Diff X 270.0876 70% 722.6249
Diff P 90% 75% 734.9016
#Errors 0 80% 750.7699
Filter Min Off 85% 768.5844
Filter Max Off 90% 792.2406
#Filtered 0 95% 826.2678
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 connect hose to hydrant outlet and charge to f ire f loor:0.745 0.750
2 Auckland appliance 1-0.449 -0.410
3 Time to dress and leave station - CBD0.337 0.314
4 Horizontal travel time from appliance to entrance lobby-0.194 -0.173
5 Time to relay dispatch information by NZFS CAD systems0.180 0.151
6 ascend stairs w ith 65 mm diameter hose0.078 0.090
7 Time to remove high rise pack or similar0.061 0.042
8 Time to dismount f ire appliance and don BA0.053 0.074
9 Smoke detector activation0.008 0.007
10 Time delay for alarm verif ication0.000 0





Summary Statistics for Smoke detector activation and lifts
Simulation Summary Information
